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












THE

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PRINCETON  
REVIEW.

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By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

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FIFTY-SEVENTH YEAR.


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## GROUNDS OF KNOWLEDGE AND RULES FOR BELIEF.

**T**HAT there is at present a sceptical tendency of the public mind no one can doubt. With many, perhaps with most, this is, as yet, simply a tendency, a drift, a state of doubt sufficient to paralyze effort rather than positive unbelief or misbelief.

How far this is honest it is difficult to say, because an attitude of doubt, as well as of scepticism, is so often assumed from indolence, or fashion, or hostility to truth, or from its supposed implication of superior discernment. With such, discussion can be of no avail. It is only with honest doubt that we wish to deal. That is to be respected and even encouraged because it springs from a desire to know the truth. Let that be well noted. No doubt is honest that does not spring from a paramount desire to know the truth. Such doubt neither can nor ought to be removed except by presenting adequate grounds of belief, and those that shall be seen to be adequate. If there be such grounds, they can be shown. If not, the doubt should abide. No belief can rest on a ground that is stable for him who holds it, if it be not a ground which he himself sees to be adequate. Let me then invite you to accompany me in an inquiry after the grounds of knowledge and some rules for belief.

But if we are to go on together, you and I, we must start from common ground. We must either have no beliefs at all, in which case we cannot go on, or we must have common beliefs the grounds of which are either known or assumed to be adequate. What common ground, then, have we? To begin at the beginning, this: In writing I shall assume that I exist, and shall ask of you to assume the same thing. Again, in reading,

you will assume that you exist, and I will reciprocate your courtesy and assume the same thing. We shall then have common ground, I assuming my own existence and yours, and you assuming your own existence and mine. It will then be suitable for us to proceed and inquire what is involved in this existence, and also what other beings exist and what is involved in their existence.

But we must first inquire what right we have to assume that we exist. What right have I, who write this, to assume that I exist? Do I know it? and if so, how? I know it because it is so involved in my thinking that I *must* know it. I do not infer it, but know my thinking and myself in one concrete act. I know myself as thinking. I know it by necessity. Except on this knowledge I cannot use the word I. It is so involved in all that I do that I can have no right to do anything without it. What right can a man who does not know that he exists have to be talking and acting as if he did? It would be an impertinence that could not be suffered. We are then compelled to know that we exist. It is not a matter of choice or of will. If we claim to deny or to doubt it, the very denial or doubt assumes it. But if an assumption thus by necessity be not equivalent to certainty, nothing can be certain, and then we have no basis for proceeding at all.

It should be fully understood, as it has not always been, that in beginning our inquiries we are shut up to the necessity either of beginning with certainty—that is, with knowledge—or of having no right to begin at all. This is obvious; for if a man were to say, "I am not certain that I exist, I doubt it," he might be asked, "Are you certain that you doubt?" If he were to say "Yes," that would be to begin with certainty. If he were to say "No," we should ask him what right he has to be troubling people with his doubts before he is certain he has them. We should certainly require him either to keep on doubting till he should become certain of his doubts, or to hold his peace.

This certainty of our own being which we must thus have to start with is said by some to be from consciousness, and by others from self-evidence, but I do not see that anything is gained by interposing these two words or either of them. I



prefer to say simply that I know my own existence in the act of knowing; that is, that the power of knowing, and of knowing myself as knowing, is a primitive original power of my mind of which no account can be given except that it is. Thus do we, by a subjective necessity, know being, and also the existence of a being that knows itself to be. Does any one deny this in regard to himself? We cannot prove it to him, but it will matter little to us whether he exist or not, since, as we have seen, he commits logical suicide, and we have only to bury him decently and pass on.

In thus reaching at once the fact of being we reach that which probably no finite being can comprehend. That anything should be must forever remain a mystery, and the mystery which underlies one form of being is as great as that which underlies any other. How being of any kind came to be, or that there should be being that never did come to be, we cannot comprehend. This is well expressed by Coleridge in his rhapsodical way. "Hast thou," says he, "ever raised thy mind to the consideration of *EXISTENCE*, in and by itself, as the mere act of existing? Hast thou ever said to thyself thoughtfully, *IT IS!* heedless in that moment whether it were a man before thee, or a flower, or a grain of sand? Without reference, in short, to this or that particular mode of existence. If thou hast indeed attained to this, thou wilt have felt the presence of a mystery which must have fixed thy spirit in awe and wonder. The very words, *There is nothing!* or, *There was a time when there was nothing!* are self-contradictory. There is that within us which repels the proposition with as full and instantaneous a light as if it bore evidence against the fact in the right of its own eternity. Not *TO BE*, then, is impossible; *TO BE*, incomprehensible."

That all men must thus know being is clear, but how far they all consider it thoughtfully, and attain to the wonder spoken of by Coleridge, is not so clear. The capacity for this reflex thought and wonder all have, but the thought and the wonder probably all do not have. With some these appear early, and the mysteriousness of this being of ours and of all connected with it comes over them with an overwhelming power. But whether evolved in all or not, we find in this capacity a clear

line of distinction between man and the brutes. No brute has the capacity to think of "existence in and by itself," or of being that never began to be, and of course has not the capacity of wonder connected with such thinking. To the brute, and also to many persons, that things should be as they are is a matter of course, and if they are surprised or wonder, it is not that anything is, but that something is different from what it has been accustomed to be. To be surprised at what is new has its use in the mechanism of a being related to time. It puts it on the alert to guard it against danger in new combinations; but a capacity to wonder at being, of necessity coeval with a past that had no beginning, can have no relation to the wants of time. It must belong to a being capable of apprehending infinity, and who, if not related to that duration which has had no beginning, is yet ready to be swept on in the current of that which has no end.

Having thus by necessity, or, if you please, by reason, or inspiration, or transcendently, but at any rate by necessity, and with no intervention of the will, a knowledge that we exist, what else do we know in the same way? We know in the same way all those things in regard to which a distinction can be made between the order of time and the order of nature, and which are first in the order of nature. Thus, in knowing our own existence we know first in the order of time our thought, and then we know that in the order of nature our existence must have been before our thought. The thought we know directly; existence or being we know in knowing the thought. It is thus that we know space in knowing body, time in knowing succession, and cause in knowing events. With the ideas thus given there are truths immediately connected: as, that every body must be in space, and every event must have a cause. These we believe by necessity; not by necessity as an agent, but we are so constituted that we necessarily believe them. These ideas and truths are a class by themselves. The ideas are given and the truths known by what is called the reason, and are essentially different from single truths immediately known by sense or intuition. By Reid they were called principles of common-sense, and by Dugald Stewart fundamental laws of belief. By some they have been called transcendental ideas

and truths, and there is in them all there is that is solid of the nebulous transcendentalism that has been in our sky for the last fifty years. These ideas and truths are involved in our several mental processes as mathematical axioms and mere intuitions are not. Hence they are a different logical element, are of much greater importance, and should alone be ranked as first truths.

The truths of this class, and the same may be said of mathematical axioms, are first seen in some particular instance, but pass at once into a general form. This they do by a process of what may be called extension, but it is so elementary that it has not received a name. Naturally, and almost universally, the terms generalization and induction have been applied to processes in which these ideas and truths are involved, but they are misleading. The logical principle is not the same. In generalization and induction the underlying principle is resemblance, and through them absolute certainty cannot be reached; but here the underlying principle is identity, and we are as certain of the general as of the particular truth. As soon as we understand the terms we know at once, with no repetition of instances, that every body must be in space as certainly as we know that one body is in space. And so of causation. We are as certain that every event must have a cause as we are that one event has a cause. By applying generalization and induction in this connection we either give to those processes a validity that does not belong to them, or cast suspicion upon a process that gives certainty.

Having admitted the stupendous fact that we are—that is, of being—we can know nothing *a priori* of the forms in which being may manifest itself. We can only know those forms as they are revealed to our immediate knowledge in the manifestations of our own being, and to our observation in the manifestations of other beings or forms of being. Does our being reveal itself in the form of feeling? Then we know what feeling is, just as we know what knowing is when it reveals itself in the form of knowing. Does it reveal itself in the form of choice and volition? Then do we know what choice and volition are in the same way. In general it may be said that we know immediately and necessarily every essential mode, as memory or

imagination, in which our being spontaneously, and so necessarily, manifests itself.

And here it is to be observed that we have a knowledge of facts that do not admit of verification. The knowledge must be taken for what it is worth, but the peculiarity of it is that if it be not implicitly received no other knowledge can have any basis. No man can verify the fact that he exists by any assertion or mode of action that does not imply his existence, or that is more evident; and if he deny or doubt that he exists, he can have no right to affirm anything else. This class of truths, then, whatever they may be, admit neither of denial, nor of proof, nor of verification. Alarm has been expressed recently in some quarters because the facts and evidences of Christianity do not admit of verification. Science, it is said, requires this; and it is supposed that what cannot offer this may be overthrown by science, or, at least, can furnish no adequate ground for belief. But, to say nothing of historical truths universally that can never be repeated, and so cannot be verified as experimental facts can, before being alarmed about the overthrow of any class of truths by science or philosophy it may be well to inquire how far they are the very truths without which there could be no science and no philosophy. If by verification anything more is meant than an adequate ground of belief of whatever kind, we cannot rationally believe that such a man as Napoleon Bonaparte ever lived.

We have, then, each for himself, a certainty of our own existence, and also of those forms of our existence in which it spontaneously or, which, as related to our will, is the same thing, necessarily reveals itself. Immediately and necessarily do we know ourselves not only as knowing and feeling, but as choosing, as free, as under a sense of obligation and of responsibility; and the more we reflect on this original and necessary form of knowledge the more importance we shall attach to it. It belongs implicitly and unreflectingly to all men, and constitutes that great deep of their convictions which, however its surface may be ruffled and even tossed by philosophic speculations, abides essentially the same and undisturbed from age to age. This knowledge, equally the property of all, equally valid for all, it is the business of the philosopher to eliminate, to bring



into distinct consciousness, and state precisely what it is. At this point philosophers may differ. They may even deny that there is such knowledge at all, but meantime the world goes on, and the philosophers with it, believing these truths, and showing that they believe them by acting upon them. It is, indeed, a good criterion of these truths that those who deny them not only do, but must, act upon them. He who denies his own existence must act as if he existed; he who denies the existence of space cannot move without implying it. The truth is he cannot deny them without falling into absurdity, and the fact that he thus believes them by necessity detracts nothing either from his freedom or his dignity.

We have now ground to stand on. We know our own existence and those spontaneous modes of its manifestation by which we are men in distinction from other beings. We know them with a certainty that admits of no question. But knowing these things thus, do we know with the same certainty the existence of substantive being that is not ourselves? With the same certainty I think we do, but not in just the same way. We know intuitively and necessarily that there is that which resists motion originated by us, and it is from such resistance that we gain our original idea of matter. If there be not that which resists motion, involving the ideas of inertia and of incompressibility, we can have no idea of matter; but if there be, and we find it, then do we find something that is not ourselves, but that stands over against ourselves. This gives us the substance of an external world which may be clothed with attributes presented to the senses, and may become the cause of sensations purely subjective in us, and which, but for the power of motion, could never have been known as having a corresponding object. Thus, as it is by the power of thought that we know ourselves to be, so it is by the power of originating motion, and by the power of something out of ourselves to resist motion, that we know a world of matter to be. This power to originate motion is not inferred, but is immediately known, for it is, no less than the power of thought, an original mode of the manifestation of our being, and one that is among the first to reveal itself. This immediate knowledge of matter is the natural realism of Hamilton. Perhaps it may be

questioned whether our knowledge of the existence of matter comes in this way, but that it comes necessarily in some way I must believe, for if not the existence of matter cannot be proved, and yet all men act upon it with the same certainty as upon their own existence.

In gaining as above a knowledge of matter we have also by necessity two ideas which play an essential part in all our ideas and speculations concerning it. These are the ideas of force and of motion. We have them by necessity because force is a mode in which our being necessarily manifests itself. Force is that which originates, or tends to originate, motion; and motion, or resistance to motion, is the only mode in which force is revealed. That which originates motion, and, so far as we know, that only, is volition. We know ourselves as originating motion by volition. In all other cases the immediate antecedent and, as we say, cause, though it be but a second cause, is a body in motion; and motion once originated may be itself perpetuated or transferred from one body to another apparently without limit. And here we may notice an analogy between force and motion on the one hand, and thought and language on the other; for as motion is the expression of force, so is language the expression of thought; and as force, once originated and expressed in motion, perpetuates itself and can be communicated from one body to another apparently without limit of either space or time, so thought expressed in language may be communicated from one mind to another and may be perpetuated forever. Force and thought—through these the universe was constructed and is permanent in a perpetual ongoing. Motion and language—through these force is known and thought understood.

We have then, as I hope my reader will agree with me if he has accompanied me so far in these dry discussions, a kind of knowledge which no man can verify, and of the validity of which no man can doubt without committing logical suicide. This knowledge is not science or philosophy. It is the prerequisite and underlying condition of all science and of all philosophy. The extent of this knowledge, which all men not only may have but must have, I do not now claim to give, but only affirm that such knowledge there must be, and specify some things thus known.

In regard to this knowledge I have just said I hoped you, my reader, would agree with me, but am reminded that as yet you exist only by courtesy, and I proceed to inquire whether I have the same right to assume and the same ground for assuming your existence, or that of any other man, that I had for assuming my own existence, or the existence of matter. I think not. Perhaps the certainty may be as perfect, but the ground is not the same. Let us see. When I affirm that you exist, I do not merely affirm that something exists besides myself. That I might know by perception, which I hold to be a method of immediate and necessary knowledge. Through that I might get a knowledge of certain bodies as organized and having physical properties, but those bodies would not be *you*. If your body were never to be moved except by external force, I should not know that you exist. It is, then, through the perception of motion originating from yourself that I know that you exist; through that only. But the validity of this knowledge depends on two assumptions. One is that the motion has a cause, thus bringing in the fact of causation as a necessary element of our thinking. The other is that we can judge from the motion of the nature of the cause. This postulate has no name. It is not mentioned as a law of our thinking as the law of causality is, but it is not less universally accepted or less uniformly acted upon. If, then, I see in an organized body movements that tend to the good of the individual and of its species with little or no power of adapting those movements to new combinations and varying conditions, I judge that the cause within is a being possessed of instinct only. If I see movements wild and aimless, indicating recklessness of the proprieties of time and place and a disregard of the welfare of the being himself and of others, I say that the cause within is a being who is crazy. But if I see movements, some of them resulting in rational discourse, and others showing an apprehension of varying relations and a comprehension and choice of worthy ends, then I necessarily interpret those movements by the knowledge I have already gained of myself, and say that there exists back of the movements a rational and personal cause. If, therefore, my reader, you will assent to the propositions I have been seeking to establish by but a slight nod of the head, I will not only assume that you exist, but that you exist as a

rational and sensible person; and if you do thus assent, I am sure you will assume that I exist in the same way.

But here it may be asked, If it be in this way that we come to the knowledge of the existence of our fellow-men as personal beings back of their movements, but whom we never really see, why do we not have the same evidence of the being of a personal God back of the movements of nature?

The problem is the same. In each case we pass from a direct apprehension of movement to that which lies back of it; and if the movements of nature gave evidence of their origin in one personal being equal to that given by the movements of our fellow-men, our evidence for the existence of God would not only be of the same kind, but would be equal to that for the existence of our fellow-men. But the evidence is not equal, and for several reasons.

One is that no one source reveals itself to the senses from which the movements of nature emanate. The stone falls, the smoke ascends, the heavenly bodies revolve, the tides come and go, and we do not readily trace these movements to one source. This diversity of movement and of the operations in nature, together with the marked division of what we see into the heavens, the earth, and the ocean, led those who did not like to retain God in their knowledge to a fanciful polytheism.

Again, there is not only great diversity of movement in nature, but an apparent opposition of tendencies. Vegetable life and warmth and moisture tend in one direction, the creeping frost and blight and mildew tend in another. The instinct of the hare tends to its own preservation, that of the dog to its destruction. We have on the one hand the beneficence of nature; on the other, we have tornadoes and floods and earthquakes. This apparent opposition of tendencies has led men to believe in two beings, one good and the other evil, and sometimes to the worship of the evil one.

Again, the movements in nature are by general laws, and so far as they are wholly so seem to be impersonal. They make no exceptions and pay not the least regard to character or to the interests of sensitive beings. When we come to understand it we can see the necessity and wisdom of this as a condition for the training of free and responsible beings; but on the face of



it there is a uniformity and blind persistence in these movements, or, as they are sometimes called, laws, indicating a force behind that is instinctive and necessitated rather than one that is rational and free. Hence, on the part of those who look too exclusively in this direction, a belief in an impersonal principle as back of all movement in nature, and in pantheism.

Some force back of the movements of nature we must admit. All do admit. And knowing the universe as we do now in its unity, and in the universality and perfection of its contrivances and adaptations, we say that we have as much evidence for a contriving and adaptive power lying somewhere and somehow behind it as we have for such a power lying behind the works and the movements of man. We say, too, that there is thought in nature, as distinct from contrivance. The conception of a tree must have preceded the tree, and that is a thought and not a contrivance. The same is true of the different organized beings in nature in their orders and species, so that nature is full of thought as well as of contrivance. We have, therefore, as much evidence of a thinking force back of the structures formed by nature as we have of such a force back of those formed by man.

But force, contriving force, thinking force—these are not God. No, we know God as God only as we know him in his moral attributes, and we can know him in these only as we know him through our own moral nature. As a God possessed of force, we know him as we are possessed of force. So only. As a God of contrivance and of thought, we know him only as we are possessed of contrivance and thought; but as a holy Moral Governor and as a God worthy to be worshipped and obeyed, we know him only as we have a moral nature and a capacity for love and worship and obedience. With such a nature, if men would take themselves into the account as they logically should, and if there were no mists from a wrong moral state, I think they would grow up in a recognition of “the invisible things of him” as readily and as uniformly as of each other. The step from a created moral and personal being to a moral and personal creator would seem immediate and imperative, and men would feel that their knowledge of God rested on certain ground. This could be, however, only through the normal action of the moral and spiritual powers, and might be prevented by wickedness.

That there are those, as Cousin, who place the existence of God among first truths, and so preclude the possibility of atheism, I know. But to this I cannot assent. Neither do I think that the belief of all those who believe in the existence of God rests wholly on argument, or on evidence that may be called scientific. Such evidence must depend wholly on the intellect, and must be the same for all. But we are not dealing here with uniformities, which alone can be the basis of science, but with personal beings where there may be, on one side, more or less power of vision according to the moral state, and, on the other, fuller or less full manifestation. Here we have, as I think, an element not sufficiently taken into the account in what is said of the ground of the belief among men for the being of God. It seems wholly rational that He in whom we live and move and have our being may have ways of revealing his own being to us as our moral nature becomes quickened, so that while the direct knowledge of God may be to one man as the dim twilight, it may be to another as the clear shining of the noonday. "The pure in heart shall see God." To many in their favored moments, I have no doubt, the being and presence of God are as evident as that of the sun in the heavens, and far more vital, while the same person may, perhaps, say at another time, "Oh that I knew where I might find him!" This is the scriptural view, and this alone accounts for the varying attitude of the human mind in regard to this belief. It shows the possibility of atheism through the torpidity or perversion of the moral powers, and makes a place for that judicial blindness of which the Scriptures speak: "If the light that is in you be darkness, how great is that darkness!" I suppose it may even become the darkness of atheism.

We have now found the ground on which we know the fact of our own existence and of its essential manifestations, on which we know the existence of matter, of our fellow-men, and of God. In speaking of these, some would call them grounds of belief rather than of knowledge. These terms are often used interchangeably in this connection, and perhaps unavoidably; but, as far as may be, knowledge should be used to indicate certainty, and belief a conviction based on a balance of probabilities in favor of what is believed, but falling short of certainty. For such beliefs, which are for the most part those with which

we are occupied in practical life, it remains to lay down certain rules that we may know what to believe, or at least on what grounds we may or may not, in any case whatever, found a rational belief.

First, then, we are not to believe, and cannot believe, a contradiction or an absurdity.

A contradiction may be made by two propositions mutually opposed, and then we cannot believe both, or by a single proposition that asserts the union of qualities that we know to be incompatible. We cannot believe that it both rains and does not rain at the same time and place, or that the same figure can be both round and square. From the imperfection of language it is not always easy to distinguish between a contradiction and a paradox. When the apostle Paul says of himself that he had nothing and yet possessed all things, it seems to be a contradiction, and yet there is a sense in which it was true. We need, therefore, before pronouncing a proposition to be a contradiction, to be sure that we fully understand its subject, and also that the words, in the connection in which they are used, are susceptible of but a single meaning. An absurdity is any proposition that is opposed either to a first truth or to a mathematical axiom or demonstration. No one can believe there can be a body that is not in space, or that the whole is not equal to the sum of its parts.

Second. We are not to believe a proposition unless it is more rational to believe it than not to believe it.

To the extent implied in this proposition I am a rationalist. Rationalist is a good name perverted. As now used it involves a claim by those who adopt it to be more fully guided by reason than others, and that we do not allow. I believe in reason. I say with Bishop Butler, "Let reason be kept to, but let not such poor creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call this reasoning." I believe in the capacity and duty of reason to judge of the evidence for anything claiming to be a revelation from God. Also, that reason has the capacity to judge, and ought to judge, what is the meaning of anything thus claiming to be a revelation. But when anything has been accepted as a revelation and its meaning ascertained, then I hold that it is the business of reason, as reason, to believe it. This I

hold on the ground that confidence in the God who gave us our faculties ought rationally to be as great as in the faculties themselves. Certainly if we cannot trust him we cannot trust the faculties given by him. But this rationalism does not say, and I hold that in saying it we are more rational than rationalism. As some of old "professing themselves to be wise became fools," so we think that rationalists, professing themselves to be rational, become irrational.

Third. We are not to believe what we do not understand.

By this I mean that in order to assent to a proposition we must know its meaning, and also its application in the connection in which it stands. This may seem self-evident, but needs to be stated as a guard against nonsense and an indefiniteness that amounts to the same thing. Too often ignorance conceals itself and puts on an air of profoundness by the use of indefinite terms, or of terms in such relation that they convey no definite meaning. When Hegel says, and makes it the starting-point of his system, that "thought and being are identical," the words are familiar and the sentence is simple, but it conveys no meaning whatever to my mind. The terms are incongruous and the relation impossible, but the incongruity is concealed by the indefiniteness of that most indefinite of all terms, being, while the sentence has as little meaning as the proposition that a thought and a horse are identical, a horse being a particular form of being. So, too, when Mr. Herbert Spencer says that "life is a continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," and asks me if I believe that, I say to him that sight is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations, and ask him if he believes that. The trouble with this definition, which is equally applicable to hearing, the boiling of water, and numerous other things, I suspect to be that it does not mean anything at all, and so can be neither believed nor disbelieved. The words are familiar, they are put together grammatically; and so they are when I say that internal relations are to external relations as four to six; but no one can get any meaning from them. If it be said that there is an adjustment of things to things, I understand what is meant; but I do not understand what is meant by an adjustment of relations to relations, nor yet, further, how an adjustment of these tenuous abstractions can constitute that, whatever it may be, which

distinguishes the vast realm of organized from unorganized being. Indeed, I do not understand what is meant by internal relations or external relations, unless it be the relations of internal and external things, and then the definition of life would be, A continuous adjustment of the relations of internal things to the relations of external things—a proposition which I am unable either to believe or to disbelieve. Passages of this kind might be given indefinitely. As now before me I will simply add the definition by Hegel of “the essence as such” as it is given by Schwegeler—in a translation by President Seeley which secures its accuracy: “The essence as reflected being is the reference to itself only as it is a reference to something other.” It would be a great gain if writings which claim to be philosophical and profound could be freed from this class of propositions.

Fourth, and positively. It is rational to believe on evidence facts the causes and mode of which we do not understand.

It is this that most persons mean, or suppose they mean, when they say they will not believe what they do not understand. This, however, is not said with reference to ordinary facts where there is simple ignorance, and perhaps invincible ignorance, of their causes and modes. The grass grows, but how and why we do not know. We know its concomitants, heat and moisture; but life, its vital cause, and the mode of its action, we do not know. Still, if we do not know how it grows, we know no reason why it should not grow, and this ignorance does not stand in the way of our believing the fact. By far the larger part of the facts which we accept, we accept before understanding their causes or modes; and indeed this is the natural order. It must be so. No one hesitates to accept the fact of an earthquake or the aurora borealis who simply knows the fact and nothing more.

But there are facts in connection with which the elements of wonder and mystery come in. These come in connection with facts which seem inconsistent with all we have previously known, so much so, perhaps, that we cannot even conceive of the cause or mode of them. To a child one thing is as wonderful and mysterious as another. He does not know enough to wonder. But when a course of nature has been recognized and anything occurs that is opposed to our experience, and so opposed that its cause and mode are inconceivable to us, we wonder, there is



mystery, and it is with reference to such events that many say they will not believe what they do not understand. But this cannot be rationally said, and is less said now than formerly. To any man, however cultivated, who lived fifty years ago, the cause and mode of a communication from New York to London in half a minute, or less, would be inconceivable, and yet he might have such evidence of the fact that it would be folly not to believe it. So it is in all cases of wonder and mystery. Any fact that is possible may have such evidence that it would be folly not to believe it, and the men who undertake to say, *a priori*, what facts are or are not possible in such a universe as this may find, as has happened in some signal instances, that the fact is accomplished while they are demonstrating its impossibility.

Fifth. Each of two propositions may be so supported by evidence that it may be rational to believe both, tho we cannot reconcile them with each other.

Two statements are made to a man not an astronomer. One is that the north star is fixed, and that, as he knows by observation, the pole of the earth either does or seems to point equally towards it at all seasons of the year, thus becoming the steady friend of the fugitive and the traveller. The other statement is that the earth moves in its orbit round the sun, its axis being parallel with itself, a hundred and eighty million of miles, the distance being measured in a straight line from one extreme point of the orbit to the other. But if this be true, the pole of the earth must be directed at one time in its orbit to a point in space a hundred and eighty million of miles distant from that to which it was directed at another point, and that would seem to render it impossible that it should either point, or seem to point, equally to one fixed point. With these two statements before him, what is the man to do? Is he to say, as I once heard a man who was so far forth a rationalist, say, "The astronomers are mistaken; the star moves, and its motion corresponds to that of the earth. It must be so"? Or is he to accept both statements as true on the testimony of astronomers, and suppose there may be an element in the case of which he is ignorant? In the broadest sense of the word *rational*, taking into view the strength of the testimony that might be brought, the limitation of his faculties, and his ignorance of the subject, it would be rational to accept both statements or facts and wait



till some one should explain to him the effect of distance on parallax, and then he would not only believe both facts, but see how they may be reconciled. This instance is taken from natural science, and others might be given; but occasions for the application of this rule are more frequent in connection with the truths of revelation. Men do not see the consistency of the foreknowledge, or purposes, or decrees of God with human freedom, and so, instead of seeking candidly for the evidence of each, they reject one or the other. They do not see the consistency of the doctrine of the trinity with the divine unity, and so they reject one or the other, more commonly that of the trinity, but sometimes, virtually at least, that of the unity. Coming up as we do from entire ignorance into a universe so vast and complex as this, we ought to expect—it is folly not to expect—that the evidence for single facts which are so removed from all we have known before as to be inconceivable by us, and also for each of two facts which we cannot reconcile with each other, may be such that the only rational course will be to accept the facts and leave the mode of the facts, and of their reconciliation, to the ampler knowledge of the future.

It is more especially in connection with the last two propositions that men say they will not believe what they do not understand, meaning by that that they will not believe a fact the mode of which they cannot conceive of, or which they are unable to reconcile with some other fact. But in saying this they fail to distinguish the processes of the mind when the question *What?* is asked from those when the question *How?* is asked. When the question *What?* is asked, the mind should be governed wholly by evidence. To this there is no limitation except the avoidance of contradiction or absurdity. Whoever is sure he so comprehends the whole subject that the fact or statement in question can be seen to involve a contradiction or an absurdity, cannot believe that statement or fact. Short of that he is to be governed wholly by the evidence. For everything that is possible evidence may be supposed that should convince a rational man, and he who would limit possibility by what he himself knows is far from being rational. But in strictness the term *understand* does not apply when we deal with evidence of what has been, or is, as it does when we inquire *how* it came to be. Was my house entered last night? Yes, I have evidence of it, and

know it from the absence of my overcoat and from tracks on the floor, but *how* it could have been entered I do not understand. If, then, we apply, as we should, the term *know* to evidence, and the term *understand* to modes and causes, there is a sense in which a man may properly say he will not believe what he does not understand. The fact that his house was entered he believes on evidence, and that evidence he knows. Of the mode of the entrance he knows nothing and believes nothing.

It ought to be added that if there be modes of being or of action in this universe that we do not share, it would not be rational or philosophical to suppose that we could even conceive of them, much less understand their modes or causes. This, as we all know, is true even of the senses. One originally destitute of the sense of sight in its rudimentary organs can have no conception of color, or of any of the modes or causes of the information conveyed by that sense; and so of all the senses. If, therefore, there be, as there may be and doubtless are, in angels or in God modes of being or perception which we do not share, the fact may be made known to us by testimony; but to suppose that we can conceive of or comprehend them would be opposed to the laws of thought.

If, now, my reader, you accept the grounds of knowledge we have discussed together, and also the rules for belief, I hope you will agree with me, first, that we have firm ground to stand on; second, that we give reason its full scope; and, third, that we may find rational ground for our belief in miracles and in mysteries, unless they can be shown to be contradictory or absurd, precisely as we find it for anything else.

But if we are to believe nothing that it is not more rational to believe than not to believe, what becomes of the conflict between reason and faith? There is no such conflict, there never was, and nothing but perverseness or a marvellous stupidity could have led to the supposition that there is. Faith—that is, the faith of the New Testament—is not simple belief. It is confidence in a person, and that confidence is never to be given except on rational grounds. We have thus a faith with the warmth and might of a feeling, and yet so begotten of reason and interpenetrated by it that they can never come into conflict.

MARK HOPKINS.

## THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF ENGLAND.

**D**URING the last twenty years there has been throughout the civilized world so vital an interest in education that investigation, reform, and new methods are everywhere demanded. England and America have been concerned rather with the practical side of the science, while the Continent of Europe has been proving both theory and practice. In the hope of obtaining at no distant period strong foundations for schools preparatory to college and university work, there has been a general inquiry in the United States as to the merits of different European systems. Among other discussions in this field a distinguished writer has lately asked the question : Is the English Public School a model for Americans to imitate in similar educational establishments ? The question, being put by an Englishman who is at the same time an enthusiast for Rugby as it was reformed under the administration of Dr. Arnold, is answered in the affirmative. Mr. Hughes finds it impossible to give an exact definition of that which he recommends to us, and contents himself with giving the names and a sketch of the constitution of a number of schools which are considered by the British public as coming under the somewhat vague designation of public school. His definition is substantially this : There are nine great boarding-schools in England which for centuries have been attended by the sons of the aristocracy and gentry before entering upon the life of the universities. They are graded, and give instruction in religion, Latin, Greek, mathematics, English, and, since the passage of the Endowed Schools Act, in natural science and modern languages. Their discipline is peculiar : the general government of the school is in the hands of the instructors, but its particular control during the time not occupied by class duties is entrusted to the highest form, and personal liberty in a wide sense is

granted to all the boys. The appointment of a head-master, the management of the finances, and the supreme direction are vested in a body of trustees called the governing board. There are upwards of thirty other schools which resemble these nine in some but not in all essentials. Their foundation is of recent date, or they are destined for the sons of other classes in the community, they give prominence in their course to the requirements of polytechnic or special government schools, they have no provision for poor boys on the foundation, or are mainly attended by day-scholars.

We cannot animadvert on Mr. Hughes because he was not able to mention certain names and say: These are the public schools of which we boast. Since the time of Dr. Arnold there has been in progress a radical reform as to methods of teaching and government in the school-system of England. The great collegiate institutions could no longer disregard the demands for improvement which characterized the expression of public sentiment, and, in the confusion of almost universal change, claims to the title of public school have been put forward by at least half of the forty and more establishments to which we have referred. There was no competent court to sit in judgment on these claims, and the difficulty of finding a categorical definition for the much-used term remains insurmountable. To find a firm basis for the discussion of the question whether the English public-school system can be transplanted to America is not easy. Even if we consider three or four of the most ancient corporations with such prestige as to make their place an unquestioned one, we shall find them in a transition state. The best expedient seems to be a general consideration of the constitution of one or more of the oldest and most famous endowed institutions as modified by the changes introduced through the Royal Commission appointed in 1861, and of some one sufficient representative of the modern schools with facilities for preparing boys not only for the universities but for professional and scientific pursuits. If we can discover the points which are typical and fairly characteristic of the great schools, no charge of unfairness can be made if we make no mention of minor individual peculiarities. We shall therefore speak of Eton, Winchester, and Rugby as being the most noteworthy among the old foundations. Clifton College, near Bristol, embodies in itself all the special features

of the modern ones which of late years have come into existence as fully equipped, professed and successful rivals of their more famous sisters. These four seemed, for the reasons stated, worthy of particular attention when the writer, at the request of the president of Princeton College, spent two months of 1877 in the examination of the practical workings of the English and Scotch schools.

For boys who receive no assistance from the endowments the nominal annual charges at Eton are \$720, at Winchester \$545, at Rugby \$595, and at Clifton College \$540. Rugby extends the benefits of free tuition to upwards of sixty, and Clifton to a few, but Winchester and Eton each provide free instruction, board and lodging for at least seventy scholars, subject in Eton to an annual payment of ten and in Winchester of twenty guineas. These are the totals of the schedule fees, and do not seem exorbitant except at Eton, but they do not at all represent the necessary expense of keeping a boy at school. Extra charges are made for instruction in modern languages, any mathematics beyond the simplest, drawing, and fencing. The fare at the boarding-houses is, as a rule, sufficiently abundant, but very simple, and it is the universal custom for each boy to provide for himself any luxury which he may desire. Add to these the support of games and a little pocket-money, and the extras will amount, at a moderate estimate, to not less than \$175. When we remember that the endowments of these institutions produce from \$30,000 to \$100,000 yearly, the sum of \$800 seems a large one to pay for the enjoyment of their privileges. At all events, far the largest number of those in the United States whose birth and education prompt them to give a liberal training to their sons could not avail themselves of the advantages of any school, however fine, at such rates. There are doubtless many parents able and willing to pay even more than these prices, but they should not be required to do so. For the proof that a sound discipline both of body and mind is not necessarily accompanied by such an outlay of money we have only to look to some of our own older academies and colleges or such German gymnasia as Schulpforte near Naumburg and the Joachimsthal Alumnat in Berlin, which in their general arrangement resemble Eton and Winchester.

The distinguishing feature of English schools is the formal



control exercised by the older boys over the younger. This comprises the recognized right of the two highest classes, the sixth and upper fifth, to require certain menial services from the smallest boys, the power which is vested in the highest class of inflicting corporal punishment upon all boys below the upper fifth, and the exercise of other functions of restraint and protection which in other countries belong exclusively to the masters. Fagging and the government of the school by prepostors or prefects, to use the jargon of the school-boys, have been the subjects of a bitter controversy between different classes of Englishmen for the last thirty-five years. In one or both of these two forms this tyranny of the strong over subjects who are willing in theory but rebellious in practice is to be met with as an integral part of the life of every public school. We in America wonder that there could be two opinions on such a subject, but as yet the advocates of the system have the best of the argument and remain in possession of the field. No one denies that bullying, brutality, and gross personal outrages and indignities are the too frequent outcome of the custom; that, in the case of feeble and delicate natures, impaired health and sometimes despair and suicide have resulted from the "management" of younger boys by older ones. "No one," says Mr. Staunton, "appears to know when, or under what circumstances, this law of might sprang up in our schools; but there is something so inconceivably wrong in permitting an elder boy to exercise over a younger one a tyranny no master dare practise over either, that it is surprising public opinion has not long since put the system down." On the other hand, the advocates of fagging claim that in return for his services the fag enjoys in the oversight of his senior security and protection from other annoyances, that the advice and supervision of a large boy are invaluable to a small one entering upon the strange life of a great school, and that these benefits cannot be had by any other device. They say that the prepostors or monitors who are about to enter upon the life of the world are rendered more capable and self-restrained by the duties which they are called on to perform, that they learn to measure the responsibilities of authority and weigh the force of public opinion, and that the lessons taught by their school-fellows in

this way are as important as those which they learn from their instructors. They point to periods in the history of certain schools as proof that a head-master of strong character and piety has in the system not only an instrument for good which can be wielded to advantage, but one whose equal has never yet been discovered in any other country.

Whatever may be the views of those most thoroughly committed on either side, it is certain that, in spite of the conservatism of the aristocracy and the opinions of many head-masters who were themselves once public-school boys, there is a growing public sentiment in England against any system which formally makes boys masters over boys. The twenty-ninth and thirtieth paragraphs of the General Recommendations of Her Majesty's Commissioners appointed to inquire into the revenues and management of certain colleges and schools are as follows: "The working of the monitorial system, where it exists, should be watched, and boys who deem themselves aggrieved by any abuse of it should be able at all times to appeal freely to the head-master. *The power of punishment when entrusted to boys should be carefully guarded.* The system of fagging should be likewise watched. Fags should be relieved from all services which may be more properly performed by servants, and care should be taken that neither the time which a little boy has for preparing his lessons nor the time which he has for play should be encroached upon unduly." These paragraphs, demanding that both monitors and fagging should be carefully watched, are a sufficient admission that both are dangerous to the well-being of the institutions where they exist.

There have occurred, however, within less than a decade two most flagrant instances of cruelty on the part of older boys toward younger ones, and these in the two schools where the system virtually originated. At Winchester one of the prefects "tunded" (Anglicé flogged) a small boy so severely as to render the sufferer an invalid for a period of months and make it doubtful whether he could ever return to his school duties. The peculiar instrument with which a Winton tunding is administered is, in their parlance, a ground-ash or ash-sucker, a rod two and a half to three feet long, about as thick as a man's forefinger, and of remarkable toughness and elasticity.

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And but two years ago a little fellow in the Blue Coat school committed suicide in a fit of despondency which could be directly traced to the severity of the treatment which he had received from an older boy. The storm of invective and furious indignation which these two events aroused in the public mind will be long remembered by the readers of English newspapers. Such extreme cases are perhaps rare, but in all probability many similar ones are never heard of, and even the most enthusiastic advocates of the public schools as they have been and still are feel compelled in candor to relate the periods of dreariness and depression which constantly recur when the highest class is filled with boys too precocious to have the physical strength necessary for the requisite discipline or too indolent to control the bullies among their own number or in the class just below them. Regard for the institutions of past ages and a reverence for historical prestige are nothing less than a passion among the semi-monastic and collegiate schools and universities of England, and the survival of the fittest is a peculiarly English theory. If the civilization of our age has any chivalric meaning, it is that the weak are to be protected against the strong. There can be no doubt that eventually this sentiment will penetrate within the massive gates and cloistered recesses of even the oldest English schools and reform most thoroughly this remnant of the rule of might.

Boarders, not including the scholars and foundationers at Winchester and Eton, are entertained almost entirely on the Rugby plan. The head-master and certain of the chief classical and mathematical masters in each school are designated by the governing board as heads of houses. In these houses, which are attached to the residences of those who control them, the boys are furnished with food, a bed in one of several small dormitories, and a right to the whole or half of a small room for study. Breakfast consists of tea and coffee with bread and butter, dinner of meat and vegetables, sometimes accompanied by soup or pudding; tea is served shortly after dinner, and a supper of bread and cheese or cold meat closes the day. A half-pint of beer is often served at dinner or at supper, and sometimes at both. The numbers in each house range from forty to eighty, being generally under fifty. The beds are very

simple, and are ranged in dormitories in recesses separated from each other by partitions about five feet high. An average study is about seven feet square, furnished as the means of the occupants permit. At Eton each boy has a room to himself which is both study and bedroom, except that brothers are almost invariably put together in the same room, as they are in the same study at other schools. Harrow has a number of "small houses," with accommodations for six or seven boys, where, by the payment of some two hundred dollars more than the average yearly price of board, boys are virtually taken into the master's family. But in general an excessive freedom from magisterial supervision prevails out of school-hours, and the boarders are left entirely to their own will and the control of the "prefects" and of tradition. The strong hold of this system where it already obtains and its gradual spread are explained by this fact. The estimated profit on each boarder is from \$100 to \$125, and accordingly the income from profit on board for the head-masters of Winchester, Harrow, and Rugby is \$10,000, \$6300, and \$6385 respectively, and that of the lower masters in all the schools is in the same proportion. The boys do not complain of the quantity of the fare, but, as we have already said, the quality and variety are always largely supplemented from their pocket-money, and the pastry-cooks, sausage-makers, and confectioners in the neighborhood of the great schools thrive accordingly.

There remains still another point which characterizes all the great endowed schools, with regard to which there may certainly be two opinions—namely, the excess of examination. There are examinations for admission, class examinations, and examinations for promotion held by the masters themselves, frequent visits from examiners appointed by the universities, and "once in every year an examination of scholars by an examiner or examiners appointed for the purpose by the governors and paid by them, but otherwise unconnected with the school." Dr. Wiese states that there came under his observation a printed schedule of examination which appointed for the period between the 17th of June and the 22d of July no less than forty-four examinations for one class. "The iron of examination which has entered into the soul of the nation was

forged at Oxford and Cambridge." The business of the English school-master is likely to degenerate into setting hard questions for boys whose aim is to have their names published in class-lists as successful crammers. There is always an examination or a preparation for one in progress, and in the extended system of examining there is laid upon the school a burden of expense, upon the master a burden of wrong and vexation, and upon the boys the burden of learning by rote much material which they do not assimilate, and which they rapidly forget as soon as the occasion for using it is past. The effect upon the master is disastrous. The old methods of patient explanation and thorough teaching are falling into desuetude, and in their place is growing up a forcing system both in classical and mathematical instruction which may answer to a certain degree for the latter, but which succeeds admirably in bringing the study of the classics into general disrepute. Let us carefully avoid this extreme of over-examination. Our colleges in the first two years of their course do a portion of the work done in the upper classes of English schools. It is their duty to furnish a rigid course of instruction in the humanities without regard to a student's destination, unless America is to provide no general culture for her youth. Such provision can only be made through the resources of abundant endowments, and these our schools do not as yet possess. The training of the mind in these years is of incalculable importance to the young men themselves and to the country, and can only be properly done by the attention of a mature instructor to the individual requirements of his scholars. Such attention is difficult to secure, but surely the end is more nearly attained by a system of close oral questioning and answer combined with a running commentary from the teacher than by the constant recurrence of written trials in mental gymnastics. Written examinations have an unquestioned place in the school economy, but their function is merely a final test of ripeness. A constant employment of them defeats its own aim. They lack the element of personal contact necessary for instruction, and they cannot, if frequent, be sufficiently severe to afford trustworthy proof of proficiency. The old simile of a child's garden where the plants are rooted up every third day to see if they are growing is full of food for reflection.



It was said for many years that colleges produced a set of hollow-chested, nervous, consumptive graduates, who were totally unfit for the wear and tear of a rude, jostling world. The charge was reiterated until it was believed, and accordingly a new element has been introduced into school-life, both here and in England, namely, the systematic fostering of games and gymnastic exercises. The attention paid to this part of the "curriculum" by teachers and taught affords unlimited material to the casual newspaper jester and to those who sneer at liberal training and plead for something which they call practical education. What would be said by these cavillers if we should attempt to introduce the compulsory support of games into American schools? In England every boy is not only made to pay but also to play, and in Eton I have seen a class of lads as carefully and severely examined in swimming as in Homer. Cricket, foot-ball, fives, tennis, and, if possible, boating are carefully provided for. Expensive playing-grounds and courts for the various sports are maintained by the school-corporation and supported by an indirect tax upon each boy. Direct taxes pay for the bats, balls, and other essentials of out-door exercise. But little attention is paid to regular instruction in in-door gymnastics. The climate is so mild that there are very few days when shelter is absolutely necessary, and the place of a gymnasium is supplied as far as possible by rifle-corps and military drill. The training of the body is considered by a large majority of the masters in the great endowed schools as of equal importance with the training of the mind, and there is a sentiment far from insignificant that in the rearrangement of work a larger portion of the day should be devoted to out-door sport than to in-door work. You will be told that England needs in the sons of her gentry men of action rather than men of mere studious habits. The Duke of Wellington is said to have remarked that the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing-fields of Eton. A repetition of this sentiment will almost certainly be a part of the answer to any question as to the share of time and attention which a school-boy should give to play.

There is on the other hand much which seems worthy of imitation in the constitution of the public schools of England. It is unfortunately the hardening process, cropping out in all

the different points of policy on which we have touched, which is most frequently held up to admiration. If we cannot grow enthusiastic over these methods, whatever may be thought of the end itself, there are other characteristics which we would do well to mark. The age and social rank of their teachers is altogether different from that of the instructors in most of our classical schools. There is not as yet a recognition of teaching as a distinct profession in England any more than here, but the belief, prevalent in Germany since the time of F. A. Wolf, that it is just as individual and separate a calling as any of the other learned professions, and requires as distinct and extended a training as the pursuit of medicine, law, or theology, gains ground daily. Many men whose chosen avocation was the church, and who, as the great majority of teachers in America outside of New England still do, regarded school-teaching only in the light of a ready means of financial recuperation, have recognized the dignity of the employment into which chance threw them and devoted their lives to it. The splendid emoluments of masters in the great schools have, however, always attracted high-class men, while those of head-masterships are prizes which secure the highest ability and earnestness. The head-master at Winchester receives \$15,000; at Eton, \$22,500; at Harrow, \$20,000; and at Rugby and Clifton, from \$15,000 to \$20,000. The average income of the under-masters, who are heads of houses, is about \$5000, the variation being between \$2500 and \$7500. Such rewards attract strong men, and in this fact lies the main strength of the whole system; but admitting this truth, the endowments are so large and productive that these sums could still be realized without imposing such terms as those we have mentioned upon parents, if only all sinecures were abolished. "The head-master is the school." He gathers around him men who are in perfect sympathy with him. First-rate men do first-rate work and make a recognized place for themselves in society. Their pupils regard them as their superiors, not as equals or inferiors, and there is no necessity for that constant self-assertion and constraint which do so much to destroy the cordiality between teachers and pupils in the United States. Appointments to place are made nominally by the board of governors or trustees, but in reality by the

head-master's influence. There is no political favoritism or governmental interference. Some of the wisest English writers on the subject deplore this, but whether an extended system of governmental control, such as exists in Germany, would be feasible and advisable in Great Britain or not, our own history and traditions will compel us to follow the English example in this respect. The politicians who govern us so much to their own advantage must never be permitted to lay hands upon our schools if we are to have any deserving the name.

As to the methods of instruction in English public schools, we have not much to learn from them except in one direction. The classical teaching which characterizes the best New England academies will leaven the whole system of similar high-schools which are yet *in posse* in the United States, and it will not suffer by comparison as regards drill, accuracy, and mental training with English teaching. But there is one point in which they excel us. Together with all that we cultivate, they prize and inculcate a living acquaintance with the spirit of the classics. They read, note, and compare more than we do, with reference to the spirit of the text. The translation of idiomatic English into idiomatic Latin or Greek is an altogether different pursuit from that turning of half-digested English into a mould of grammatical English-Latin which we dignify by the name of Latin prose composition; the latter finds little or no place in an English school; the turning of real English into Latin-English, preparatory to the final step of producing a real Latin equivalent, forms the best incentive to a careful and accurate reading of Latin classics. I have heard repeatedly, during recitations on Cicero, Virgil, Horace, Sophocles, and other Greek and Latin authors, questions such as: Cite another passage in this author where a similar idea is expressed. Who else has said the same thing with greater force, and where? Has any English writer made this thought his own, and in what words? How then may we best convey the same notion in the English idiom? Such questions were not only asked, but answered by the repetition in the original of from three to ten lines word for word from the passage cited. Material gained in this way is afterwards employed in the composition of original Latin or Greek themes in which the aim is not to express English thoughts and idioms in

Latin or Greek words, but to convey ideas harmonious with the spirit of those languages in a becoming garb. Of course it is only the best minds which really profit by this mode of procedure, but the whole system of English education is not to do the greatest good to the greatest number, but to cherish the best minds, to give every opportunity to real ability for elegant culture and distinction. Not that the boy of average strength or the dullard fares badly; by no means: if he can pay his way he is pushed along through school and college and permitted to take his place in society as a gentleman, but the fact that he has taken a degree deceives no one in the belief that he is necessarily a scholar. The gifted few are not sacrificed to the common multitude, and there seems to be no systematic fostering of mediocrity simply because of negative goodness and harmlessness.

The aim of English schoolmasters has changed within the last century. They are no longer fitly characterized by the Westminster boy's translation of *arma virumque cano*, arms and a man with a cane. Their effort is not to beat a certain quantity of Latin and Greek into the dullest head, or punish with severity the slightest offence against decorum. They believe that boys who possess ability must be well taught, and in particular thoroughly examined, but that the main benefit in school-life for all must come from the formation of character and the cultivation of manliness. Everything is sacrificed to this end. Traditions empty and antiquated are cherished for the culture of a national self-confidence, a very large part of the school-day is given up to out-door sports and games as a means of producing coolness of temper and establishing health, the younger boys are fagged that the older may learn to govern and the fags to obey, and as far as possible the life of the school is made an epitome of the life of the nation in order that it may produce a small and chosen aristocracy of scholars if possible, but before all else a body of self-reliant, sturdy Englishmen, full of admiration for queen and country and loyal to church and state. If a boy give promise of becoming a Christian gentleman, the aim of the largest and most influential schools is reached. Mr. Staunton admits that "they neither furnish the best moral training nor the best mental discipline, nor the most salutary and substantial mental enrichment. They do not form the most accomplished

scholars or the most heroic, exalted, and disinterested men, but they are the theatres of athletic manners and the training-places of a gallant, generous spirit for the English gentleman. This is the highest merit claimed for them by the warmest and most discerning of their admirers."

It would be easy, if it were necessary, to show how the historical development of these great institutions is interwoven with that of the nation to which they belong. They are intensely conservative, and have been again and again outstripped by the progress of the English people, but the history of the nation is their history and its life is their life. If we are to have strong, influential, stable American academies, the same will be true of them in their relation to this nation. We cannot adopt the system of any other country or transplant an English public school, a French lyceum, or a German gymnasium to American soil. Two experiments of this sort have already been made within the century. Mr. Bancroft's school at Round Hill was founded on German models with every apparent chance for success, but he abandoned it in a few years. The excellent and successful institution at Concord in New Hampshire preserves much of the English stamp which was impressed on it at the beginning as regards externals, but in spirit and practice it is thoroughly democratic and American. The more catholic and careful our examination of foreign schools the more successful will be our results, but our method must be eclectic. We should emulate the English pedagogic in infusing more of the humanistic spirit into our teaching of the classics, our masters should be strong and gentle to produce genuine love and respect in their pupils, and we should certainly place a higher estimate on Christian character than on mere critical knowledge. These are worthy aims, but we must reach them through our own methods. We cannot tolerate fagging or the recognition of the right of older boys to inflict punishment on younger ones, nor can we afford the fearful risk of sacrificing feeble natures in the slough of school-boy morality that the strong may grow yet stronger and more independent in the absence of a rigid magisterial oversight.

But there are several other features in the English schools which seem well worthy of consideration. Hours of private tuition in which the regular masters assist one or more boys in



the preparation of the tasks set in the recitation-rooms by themselves or their colleagues were not originally contemplated as a part of the systematic work of any class. The practice originated, I believe, at Eton, and has gradually spread through other institutions, being generally recognized as a fertile and useful idea. It is a legitimate source of additional income to the teacher, and its effect on boys of average or low ability is beneficial in a marked degree. Even to the strongest it conveys a knowledge of that art the most useful to all students and the most hidden from many of them, the art of studying, while in the class-room a greater uniformity in preparation enables the instructor to avoid the common waste of time spent in explaining to one boy trifling points which are perhaps clear to all the others. If the system were so arranged with us that every boy would find in his private tutor a mentor in morals and religion and a general guardian, even greater benefits would arise from it.

The exhibitions and scholarships at the universities which are the prizes bestowed upon leaving scholars seem well fitted to strengthen the school. These are simply sums of money varying from fifty to four hundred dollars or more, payable annually to the incumbent during the three years of his university course. They are sometimes furnished from the funds of the school itself, less frequently from those of the affiliated college at the university. Prizes, generally in the form of books, are bestowed so lavishly throughout the whole course in most English schools that there is a real danger lest boys should forget to study for the sake of study, but these substantial aids to further progress in scholarship are worthy of a struggle. They have been the ladder on which many of the greatest Englishmen have climbed to eminence in church and state. Our schools are as yet too feeble for such munificence, and it seems like mockery to recommend such a magnificent example to them. But the process might well be reversed in America. Our colleges constantly complain of the preparatory academies, and their greatest effort is to scold the teachers into elevating the standard of preparation. Why should they not offer more substantial aid than mere advice, and say to some half-dozen of the schools which stand in the closest relationship to them: "We will give to a certain proportion of each class you send us material aid. We will give your first boy tuition, the use of a room, of our

library and our gymnasium, and to the others similar assistance in proportion to their scholarship and character." If the princely benefactors of our colleges would furnish the requisite funds to either schools or universities for such prizes, it would be productive of the greatest benefit in advancing polite learning and the cause of secondary education in this country.

Finally, let us regard with merited admiration the wealth of beauty which nature and art have united to bestow upon so many of the institutions which we have been considering. Winchester, Eton, Harrow, and Rugby have been able for centuries to keep the seats of their first foundations and maintain their growth by reason of the loveliness and healthfulness of their situation. The Charter-house, so familiar to us all in Thackeray's memories of it, has already been driven from London into the country. Westminster and St. Paul's both languish in numbers and reputation, and will probably soon follow. The paying public is wise in its generation, and the sons of anxious mothers will be sent to seek all the advantages which the diversified and healthy amusements and occupations of the country afford to growing boys. Winchester College is the fairest as it is the oldest of all the great schools. From its constitution all the others have gleaned more or less of their manners and customs, although it has felt and yielded in time to the influences of its daughters in many respects. Wise as William of Wykeham showed himself to be in the body of aphoristic laws and mottoes which he imposed upon his school, he was still wiser in the site which he chose and the magnificent buildings to the erection of which he gave the impulse. You may still read upon the college arms that "Manners makyth man;" you may still behold upon the school-house wall "the painted mitre and crozier, the rewards of clerical learning; a pen and inkhorn and a sword, the insignia of civil and military pursuits; and a long Winton-rod, typifying the punishment of those too indolent to devote themselves either to study or to active life"—each emblem with its appropriate legend: *Aut Disce; Aut Discede; Manet Sors Tertia Cædi*. There, too, is the *Tabula legum Pædagogicorum* with its quaint Latinized directions for the boys' behavior, "*In templo, in scholâ, in Aulâ, in atrio, in cubiculo, in oppido ad montem, in omni loco et tempore.*" The old school-room is deserted, the ethics and learning of which it is a type have given place to

widely different ones, and the old monastic regulations have been modified or have passed away. The wise founder would with difficulty recognize in the hundreds of merry, stalwart, athletic boys who swarm in "chapel-yard" and "meads" his seventy serge-clad scholars with their prim habits and grave demeanor. But the essentials of the school-life have not passed away. The grand old Gothic chapel, the shady and retired cloisters, the spacious refectory, the whole substantial and beautiful pile of the school-buildings, the wisely-invested foundations, and the breezy playing-grounds are still there. The sparkling Itchen still winds by the town, the hoary cathedral still invites to prayer and meditation, St. Catherine's Hill still offers itself for healthful rambles, and the chalky downs are still the haunts of all the forms of life which give such zest to "amateur poaching" and long country walks.

This is not the place to institute a comparison between the scenery of the mother-country and our own. Nature has been as lavish in her gifts to America as to England, but to be enjoyed she must be sought. Of all the lessons which we can learn from a consideration of the influence and power of British schools as they are, that of a careful choice of site is the most important. Our academies must be within easy reach of the centres of population, near a thrifty town if possible, but especially amid the delights of real country. Traditions will grow up in schools. We cannot disregard them, but we can mold them, and every mollifying influence which can be brought to bear upon the abnormal life of a school-boy is a clear gain. His period of probation for the active duties of the world should be a time of regular growth, as free as possible from over-work and over-excitement. No steady progress can be expected without quiet and freedom from distraction. By all means let us, at least for the greater part of the year, separate our boys from the excitement of city life, from the whirl of city streets, from the news-stands and the dangerous associations of promiscuous crowds. It is part of a liberal education to associate with beauty, whether in nature or in art, and as we cannot yet enjoy the fulness of the latter, at least let us prize and use the gifts of the former.

WILLIAM M. SLOANE.

## THE HISTORICAL PROOFS OF CHRISTIANITY.

### SECOND ARTICLE : THE MIRACLES.

THE reader will bear in mind that we are reasoning for the present on the basis of the view respecting the origin of the gospels which is commonly taken by critics of the sceptical school. Let it be assumed that one or more of the gospels resulted from an expansion of earlier documents, which included a less amount of matter ; that the traditions which are collected in the gospels of the canon are of unequal value, and that all of these books first saw the light in their present form somewhere in the course of the second century. Still it is maintained that, even on this hypothesis, the main facts at the foundation of the Christian faith can be established. In this article I propose to bring forward evidence to prove that miracles were wrought by Jesus substantially as related by the evangelists.

I. The fact that the apostles themselves professed to work miracles by a power derived from Christ makes it highly probable that they believed miracles to have been wrought by him.

The point to be shown is that narratives of miracles performed by Christ were embraced in the accounts which the apostles were in the habit of giving of his life. A presumptive proof of this proposition is drawn from the circumstance that they themselves, in fulfilling the office to which they were appointed by him, professed to work miracles, and considered this an indispensable criterion of their divine mission. There is no doubt of the fact as here stated. Few scholars now hold that the

Epistle to the Hebrews was written by Paul. Some follow an ancient opinion, which Grotius held, and to which Calvin was inclined, that Luke wrote it. Others attribute it to Barnabas. Many are disposed with Luther to consider Apollos its author. It is a question which we have no occasion to discuss here. The date of the Epistle is the only point that concerns us at present. It was used by Clement of Rome in his Epistle to the Corinthians, and therefore must have existed as early as A.D. 97. A majority of critics, including adherents of opposite creeds in theology, infer from passages in the epistle itself that the temple at Jerusalem was still standing when it was written.<sup>1</sup> Hilgenfeld, the ablest representative of the Tübingen school, is of opinion that Apollos wrote it before A.D. 67.<sup>2</sup> Be this as it may, its author was a contemporary and acquaintance of the apostles.<sup>3</sup> Now he tells us that their supernatural mission was confirmed by the miracles which they did: "God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost."<sup>4</sup> The same thing is repeatedly asserted by the Apostle Paul. "Working miracles among you"<sup>5</sup> is the phrase which he uses when speaking of what he himself had done in Galatia. If we give to the preposition, as perhaps we should, its literal sense "in," the meaning is that the apostle had imparted to his converts the power to work miracles.<sup>6</sup> In the Epistle to the Romans he explicitly refers to "the mighty signs and wonders" which Christ had wrought by him: it was by "deed" as well as word that he had succeeded in convincing a multitude of brethren.<sup>7</sup> How, indeed, we might stop to ask, could such an effect have been produced at that time in the heathen world by "word" alone? But in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians he reminds them that miracles—"signs and wonders and mighty deeds"—had been wrought by him before their eyes; and he calls them "the signs," not of *an* apostle, as the authorized version has it, but of "the apostle."<sup>8</sup> They are the credentials of the

<sup>1</sup> See Heb. viii. 3, ix. 4, vii. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Heb. ii. 3.

<sup>3</sup> ἐνεργῶν δυνάμεις ἐν ὑμῖν, Gal. iii. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Rom. xv. 18-20.

<sup>5</sup> Einl. in d. N. Test. p. 383.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. ver. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Lightfoot, and Meyer, *ad loc.*

<sup>8</sup> 2 Cor. xii. 12.



apostolic office. By these an apostle is known to be what he professes to be. In working miracles he had exhibited the characteristic marks of an apostle. The author of the book of Acts, then, goes no farther than Paul himself goes when that author ascribes to the apostles "many wonders and signs."<sup>1</sup> It is in the highest degree probable, in the light of the passages quoted from Paul, that if he and Barnabas were vindicating themselves and their work, they would declare, as the author of Acts affirms they did, "what miracles and wonders God had wrought among the Gentiles by them."<sup>2</sup> Now we advance another step. In each of the first three gospels the direction to work miracles forms a part of the brief commission given by Christ to the apostles.<sup>3</sup> If the apostles could remember anything correctly, would they forget the terms of this brief, momentous charge from the Master? This, if anything, would be handed down in an authentic form. In the charge when the apostles were first sent out, as it is given in Matthew, they were to limit their labors to the Jews—to "the lost sheep of the house of Israel." They were not even to go at that time to the Samaritans. This injunction is a strong confirmation of the exactness of the report in the first evangelist. Coupling the known fact that the working of miracles was considered by the apostles a distinguishing sign of their office, with the united testimony of the first three gospels—the gospels in which the appointment of the Twelve is recorded—it may be safely concluded that Jesus did tell them to "heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils." He told them to preach and to verify their authority as teachers by this merciful exertion of powers greater than belong to man. Is it probable that he expected them to furnish proofs of a kind which he had not furnished himself? Did he direct them to do what they had never seen him do? Did he profess to communicate to his apostles a power which he had given them no evidence of possessing?

## II. Injunctions of Jesus not to report his miracles, it is

<sup>1</sup> Acts ii. 43, cf. iv. 30, v. 12, xiv. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Acts xv. 12, cf. ver. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. x. 1, 8; Mark iii. 15; Luke ix. 2 (cf. Luke x. 9).

evident, are truthfully imputed to him ; and this proves that the events to which they relate actually took place.

It is frequently said in the gospels that Jesus enjoined upon those whom he miraculously healed not to make it publicly known.<sup>1</sup> He was anxious that the miracle should not be noised abroad. For instance, it is said in Mark that in the neighborhood of Bethsaida he sent home a blind man whom he had cured, saying, "Neither go into the town, nor tell it to any in the town."<sup>2</sup> The motive is plainly indicated. Jesus had to guard against a popular uprising, than which nothing was easier to provoke among the inflammable population of Galilee. There were times, it costs no effort to believe, when they were eager to make him a king.<sup>3</sup> He had to conceal himself from the multitude. He had to withdraw into retired places. It was necessary for him to recast utterly the popular conception of the Messiah, and this was a slow and almost impossible task. It was hard to educate even the disciples out of the old prepossession. Hence he used great reserve and caution in announcing himself as the Messiah. He made himself known by degrees. When Peter uttered his glowing confession of faith, Jesus charged him and his companions "that they should tell no man of him"—that is, they should keep to themselves their knowledge that he was the Christ.<sup>4</sup> The interdict against publishing abroad his miracles is therefore quite in keeping with a portion of the evangelic tradition that is indubitably authentic. On the other hand, such an interdict is a thing which it would occur to nobody to invent. It is the last thing which contrivers of miraculous tales (unless they had before them the model of the gospels) would be likely to imagine. No plausible motive can be thought of for attributing falsely such injunctions to Jesus, unless it is assumed that there was a desire to account for the alleged miracles not being more widely known. But this would imply intentional falsehood in the first narrators, whoever they were. Even this supposition, in itself most unlikely, is completely shut out, because the

<sup>1</sup> Matt. ix. 30, xii. 16, xvii. 9 ; Mark iii. 12, v. 43, vii. 36, viii. 26, ix. 9 ; Luke v. 14, viii. 56.

<sup>2</sup> Mark viii. 56.

<sup>3</sup> John vi. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Mark viii. 30 ; Luke ix. 21.

prohibitions are generally said to have proved ineffectual. It is commonly added in the gospels that the individuals who were healed of their maladies did not heed them, but blazed abroad the fact of their miraculous cure. Since the injunctions imposing silence are authentic, the miracles, without which they are meaningless, must have been wrought. It is worthy of note that when the maniac of Gadara was restored to health, Jesus did not lay this commandment on him. He sent him to his home, bidding him tell his friends of his experience of the mercy of God.<sup>1</sup> Connected with the narratives of miracles, both before, and just after in the same chapter,<sup>2</sup> we find the usual charge not to tell what had been done. Why not in this instance of the madman of Gadara? The reason would seem to have been that in that region where Jesus had not taught, and where he did not purpose to remain, the same danger from publicity did not exist. To be sure, the man was not told "to publish it in Decapolis," as he proceeded to do, but no pains were taken to prevent him from doing this. He was left at liberty to act in this respect as he pleased. The evangelist does not call our attention in any way to this peculiarity of the Gadara miracle. It is thus an undesigned confirmation of the truth of the narrative, and, at the same time, of the other narratives with which the injunction to observe silence is connected.

III. Cautions, plainly authentic, against an overestimate of miracles are a proof that they were actually wrought.

No one who falsely sets up to be a miracle-worker seeks to lower the popular esteem of miracles. Such an one never rebukes the wonder-loving spirit. The same is equally true of those who imagine or otherwise fabricate stories of miracles. The moods of mind out of which fictions of this kind are hatched are incompatible with anything like a disparagement of miracles. The tendency will be to make as much of them as possible. Now the gospel records represent Christ as taking the opposite course. "Except ye see signs and wonders ye

<sup>1</sup> Mark v. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Mark iii. 12, v. 43.

will not believe.''' This implies that there were higher grounds of faith. It is an expression of blame. "Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me : or else believe me for the very works' sake."² That is, if you cannot take my word for it, then let the miracles convince you. It would almost seem that Christ performed his miracles under a protest. He refused to do a miracle where there was not a germ of faith beforehand. In the first three gospels there is the same relative estimate of miracles as in the fourth. If men form an opinion about the weather by the looks of the sky, they ought to be convinced by "the signs of the times"—in which, if the miracles are included, it is only as one element in the collective manifestation of Christ.³ When the seventy disciples returned full of joy that they had not only been able to heal the sick, but also to deliver demoniacs from their distress—'which had not been explicitly promised them when they went forth—Jesus sympathized with their joy ; he beheld before his mind's eye the swift downfall of the dominating spirit of evil, and he assured the disciples that further miraculous power should be given to them. But he added, "Notwithstanding, in this rejoice not, that the spirits are subject unto you ; but rather rejoice because your names are written in heaven." They were not to be elated by the supernatural power exercised, or to be exercised, by them. They were not to make it a ground of self-congratulation. These statements of Jesus, be it observed, for the reasons stated above, verify themselves as authentic. And they presuppose the reality of the miracles.

IV. Teaching of Jesus which is evidently genuine is inseparable from certain miracles. In other words, the miracles cannot be dissected out of teaching and incidents with which they are connected in the narrative. A few illustrations will prove this to be the case.

(1) John the Baptist, being then in prison, sent two of his disciples to ask Jesus if he was indeed the Messiah.⁴ A doubt

¹ John iv. 48.

² John xiv. 11.

³ Matt. xvi. 3.

⁴ Such is the force of the καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια, etc.), Luke x. 17.

⁵ Matt. xi. 4 ; Luke vii. 22.

had sprung up in his mind. This is an incident which nobody would have invented. In proof of this it is enough to say that there has been an effort of commentators, who have caught up a suggestion of Origen, to explain away the fact. It has been conjectured that the message was probably to satisfy some of John's doubting disciples. There is not a word in the narrative to countenance this view. It is excluded by the message which the disciples were to carry from Christ to John: "Blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me!" That is, blessed is the man who is not led to disbelieve because the course that I take does not answer to his ideal of the Messiah. There is no reason to think that John's mind was free from those more or less sensuous anticipations concerning Christ and his kingdom which the apostles, even after they had long been with Jesus, had not shaken off. He had foretold that the Messiah was to have a "fan in his hand," was to "gather his wheat into the garner," and to burn up the chaff.<sup>1</sup> He was perplexed that Jesus took no more decisive step, that no great overturning had come. Was Jesus, after all, the Messiah himself, or a precursor? If, in his prison there, the faith of John for the moment faltered, it was nothing worse than was true of Moses and Elijah the greatest of the old prophets. The commendation of John which Jesus uttered in the hearing of the bystanders, immediately after he had sent back the disciples, was probably designed to efface any impression derogatory to the Baptist which might have been left on their minds. This eulogy is another corroboration of the truth of the narrative. The same is true of his closing words: "Notwithstanding, he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." They suggest the limit of John's insight into the nature of the kingdom. It is an unquestionable fact, therefore, that the inquiry was sent by John. Nor is it denied that Jesus returned the following answer: "Go and show John again those things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have

<sup>1</sup> Matt. iii. 12.



the Gospel preached to them." The messengers were to describe to John the miracles which Jesus was doing—Luke expressly adds that they themselves were witnesses of them—and to assure him that in addition to these signs of the Messianic era which Isaiah had predicted,<sup>1</sup> to the poor the good news of the speedy advent of the kingdom were proclaimed. The message of Jesus had no ambiguity. It meant what the evangelists understood it to mean. The idea that he was merely using symbols to denote the scriptural effect of his preaching is a mere subterfuge of interpreters who cannot otherwise get rid of the necessity of admitting the fact of miracles. What sort of satisfaction would it have given John, in the state of mind in which he then was, to be assured simply that the teaching of Jesus was causing great pleasure and doing a great deal of good? The same, or almost as much, he knew to be true of his own preaching. What he needed to learn, and what he did learn from his messengers, was that the miracles of which he had heard were really done, and to be reminded of their significance.

(2) The gospels record several controversies of Jesus with over-rigid observers of the Sabbath. They found fault with him for laxness in this particular. On one occasion he is said to have met a reproach of this kind with the retort, "Which of you shall have an ass or an ox fallen into a pit, and will not straightway pull him out on the Sabbath day?"<sup>2</sup> It has been said of the books written by the companions of Napoleon at St. Helena, that it is not difficult to mark off what he really said, his sayings having a recognizable style of their own. They who maintain that a like distinction is to be drawn in the Gospels among the reported sayings of Christ have to concede that he uttered the words above quoted. They are characteristic words. Even Strauss holds that they were spoken by him. If so, on what occasion? Luke says that it was on the occasion of Christ's healing a man who had the dropsy. There must have been a rescue from *some* evil. The evil must have been a very serious one; otherwise the parable of the ox or the ass

<sup>1</sup> Is. xxxv. 5, 6.

Luke xiv. 5.

falling into a pit would be out of place. What more proof is wanted of the correctness of the evangelic tradition, and thus of the miracle? On another Sabbath he is said to have cured a woman who, from a muscular disorder, had been bowed down for eighteen years. His reply to his censors is equally characteristic.<sup>1</sup> If the reply was made, the miracle that occasioned it was done. On still another occasion of the same kind he added to the illustration of a sheep falling into a pit the significant question, "How much, then, is a man better than a sheep?"<sup>2</sup> If he uttered these words, then he healed a man with a withered hand. Unless he had just saved a man from some grievous peril, the question is meaningless.

(3) In Matthew, Mark, and Luke, it is related that Jesus was charged by the Pharisees with casting out demons through the help of Beelzebub their prince.<sup>3</sup> The conversation that ensued upon this accusation is given. Jesus exposed the absurdity of the charge. It implied that Satan was working against himself, and for the subversion of his own kingdom: "If an house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand."<sup>4</sup> The conversation is stamped with internal marks of authenticity. The fact of this charge having been made against Christ was inwrought into the evangelic tradition. Now the occasion of the debate was the cure of a man who was blind and dumb. The reader may consider demoniacal possession to be a literal fact, or nothing more than a popular idea or theory: in either case the phenomena—epilepsy, lunacy, etc.—were what presented themselves to observation. It may be said that the Jews had exorcists. Jesus implies this when he asks, "By whom do your children"—that is, your disciples—"cast them out?" Yet the cures of this sort which were effected by Christ must have included aggravated cases of mental and physical disorder, or they must have been wrought with a uniformity which distinguished them from similar relief administered by others through the medium of prayer and fasting. There was an evident contrast between the power exerted by him in such cases, and that with which the Pharisees were

<sup>1</sup> Luke xiii. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xii. 22-31; Mark iii. 22-31; Luke xi. 14-23.

<sup>3</sup> Matt. xii. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Mark iii. 25.

acquainted. This is implied in the astonishment which this class of miracles is represented to have called forth. It is implied also in the fact that the accusation of a league with Satan was brought against him. They had to assert this or else admit that it was "with the finger of God" that he cast out devils.<sup>1</sup> "He *commanded* the unclean spirits, and they obeyed him."

(4) We find both in Matthew and Luke a passage in which woes are pronounced against certain cities of Galilee for remaining impenitent.<sup>2</sup> There is no reason for doubting that they were uttered by Jesus. There is a question as to the time when they were uttered, unless it be assumed that they were spoken on two different occasions; but that chronological question is immaterial here. The authenticity of the tradition is confirmed, if confirmation were required, by the mention of Bethsaida and Chorazin. No account of miracles wrought in these towns is embraced in either of the gospels.<sup>3</sup> Had the passage been put into the mouth of Jesus falsely, there would naturally have been framed a narrative to match it. There would have stood in connection with it a description, briefer or longer, of miracles alleged to have been done in those towns. Moreover, "in that same hour," according to the first gospel, Jesus uttered a fervent thanksgiving that the truth, hidden from the wise, had been revealed to the simple-hearted<sup>4</sup>—a passage that needs no vindication of its authenticity. This outpouring of emotion is a natural sequel to the sorrowful impression made on him by the obduracy of the Galilean cities. In Luke there is the same succession of moods of feeling, although the juxtaposition of the two passages is not quite so close. Now what is the ground of this condemnation of Capernaum, Chorazin, and Bethsaida? It is "the mighty works" which they had witnessed. This privilege makes their guilt more heinous than that of Tyre and Sidon. It is the reference to the miracles which gives point to the denunciation.

(5) In connection with one miracle there is instruction as to

<sup>1</sup> Luke xi. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Matt. xi. 20-25; Luke x. 13-16.

<sup>3</sup> The Bethsaida of Mark viii. 22 was another place, north-east of the Lake.

<sup>4</sup> Matt. xi. 25-28.

its design, which it is difficult to believe did not emanate from Jesus. It is imbedded in the heart of the narrative, as it was an essential part of the transaction.<sup>1</sup> He is in a house at Capernaum surrounded by a crowd. A paralytic is brought by four men, and is let down through the roof, this being the only means of bringing him near Jesus. Seeing their faith, he said tenderly to the paralytic, "Son (or child) be of good courage; thy sins are forgiven thee." The disease, we are led to infer, was the result of sin, it may be of sensuality. The sufferer's pain of heart Jesus first sought to assuage. It was the first step toward his cure. These words struck the scribes who heard them as blasphemous. Jesus divined their thoughts, and asked them which is the easier to say, "Thy sins be forgiven thee," or "Arise and walk?" If one presupposed divine power, so did the other. Then follows the statement: "That ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins"—here he turned to the paralytic—"Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thine house." The entire narrative is replete with the marks of truth; but this one observation, defining the motive of the miracle, making it subordinate to the higher end of verifying his authority to grant spiritual blessings, carries in it evident marks of authenticity. Did not Jesus say this? If he did, he performed the miracle.

V. The fact that no miracles are attributed to John the Baptist should convince one that the miracles attributed to Jesus were actually performed.

In the gospels John is regarded as a prophet inferior to no other. His career is described. Great stress is laid on his testimony to Jesus. Why, then, are no miracles ascribed to him? They would have served to corroborate his testimony. If there was a propensity in the first disciples or their successors to imagine miracles where there were none, why are no fabrications of this sort interwoven with the story of John's preaching? They had before them the life of his prototype, Elijah, and the record of the miracles done by him. What (except a

<sup>1</sup> Mark ii. 10; cf. Matt. ix. 6; Luke v. 24.

regard for truth) hindered them from mingling in the story of the forerunner of Jesus occurrences equally wonderful? Why do we not read that one day he responded to the entreaty of a poor blind man by restoring his sight; that on another occasion he gave back to a widow the life of her son; that at a certain time a woman who had been for years a helpless invalid was immediately cured by a word from the prophet; that the diseased were often brought to him by their friends to be healed? The only answer is that the gospel narratives are not the product of imagination. They give the events that actually took place.

VI. It is equally difficult for sceptical criticism to explain why no miracles are ascribed to Jesus prior to his public ministry. Why should the imagination of the early Christians have stopped short at his baptism? Why did not fancy run back, after the manner of the apocryphal fictions, over the period that preceded? A definite date is assigned for the beginning of his miraculous agency. Fancy and fraud do not curb themselves in this way.

VII. The persistence of the faith of the apostles in Jesus as the Messiah, and of his faith in himself, admits of no satisfactory explanation when the miracles are denied.

How were the apostles to be convinced that he was the promised, expected Messiah? What were the evidences of it? He took a course opposite to that which they expected the Messiah to take. He planned no political change. He enjoined meekness and patience. He held out to them the prospect of persecution and death as the penalty of adhering to him. Where was the national deliverance which they had confidently anticipated that the Messiah would effect? How intangible, compared with their sanguine hopes, was the good which he sought to impart! Moreover, they heard his claims denied on every side. The guides of the people in religion scorned or denounced them. Had there been no exertions of power to impress the senses, and the mind through the senses, it is incredible that the apostles could have believed in him, and



have clung to him in the teeth of all the influences fitted to inspire distrust. We might ask how Jesus himself could have retained immovable the conviction that he was in truth the Messiah of God, if he found himself possessed of no powers exceeding those of the mortals about him. How could he have maintained this consciousness, without the least faltering, when he saw himself rejected by rulers and people, and at length forsaken by his timid disciples?

Strauss is, on the whole, the most prominent disbeliever in modern times who has undertaken to reconstruct the gospel history, leaving out the miracles. His theory was that the narratives of miracles are a mythology, spontaneously spun out of the imagination of groups of early disciples. But what moved them to build up so baseless a fabric? What was the idea that possessed the mind and gave birth to its unconscious fancies? Why, at the foundation of it all was the fixed expectation that the Messiah must be a miracle-worker. The predictions of the Old Testament and the example of the prophets required it. How was it, then, that, in the absence of this indispensable criterion of the Messianic office, these same disciples believed in Jesus? How came he to believe in himself? To these questions the author of the mythical theory could give no answer which does not subvert his own hypothesis. The same cause which, by the supposition, led to the imagining of miracles that were false must have precluded faith except on the basis of miracles that were true.

VIII. In the evangelical tradition the miracles enter as potent causes into the nexus of occurrences. They are links which cannot be spared in the chain of events.

Take, for example, the opening chapters of Mark, which most critics at present hold to be the oldest gospel. There is an exceedingly vivid picture of the first labors of Jesus in Capernaum and its vicinity. His teaching, to be sure, thrilled his hearers: "He taught as one having authority."<sup>1</sup> But the intense excitement of the people was due even more to another

<sup>1</sup> Mark i. 22.

cause. In the synagogue at Capernaum a demoniac interrupted him with loud cries, calling him "the Holy One of God." At the word of Jesus, after uttering one shriek, the frenzied man became quiet and sane. The mother of Peter's wife was raised from a sick-bed. Other miraculous cures followed. It was the effect of these upon the people that obliged him to rise long before dawn, in order to anticipate their coming, and to escape to a retired place for prayer. It was a miracle wrought upon a leper that compelled Jesus to leave the city for "desert places"—secluded spots where the people would not throng upon him in so great numbers.<sup>1</sup> Very definite occurrences are traced to particular causes, which are miraculous acts done by Christ. It was the raising of Lazarus that determined the Jewish rulers to apprehend Jesus and put him to death. The fact that this event, in a record which contains so many unmistakably authentic details, is the point on which the subsequent history turns, forced upon Rénan the conviction that there was an apparent miracle—something that was taken for a miracle—and this conviction he has not been able to persuade himself absolutely to relinquish.<sup>2</sup>

The miracle at Jericho, which is described with some diversity in the circumstances by three of the evangelists, Keim finds it impossible to resolve into a fiction. He refers to the fact that all of the first three gospels record it. He adverts to the fresh and vivid character of the narratives. But the main consideration is the explanation afforded of the rising tide of enthusiasm in the people at this time, of which there is full proof. But Keim, still reluctant to admit the supernatural, alludes to the popular excitement as quickening "the vital and nervous forces," and so restoring the impaired or lost vision of the man healed. It is intimated that this access of nerve-force, coupled with his faith, may have effected the cure.<sup>3</sup> It is found necessary to revert to a method of explanation which German criticism had long ago tested and discarded. The point which concerns us here is the reality of the transaction as it appeared to the spectators. The physiological solution may

<sup>1</sup> Mark i. 35, v. 45.

<sup>2</sup> "Vie de Jésus" (13me. ed.), pp. 507, 514.

<sup>3</sup> "Gesch. Jesu von Nazara," vol. iii. p. 53.

pass for what it is worth. If cures had been effected in this way by Jesus, there would have been conspicuous failures as well as instances of success ; and how would these failures have affected the minds of the disciples and of other witnesses of them, not to speak of the mind of Jesus himself ? The resurrection of Jesus, more than any other of the miracles, bridges over an otherwise impassable chasm in the course of events. We see the disciples, a company of disheartened mourners. Then we see them on a sudden transformed into a band of bold propagandists of the new faith, ready to lay down their lives for it. The resurrection is the event which accounts for this marvellous change, and for the spread of Christianity which follows. But this event requires to be more thoroughly considered.

IX. The proof of the crowning miracle of Christianity, the resurrection of Jesus, cannot be successfully assailed, even were the views of the sceptical school as to the origin of the gospels well founded.

As we stand for the moment on common ground with them, we cannot make use of such an incident as the doubt of Thomas and the removal of it,<sup>1</sup> although this incident, as well as various other portions of the fourth gospel, may be historical, even if not John but a later author wrote the book. An uncertainty is thrown over circumstances relating to the intercourse of the disciples with Jesus after his death, which are found in the gospels. That is, prior to establishing the genuineness of the gospels, it is open to question how far the details are faithfully transmitted from the witnesses. But as regards the cardinal fact of the gospel, we have precious evidence from an unimpeachable source. The Apostle Paul states with precision the result of his inquiries on the subject.<sup>2</sup> There were five interviews of the disciples with the risen Jesus, besides the miracle on the journey to Damascus. Paul was converted A.D. 35, four years after the crucifixion. In A.D. 38 he went to Jerusalem, and stayed a fortnight with Peter. He was conversant with the apostles and other disciples. He knew what their

<sup>1</sup> John xx. 24-30.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 4-8.

testimony was. From his explicit statement, and from other perfectly conclusive evidence, it is certain that the first of the supposed appearances of Christ to the disciples was on the morning of the next Sunday after his death. It was on "the third day."<sup>1</sup> Then it was that they believed themselves to have irresistible proof that he had risen from the tomb. Ever after, this was the principal fact which they proclaimed, the main foundation of their faith and hope. The question is, Were they or were they not deceived? Is the Church founded on a fact or on a delusion? Did Christianity, which owes its existence and spread to this immovable conviction on the part of the apostles, spring from either a fraud or a dream? The notion which once had advocates, that Christ did not really die, but revived from a swoon, is given up. How could he have gone through the crucifixion without dying? What would have been his physical condition, even if a spark of life had remained? If he did not die then, when did he die? Did he and the apostles agree to pretend that he had died? The slander of the Jews, that some of the disciples stole his body, is not deserving of consideration. Why should men make up a story which was to bring them no benefit, but only contempt, persecution, and death? The question what became of the body of Jesus is one which disbelievers in the resurrection do not satisfactorily answer. It is not doubted that the tomb was found empty. Jewish adversaries had the strongest reason for producing the body if they knew where it was. That would have destroyed the apostles' testimony in a moment.

The only hypothesis which has any plausibility at the present day, in opposition to the Christian faith, is the "vision-theory." The idea of it is that the apostles mistook mental impressions for actual perceptions. Their belief in the resurrection was the result of hallucination. Some would hold that Christ really manifested himself to them in a miraculous way, but to their souls only: he did not come to them visibly and tangibly. Of this theory, especially in the first form, it is to be

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 4; cf. Matt. xvi. 21, xvii. 23, xx. 19, xxvii. 63, xxviii. 1; Mark viii. 31, ix. 31, xiv. 58, xv. 29, xvi. 2, 9; Luke ix. 22, xiii. 32, xviii. 33, xxiv. 1, 7, 21, 46; John ii. 19, xx. 1, 19, 26.

said that responsibility for the delusion supposed comes back upon the founder of Christianity himself. Whoever thinks that the disciples were self-deceived, as Schleiermacher has well said, not only attributes to them a mental imbecility which would make their entire testimony respecting Christ untrustworthy, but he implies that when Christ chose such witnesses he did not know what was in man. Or, if Christ willingly permitted or led them to mistake an inward impression for actual perceptions, he is himself the author of error, and forfeits our moral respect.<sup>1</sup> But the vision-theory is built up on false assumptions, and signally fails to explain the phenomena in the case. I shall not here pause to examine the affirmation of Paul that he had personally seen Christ. This must be observed, that he distinguishes that first revelation of Christ to him—which stopped him in his career as an inquisitor, and made him a new man in his convictions and aims—from subsequent “visions and revelations.”<sup>2</sup> They were separated in time. It was not on them that Paul professed to found his claim to be an apostle. He refers to them for another purpose. The words that he heard in a moment of ecstasy—whether “in the body or out of the body” he could not tell—he never even repeated.<sup>3</sup> That sight of Jesus, which was the prelude of his conversion, he gives as the sixth and last of his appearances to the apostles. It was objective, a disclosure to the senses. It was such a perception of Christ that his resurrection was proved by it—a fact with which the resurrection of believers is declared to be indissolubly connected.<sup>4</sup> Attempts have been made to account for Paul’s conversion by referring it to a mental crisis induced by secret misgivings and leanings toward the faith which he was striving to destroy. Some have brought in a thunder-clap or a sunstroke to help on the effect of the struggle supposed to be taking place within his soul. One trouble with this psychological explanation of the miracle is that the assumption of previous doubts and of remorseful feelings is not only without historical warrant, but is directly in the teeth of Paul’s own

<sup>1</sup> “Christlicher Glaube,” vol. ii. p. 88.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Cor. xii. 1 ; 1 Cor. ii. 10.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Cor. xii. 4 ; cf. Keim, vol. iii. p. 583, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 12-21.



assertions.<sup>1</sup> It is not true, however, that Paul implies in the least that the appearances of the risen Christ to the other apostles were exactly similar to Christ's appearance to him on the road to Damascus. His claim was simply that he, too, had seen Christ. The circumstances might be wholly different in his case. Jewish Christians who were hostile to Paul made a point of the difference between his knowledge of Christ through visions and the sort of knowledge vouchsafed to the other apostles. The risen Christ whom these saw did not speak to them from heaven. They believed him to be with them on the earth. He had not yet ascended. His real or supposed presence in the body with them was an essential part of what they related. Without it, the whole idea of the ascension was meaningless. We might go further and say that, in the absence of decisive proof to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the accounts which the apostles were in the habit of giving of their interviews with the risen Jesus—facts so immeasurably important to themselves and others—are substantially preserved in the gospels. Why should it be doubted that at least the essential nature of these interviews, or of their impression of them, about which the Apostle Paul had so particularly inquired, is set forth by the four evangelists?

But the details in the gospel narratives we leave out of account for the present. The main facts indisputably embraced in the testimony of the apostles are sufficient. There are criteria of hallucination. If there were not, we should on all occasions be at a loss to know when to credit witnesses, or even to trust our own senses. We have to consider, in the first place, the state of mind into which the apostles were thrown by the crucifixion. It was a state of extreme sorrow and dejection. They were struck with dismay. Their hopes were crushed. Whoever has seen the dead Christ in the famous painting of Rubens at Antwerp can imagine the feeling of the disciples when they looked on the terrible reality. How was it possible for them within a few days—within two days, in the case of some, if not of all—to recover from the shock? How was it

<sup>1</sup> Before discussing fully the subject of Paul's conversion, it is requisite to examine the question of the authorship and credibility of the Acts.

possible that in so short a time joy took the place of grief and consternation? Whence came the sudden revival of faith, and with it the courage to go forth and testify, at the risk of their own lives, that Jesus was indeed the Messiah? The glowing faith, rising to an ecstasy of peace and assurance, out of which hallucination might spring, did not exist. The necessary materials of illusion were absolutely wanting. There was no long interval of silent brooding over the Master's words and worth. The time was short—a few days. Even then there are no traces of any fever of enthusiasm. The interviews with the risen Christ are set down in the gospels in a brief, calm way, without any marks of bewildering agitation. No! the revulsion of feeling must have come from without. The event that produced it was no creation of the apostles' minds. It took them by surprise. Secondly, the number and variety of the persons—five hundred at once—who constitute the witnesses heightens the difficulty in the way of the hallucination-theory. Under circumstances so gloomy and disheartening, how were so many persons—comprising, as they must have comprised, all varieties of temperament—transported by the same enthusiasm to such a pitch of bewilderment as to confound a mental image of Christ with the veritable, present reality? But, fourthly, a greater difficulty lies in the limited number of the alleged appearances of Jesus, considering the state of mind which must be assumed to have existed if the hallucination-theory is adopted. Instead of five, the number of those known to Paul, there would have been a multitude. This the analogy of religious delusions authorizes us to assert. If the five hundred collectively imagined themselves to see Christ, a great portion of them would individually, before and after, have imagined the same thing. The limited, carefully marked, exactly recollected number of the appearances of Jesus is a powerful argument against the theory of illusion. Fifthly, connected with this last consideration is another most impressive fact. 'There was a limitation of time as well as of number. The appearances of Jesus, whatever they were, ceased in a short period. Why did they not continue longer? There were visions of one kind and another afterward. Disbelievers point to these as a

proof of the apostles' credulity. Be this as it may, the question recurs, Why were there no more visions of the risen Jesus, to be placed in the same category with those enumerated by Paul? Stephen's vision was of Christ in the heavenly world. In the persecutions recorded in Acts, when martyrs were perishing, why were there no Christophanies? There is not a solitary case of an alleged actual appearance of Jesus on the earth to disciples, after the brief period which is covered by the instances recorded by Paul and the evangelists. There were those distinct occurrences, standing by themselves, definitely marked, beginning at a certain time, ending at a certain time—so many, and no more.

We know what the mood of the apostles was from the time of these alleged interviews with the risen Christ. They set about the work of preaching the gospel of the resurrection, and of founding the Church. There was no more despondency, no more faltering. It is undeniable that they are characterized by sobriety of mind, and by a habit of reflection, without which indeed the whole movement would quickly have come to an end. The controversies attending the martyrdom of Stephen were not more than two years after the death of Jesus. Then followed the mission to the Jews and to the heathen, the deliberations respecting the position to be accorded to the Gentile converts, and the whole work of organizing and training the churches. To be sure, they claimed to be guided by the divine Spirit. Light was imparted to them, from time to time, through visions. Take what view one will of these phenomena, it is plain that, on the whole, a discreet, reflective habit characterized the apostles. This is clear enough from the Acts, and from the epistles, on any view respecting the credibility of these books which critics are disposed to take. Now this reasonableness and sobriety belonged to the apostles from the first, or it did not. If it did, it excludes the supposition of that abandonment to dreamy emotion and uninquiring revery which the hallucination-theory implies. If it did not, then it behoves the advocates of this hypothesis to tell what it was that suddenly effected such a change in them. What broke up on a sudden the mood of excitement and flightiness which engendered no-

tions of a fictitious resurrection? How was a band of religious dreamers, not gradually but in a very short space of time, transformed into men of discretion and good sense? Why did these devotees not go on with their delicious dreams, in which they believed Jesus to be visibly at their side? The sudden, final termination, without any outward cause producing it, of an absorbing religious enthusiasm, like that which is imputed to the apostles and to the five hundred disciples, is without a parallel in the history of religion.

It is the force of these considerations which compels Keim to give up the illusion-theory. "It must be acknowledged," he says, "that this theory, which has lately become popular, is only an hypothesis that explains some things, but does not explain the main thing—nay, deals with the historical facts from distorted and untenable points of view."<sup>1</sup> "If the visions are not a human product, not self-produced; if they are not the blossom and fruit of a bewildering over-excitement; if they are something strange, mysterious; if they are accompanied at once with astonishingly clear perceptions and resolves, then it remains to fall back on a source of them not yet named: it is God and the glorified Christ."<sup>2</sup> Thus the cessation of the visions at a definite point can be accounted for. The extraneous power that produced them ceased to do so. It was, in truth, the personal act and self-revelation of the departed Jesus. Without this supernatural manifestation of himself, to convince his disciples that he still lived in a higher form of being, his cause would in all probability have come to an end at his death. Faith in him as Messiah would have vanished, the disciples would have gone back to Judaism and the synagogue, and the words of Jesus would have been buried in the dust of oblivion.<sup>3</sup> A powerful impression, not originating in themselves, but coming from without, from Christ himself, alone prevented this catastrophe. The admission of a miracle is fairly extorted from this writer by the untenableness of every other solution that can be thought of. At the end of a work which is largely taken up with attempts, direct or indirect, to

<sup>1</sup> "*Gesch. Jesu von Nazara*," vol. iii. p. 600.

<sup>2</sup> P. 602.

<sup>3</sup> P. 605.

disprove supernatural agency, Keim finds himself driven by the sheer pressure of the evidence to assert its reality, and to maintain that the very survival of Christianity in the world after the death of Jesus depended on it. If he still stumbles at the particular form of the miracle which the testimony obliges us to accept, yet the miracle of a self-manifestation of Jesus to the apostles he is constrained to presuppose.

On a question of this kind historical evidence can go no farther. When it is declared by a large number of witnesses who have no motive to deceive, that a certain event took place before their eyes, and when the circumstances forbid the hypothesis of self-deception, there is no alternative but to admit the reality of the fact. The proof is complete. The fact may still be denied by an unreflecting incredulity. It may be affirmed to be impossible, or to be under any circumstances incapable of proof. Against such a position, testimony, historical proof of any sort, is powerless. The immovable faith of the apostles that Jesus "showed himself alive to them" is a fact that nobody questions. Without that faith Christianity would have died at its birth. Whoever denies credit to their testimony ought to explain in some rational way the origin, strength, and persistence of that faith. But this, as experiment has proved, cannot be done.

X. The concessions which are extorted by the force of the evidence from the ablest disbelievers in the miracles are fatal to their own cause.

At the beginning of this century the theory of Paulus, the German Euhemerus, was brought forward. It was the naturalistic solution. The stories of miracles in the New Testament were based on facts which were misunderstood. There were actual occurrences, but they were looked at through a mist of superstitious belief, and thus misinterpreted and magnified. Jesus had a secret knowledge of potent remedies, and the cures which he effected by the application of them passed for miracles. The instances of raising the dead were cases of only apparent death. For example, Jesus saw that the son of the widow of Nain was not really dead. Perhaps the young man opened his



eyes or stirred, and thus discovered to Jesus that he was alive. Jesus mercifully saved him from a premature burial. He did not think himself called upon to correct the mistaken judgments of the disciples and of others, who attributed his beneficent acts to preternatural power. He allowed himself in a tacit accommodation to the vulgar ideas in these matters. This theory was seriously advocated in learned tomes. It was applied in detail in elaborate commentaries on the gospels.

Strauss simply echoed the general verdict to which all sensible and right-minded people had arrived when he scouted this attempted explanation of the gospel narratives, and derided the exegesis by which it was supported. The theory of Paulus made the apostles fools and Christ a Jesuit. But the hypothesis which Strauss himself brought forward, if less ridiculous, was not a whit more tenable. Unconscious myths generated by communities of disciples who mistook their common fancies for facts ; myths generated by bodies of disciples cut off from the care and oversight of the apostles who knew better ; by disciples who, nevertheless, succeeded in substituting in all the churches their fictitious narrative in the room of the true narrative which was given by the apostles—here were improbabilities which prevented the mythical theory from gaining a foothold at the bar of historical criticism. It was impossible, as it has been remarked above, to see how the faith of the myth-making division of disciples was produced at the start. No such class of disciples, cut off from the superintendence of the apostles, existed. If it be supposed that such a class of disciples did exist, the agents who planted Christianity in the towns and cities of the Roman Empire were not from these, but were the apostles and their followers. And then, how could the established tradition as to Christ's life be superseded by another narrative, emanating from some obscure source, and presenting a totally diverse conception from that which the apostles or their pupils were teaching? So the mythical theory went the way of the naturalistic scheme of Paulus. Seeing his failure, Strauss afterward tried to change the definition of myth, and to introduce an element of conscious invention into the idea ; but in so doing he destroyed the work of his own hands.

Rénan has undertaken, in a series of volumes, to furnish upon the naturalistic basis an elaborate explanation of the origin of Christianity. In the successive editions of his "Life of Jesus" he has considered and reconsidered the problem of the miracles. What has he to say? He tells us that miracles at that epoch were thought indispensable to the prophetic vocation. The legends of Elijah and Elisha were full of them. It was taken for granted that the Messiah would perform many.<sup>1</sup> Jesus believed that he had a gift of healing. He acquired repute as an exorcist.<sup>2</sup> Nay, it is undeniable that "acts which would now be considered fruits of illusion or hallucination had a great place in the life of Jesus."<sup>3</sup> The four gospels, he holds, render this evident. Rénan sees that there is no way of escaping the conclusion that miracles *seemed* to be wrought, and that they were a very marked feature in the history as it actually occurred. Those about Jesus—the *entourage*—were probably more struck with the miracles than with anything else.<sup>4</sup> How shall this be accounted for? Illusion in the mind of Jesus, an exaggerated idea of his powers, will go a little way toward a solution of the question, but does not suffice. It must be held that the part of a thaumaturgist was forced on Jesus by the craving of disciples and the demand of current opinion. He had either to renounce his mission or to comply.<sup>5</sup> His miracles were "a violence done him by his age, a concession which a pressing necessity wrested from him."<sup>6</sup> There were miracles, or transactions taken for miracles, in which he consented "to play a part."<sup>7</sup> He was reluctant; it was distasteful to him, but he consented. Then come M. Rénan's apologies for Jesus. Sincerity is not a trait of Orientals. We must not be hard upon deception of this sort. We must conquer our "repugnances." "We shall have a right to be severe upon such men when we have accomplished as much with our scruples as they with their lies." In that impure city of Jerusalem, Jesus was no longer himself. His conscience, by the fault of others, had lost its original clearness. He was desperate, pushed to the extremity, no longer master of himself.

<sup>1</sup> "Vie de Jésus," p. 266, cf. p. 271.

<sup>2</sup> P. 273.

<sup>3</sup> P. 277.

<sup>4</sup> P. 269.

<sup>5</sup> P. 267.

<sup>6</sup> P. 279.

<sup>7</sup> P. 513.

Death must come to restore him to liberty, to deliver him from a part which became every hour more exacting, more difficult to sustain.<sup>1</sup>

In plain English, Jesus was an impostor—unwillingly, yet really and consciously. From enthusiasm it went on to knavery; for pious fraud, notwithstanding M. Rénan's smooth deprecation, is *fraud*. The Son of Man sinks out of sight, with his conscience clouded, his character fallen. M. Rénan's excuses for him are themselves immoral. Even his apologies for Judas are less offensive.

This defamation of Jesus is for the infidel theory a *reductio ad absurdum*. The wise and good of all ages are told that their veneration is misplaced. Jesus was not the "holy one." There is nothing even heroic in him. He is swept away by a popular current, giving up his rectitude, giving up his moral discrimination. He is made up in equal parts of the visionary and the deceiver. By his moral weakness he brings himself into such an entanglement that to escape from it by death is a piece of good fortune. He to whom mankind have looked up as to the ideal of holiness, turns out to be first a dreamer, then a fanatic and a charlatan. It is proved that a clean thing can come out of an unclean. Out of so muddy a fountain there has flowed so pure a stream. Courage, undeviating truth, steadfast loyalty to right against all seductions, in all these Christian ages have sprung from communion with a dishonest man who obeyed the maxim that the end justifies the means. For no gloss of rhetoric can cover up the meaning that lies underneath M. Rénan's fine phrases. When the light coating of French varnish is rubbed off, it is a picture of degrading duplicity that is left.

This is the last word of scientific infidelity. Let the reader mark the point to which his attention is called. On any rational theory about the date and authorship of the gospels, it is found impossible to doubt that facts supposed at the time of their occurrence to be miraculous were plentiful in the life of Jesus. The advocates of atheism are driven to the hypotheses

<sup>1</sup> "Vic de Jésus," p. 375.

of hallucination with a large infusion of pious fraud. There is no fear that such a theory will prevail. No being could exist with the heterogeneous, discordant qualities attributed by Rénan to Christ. Were such a being possible, the new life of humanity could never have flowed from such a defiled source.

The arguments which this paper contains will not convince an atheist. One who denies that God is a personal being is in direct proportion to the force of his conviction debarred from believing in a miracle. He will either seek for some other explanation of the phenomena, or leave the problem unsolved. Secondly, these arguments, it is believed, separately taken, are valid ; but they are also to be considered together. Their collective strength is to be estimated. If the single rod could be broken, the same may not be true of the bundle. Thirdly, it is not to be forgotten that demonstrative reasoning on questions of historical fact is precluded. He who requires a coercive argument where probable reasoning alone is applicable, must be left in doubt or disbelief. In the strongest conceivable case of probable reasoning, there is always a *possibility* of the opposite opinion being true. Enough that *reasonable* doubt is excluded.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

## CHRISTIAN MORALITY, EXPEDIENCY, AND LIBERTY.

THERE is an expediency which is the hand-maid of rectitude. There is another which usurps its place and tramples it in the dust. When the high-priest Caiaphas said, referring to Christ, "It is expedient for us that one man die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not" (John xi. 50), this is the climacteric instance of the latter kind. Without inquiry or concern in regard to his guilt or innocence, it was made the ethical basis of the crime of crimes, the crucifixion of the Lord of glory. Such expediency has been the great justification of the slaughter of the innocents in all ages. It was this that drenched Paris in blood in the days of the Revolution and the Commune. But the former kind of expediency has a rightful and necessary place in sound ethics. That place is carefully and even philosophically defined in the New Testament by one justly styled the "philosophic apostle."

In 1 Corinthians x. 23, Paul declares to us, "All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient: all things are lawful for me, but all things edify not." In chapter vi. 12, we find the same words with a change of the last clause: in place of "all things edify not," it reads, "but I will not be brought under the power of any." It is hardly necessary to say that the "all things" mentioned as being "lawful" do not mean "all things" in the most absolute sense of all beings or acts in the universe, actual or possible, but all things of the class of which he was speaking; *i.e.*, all actions which in themselves are morally indifferent. The actions that in this sense are permissible, or lawful in themselves to be done or abstained from, according as they are or are not for edification, are innumerable.



They become right or wrong according as circumstances do or do not render them conducive to edification, to the glory of God, the advancement of his church, and the welfare of man. To this class belong the species of actions which the apostle has in view in his ethical discussions in Romans xiv. and 1 Corinthians viii., ix., and x. They are such as eating herbs or meat that had been offered in sacrifice to idols; keeping days and rites prescribed in the Jewish ceremonial. As concerns actions of this kind, "All things are lawful, but all things are not expedient, because they edify not." There is another class of actions that fall not under this category, which are never lawful and may never be done. Such is everything prohibited in the decalogue. Otherwise, what is lawful is not lawful. Paul never meant such an absurdity. Contrariwise, in the practical parts of his epistles he is constantly reaffirming them, and putting them not only on the ground of natural, but of Christian obligation as well, and this alike with regard to the God-ward and man-ward part of the decalogue. Witness his injunctions of piety towards God, insomuch that he insists that all things be done as to the Lord and to his glory, while he enjoins, in forms the most varied and explicit, parental fidelity and love; filial obedience and reverence; regard for the sacredness of life; chastity, industry, honesty, veracity, fidelity; avoidance of all acts or feelings antagonistic to other men's just rights, privileges, and possessions. The actions thus respectively commanded and forbidden are morally good or evil in themselves. No circumstances can alter their nature or annul the obligation to do the one and shun the other. Not only does this stand in all its force as an original law of nature, written alike on tables of stone and in the natural conscience, but its obligation is enhanced by every new relation and motive of the Gospel. That there is such a thing as intrinsic moral good and evil, which no circumstances of supposed expediency can make otherwise, which cannot be set aside by any alleged tendency to promote good arising from their violation, he clearly teaches when he repels, with indignant denunciation of its authors, the charge that Christians act upon the abominable maxim of "doing evil that good may come," and declares their "damnation just" (Rom. iii. 8). There is moral evil then, that remains immutably such, no

matter what good may be effected or intended by doing it. When any principle of truth or righteousness was involved, the apostle was the last man to countenance the remotest deviation from, or shortcoming in adhering to it. When piety, veracity, profaneness, or fraud are involved, one might as well measure them by the yardstick, or seek their market value, as ask, Are they expedient? Paul rarely rises to a more superlative intensity of expression than in the outburst, "Tho we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that we have preached unto you, let him be accursed" (Gal. i. 8). Tho persecutions unto death awaited him for his fidelity to truth as it is in Jesus, yet when this was at stake he was inflexible, and, in the face of terrors which stagger humanity, he could say, with a heart dauntless and serene, "None of these things move me."

Now, of the things lawful in the sense of being morally indifferent *per se*, he says, all are not expedient, which raises the question, mooted from the very beginnings of ethical science and controversy, What is the place of expediency as in any way the foundation of morality, of moral obligation, and as a guide to moral action? On a right adjustment of its true sphere, beyond all doubt, depends the possibility of a true theory of ethics, or a true code of practical morals. In answer, it is quite safe to say that true principles on this subject are as rational as they are Scriptural. They are as adequately set forth and reasoned out by Paul, in the places already indicated, as if he were giving us a complete chapter on the right use of things indifferent, in a formal treatise on Christian ethics.

Before proceeding further, it is to be observed that this inquiry covers the whole distinction between positive and moral laws. Positive law cannot go beyond the domain of expediency. It is applicable only to actions to which expediency is applicable; *i.e.*, to actions *per se* indifferent. No positive law can annul a moral law. It can, however, make actions not in themselves morally binding, become so, when enacted by a competent law-giver. It is not within the prerogative of positive law to authorize worship of more Gods than one, or the practice of blasphemy or perjury. Nor is a positive law enjoining acts adiaphorous in their own nature, rightfully enacted unless, in the circumstances, the performance of such actions tends to good.

So, as moral laws are immutable and irrevocable, positive laws admit of repeal, suspension, or modification, when required by the interests to promote which they were enacted. Of this character are the police laws and regulations, indeed the larger part of all the legislation, of states. When warrantable, they must be adopted for the promotion of righteous ends; but changing circumstances require a constant change of laws for the most effectual furtherance of the same ends. Nearly all have recognized the positive character of the Jewish ceremonial laws in contrast to the decalogue—the former being liable to abrogation, and actually vanishing away at the coming of Christ; the latter so perfect and immutable, that sooner shall the heavens pass away than one jot or tittle thereof shall fail. The moral and religious truths and interests subserved by these ceremonies abide. The means of promoting them are changed with changing circumstances. Circumcision and the passover give way to the Christian sacraments, all being alike “signs and seals of the righteousness of faith.” The hard ritual observance of the Jewish Sabbath disappears with the other ceremonial regimen of that economy. The true rest from worldly distractions by a joyous rest in God, under an economy of greater liberty, is best attained by sloughing off integuments which once protected, but longer continued, would hamper, its power for good. It would sacrifice the true well-being of man to a stiff outward ceremony, the very end of the Sabbath to a mere outward form, so reversing the law that “the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath.”

The subjects of the controversies and divisions which led Paul to make his deliverances to the Roman and Corinthian Christians had reference in part to the sacred days of the Jews, regarded as still being such by some Jewish Christians, while not so in fact, nor so regarded by the more enlightened converts. But these days having been constituted sacred by positive statute, ceased to be such with the cessation of the law and the reasons for it—*cessante ratione cessat lex*.

Many persons confound the positive with the moral law, and argue as if each were equally subject to revocation or exception, not merely by the mere fiat of the law-giver, but at the behest of strong personal sentiment. As if a ruler could be equally

entitled to obedience in enjoining idolatry, imposing an income-tax, or making a police regulation. Something of this sort displays itself in that passionate but brilliant outburst of Jacobi in his letter to Fichte, which seems to sink ordinary morality in a super-sublimated sentimentality:

“Yea, I am that atheist, and that godless person who, contrary to the will which wills nothing, will lie like the dying Desdemona; will lie and deceive like Pylades representing himself as Orestes; will murder like Timoleon; will be a law and oath breaker like Epaminondas and John de Witt; will resolve on suicide like Otho; rob the temple like David—yea, will pluck ears of corn on the Sabbath for this reason only, that I am hungry, and the law was made for man and not man for the law. I am that godless person, and despise the philosophy which therefore calls me godless, despise it and its very essence; for with the holiest certainty of my soul I know that the *privilegium aggratiandi* for such offences against the simple letter of the absolute universal law of reason is the peculiar prerogative of man, the seal of his dignity and of his divine nature.—*Jacobi's Letter to Fichte*, Hamburg ed. pp. 32, 33.

The confusion of moral with positive law here is manifest. The shew-bread acquired its sanctity solely from positive institution. No moral principle was violated when its necessary use for ends higher than any mere outward ceremonial was tolerated. The same is true of the relation of plucking corn on the Sabbath, to appease hunger and preserve health, to the charge of Sabbath-breaking. The Lord of the Sabbath makes a very summary disposition of it—which is comprehended under a broader principle respecting the immolation of piety, morality, and humanity on those altars of external rites which are ordained only in furtherance of them—“I will have mercy and not sacrifice.” “The Sabbath,” says our Lord, “was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath.” While this shows that no such rigor of outward Sabbath observance is to be insisted on as to make man a victim of such rigid formality, nevertheless it does not annul the sacredness of the day, or the duty of abstinence from all worldly labors and recreations not demanded by necessity and mercy. But Jacobi treats this positive and dispensable element in the Sabbath as if it were on the same footing as absolutely moral laws, grounded in the nature of things, and beyond all suspension or repeal; as if the obliga-

tions to abstain from idolatry, profaneness, murder, adultery, theft, and lying, were on no higher ground, and it could be properly said of these in relation to man, "They were made for him, not he for them." The reverse of this is true of the moral law, whether as emanent in express statute, or immanent in God's perfect nature and will. It is not *made* in the sense of being capable of non-existence, so long as God and his accountable creatures exist. It is not *made* for them in the sense of being subordinate to them or their interests, if these could properly be conceived to be in conflict with it; or capable of annulment if found in real or supposed conflict with them. Conformity to this law, which is perfect, does indeed make man perfect in character and condition. But this goes to prove that man is made for it, and must make it his supreme standard; not that it was made for man, and must be flexible to his vacillations. Is it not a sheer solecism to say that the law of truth is a mere arbitrary enactment, made for the benefit of man, and revocable at pleasure when it goes athwart man's pleasure or interest? Is it not the case, rather, that man, by virtue of his moral and rational nature, is made to love, maintain, speak, and act the truth, and every other part of that perfect and immutable law no iota of which shall ever fail? It is the province of human legislatures to protect and enforce truth by punishing perjury, libel, and fraud. What would be thought of their affixing pains and penalties to the utterance of truth, or the practice of honesty?

There is indeed a border-land here, as nearly everywhere outside of pure *a priori* sciences, in which the two kinds, however distinct, still overlap and interpenetrate. The moral law, tho not any creation of mere arbitrary will, in which *stat pro ratione voluntas*, is nevertheless what God wills, and in this sense is binding because divinely commanded. Positive precepts of religion, tho only obligatory because positively instituted, are nevertheless so instituted of God because, for the time being, they serve moral ends. Sometimes these so interblend that it is not easy to find the precise boundary-line between them. This is peculiarly true of the Christian Sabbath, which, as to the nature and ends of the sacred rest it provides and enjoins, is moral, and in its own nature obligatory. But as to the precise



day, its order and frequency of recurrence, and the external form and rigor of observance—this is matter of positive enactment, and depends upon it. It would be safe to say that he is no Christian who observes no days or times of sacred rest. But it would be quite aside of the mark to say that one who, lost in the forests or on a desert island, or through mistaken calculations, fixes on the wrong day as a Sabbath, is therefore any the less a Christian. Something of this kind must be conceded to different persuasions as to the required form and manner of its observance. But because modern life is so conditioned upon facilities for public travel that even church-going requires forms of public carriage not formerly needed, it does not follow that there should be no restriction of railway travel or transportation on the Sabbath, or that these agencies of locomotion should promote its desecration by excursions for pleasure and revelry on that day. Because it is right to take the first rope or boat one can lay hold of to save a drowning man, it does not follow that St. Crispin was right in stealing leather for purposes of charity to the poor. The difficulty here, however, respects the application of principles more than the principles themselves. There is always less difficulty with principles in the abstract, as such. The chief perplexity and controversy arise as to their application to concrete cases. To render to creatures the homage due to the Creator, or worship them as God, would be unquestioned idolatry; but some Romanists, admitting this, insist that in kneeling before images of Christ and the saints, or literal figures or emblems suggesting the Trinity, they are not bowing down to these, but to the divinity they symbolize. A lie is a false representation made with intent to deceive, when the circumstances imply at least, a promise to utter truth. But in regard to how many cases may questions arise, whether there is a misrepresentation in fact or intention, or whether a promise is fairly implied to make accurate statements? It would be agreed that feints and stratagems in war, made with the design of mystifying or misleading the opposing general, involve no promise, implied or otherwise, to give him light, or not to mislead him. But communications made under a flag of truce involve a recognized pledge to utter the truth. The violation of this would make the offender an outlaw. It would hardly be

said that a mother using every deception to hide her child from the murderer or kidnapper was under any implied promise to enlighten, or not to mislead him in her communications. But go a step further. Suppose it were to save her property from robbery, spoliation, confiscation, extortion. Do we not soon reach a point where false representations with intent to deceive do break the implied understandings amongst men, and incur the guilt of lying, unless all falsehoods to protect one's interests are to be taken out of the category of lying and approved as guiltless? And then what faith can remain in the word, promise, or honor of men? The very bonds of society are thus sundered, and all men become Ishmaelites to each other. Yet while this is so, it is impossible to formulate rules to meet every case which will not become a snare by being made, without much stretching, to cover cases which admit of no justification that would not be a defence for lying in general. The only safe course in respect to this, as to all moral precepts, is to proceed on the assumption that they form the only rule of conduct, and to provide no rules for anomalous cases. Abnormities require no norm. Each case has its own peculiarities. If eccentric to all general laws, it has its own line of deflection not described by any other. If it justifies any apparent transgression of the moral rule, it will furnish its own reasons and motives of sufficient strength and urgency. There is no danger that he who recognizes no law in his utterances and promises but that, "putting away all lying, every man speak truth with his neighbor," will not be likely enough to feel and act upon the reasons, which *in extremis* may palliate or justify partial, ambiguous, or misleading answers to robbers, murderers, or simply impudent inquisitors trying to extort what no duty requires to be disclosed to them, without attempting to formulate rules and make out hair-breadth casuistical distinctions and formulas defining when false statements will be admissible. The moment we begin this we enter the confines of Jesuitism. There is no surer way of dulling the moral sense, and paralyzing the mainsprings of morality, than the process of finding or inventing reasons and occasions for being excused from it. It is not the way to grow truthful to become an expert in ways, means, and opportunities for evading or denying the truth. It is like the attempts to

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cultivate Christian feeling and enthusiasm by a morbid introversion of the mind on itself to see whether it possesses or is destitute of them, instead of contemplating the objects fitted to excite them. It is like vitalizing the body by practising anatomy and vivisection upon it. But we must now consider more positively and fully the relation of duty and expediency to things adiaphorous.

In approaching this, it is to be observed that, as in the seeming exceptional cases just noticed, each specific instance of action is quite beyond all general rules applicable to all its details. It is thrown back upon the individual conscience and judgment to make a candid and right decision, when perhaps a great complexity of considerations comes in. It is very different from the categorical yes or no, which may be the easy and unmistakable answer to such questions involving veracity as—“Are you a Presbyterian, an Episcopalian, a Methodist?” or, “What ought you to do about refunding borrowed money which you have promised to pay?” The question, how much pocket-money ought you to allow a spendthrift, or an economical son, is one which you alone can decide, which brings an individualizing of duty, and of the determination of it to yourself, as a far more formidable personal problem than the question of keeping an oath, or paying a debt.

1. This class of actions, tho in themselves neither binding nor prohibited, is nevertheless not in such a sense extra-moral, or beyond the scope of conscientious oversight and direction, that we are not amenable to conscience and to God for our course in respect to each and all of them. From our very constitution as free, voluntary, accountable agents, we are responsible for each and every voluntary act. We are bound, not only to do acts intrinsically good and avoid those intrinsically bad, but in respect to those not such, the obligation holds, to do or refrain from doing them according as they, apparently to the doer, in the exercise of his candid judgment, and in view of the best light he can get, tend to the furtherance of that which is morally, religiously, Christianly, good or evil. Herein each one is responsible for the exercise of due diligence and candor in seeking the truth. Thus, what food, dress, furniture, equipage one shall have is, in itself, a thing indifferent; but if it be

noxious to health of ourselves or others; if it be beyond our means of honest payment; if it tend to tempt others to an extravagance of ostentatious expenditure that works evil, and evil only, in the church and society; if, from unsuitableness to our position, it curtails our influence for good; in short, not to go into further detail, if the visible consequences be evil only, or evil with no compensating good; or if upon ourselves the effect be to inflame evil lusts—anything but for edification—then there is a clear obligation to abstain from it. Yet, on the other hand, it will never do to say that we must deny ourselves all of what are called luxuries, because life and efficiency in the service of Christ could be sustained without them; to rule out all that ministers to the temperate gratification of the tastes which God has given us, physical, artistic, intellectual—in short, the appetencies, “whether of the palate or of the soul.” To proscribe refinement and culture, and relapse into the privations of asceticism, barbarism, or semi-civilization—this is not Christianity, tho sometimes mistaken for it. There is little danger in this direction. It is mostly the other way in this day of abounding self-indulgence, pampered by superabounding material wealth. The poor, too, are far better supported by industry in ministering to the wants of those able to employ them, than by charity so bestowed as to support idleness and vagrancy. Still, men are accountable for every free act in respect to things indifferent. They are bound, while “free from all men and the servants of none,” in all things to seek their own and others’ welfare, and the honor of God; or, as Paul sums up all his teachings on this subject in the all-inclusive charge: “Let every one please his neighbor to edification” (Rom. xv. 2). “Whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God” (1 Cor. x. 31).

2. We are thus finding our way to the true scope of Christian liberty in such matters. For there is beyond doubt a liberty in these things that has no application to lying, stealing, licentiousness, profaneness, idolatry, or atheism. We are bound to do that which appears to be for the highest good. But who shall judge and determine this question? Each one clearly, getting the best light he can, must judge for himself. “Let each one,” says Paul, “be fully persuaded in his own mind”

(Rom. xiv. 5). He is bound, indeed, to judge candidly and carefully, but still he must judge for himself. Others may not usurp the prerogative of judging him, or judging for him. In such matters he is not a law to other men's consciences, nor they to his. "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant? To his own master he stands or falls." (Rom. xiv. 4.) In respect to other men, therefore, in things indifferent, he is not in bondage. He is in the sphere of liberty which, in all proper ways and on all suitable occasions, he is to maintain in the fear of God, indeed in the face of, and, if need be, against all men. But—

3. How is he to use this liberty? This depends on circumstances, one thing alone being invariable—that he is always responsible to God for the right use of it. At the threshold, too, it may be further added negatively, that he is not to use it for selfish gratification when this conflicts with the spiritual good of the subject of it, of his brethren; in a word, the blessing of man and the glory of God. In the epistle to the Galatians (v. 13), the apostle tells them, "For, brethren, ye have been called unto liberty; only use not your liberty as an occasion to the flesh, but by love serve one another." So his uniform charge, however varied in form, in treating of these subjects, is to "follow the things which make for peace, and things wherewith one may edify another" (Rom. xiv. 19). Since "None of us liveth to himself and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord." (*Id.* 7, 8.)

So the use of this liberty is to be governed by charity, not only in the general sense of using it for the edification of others; of doing good unto all men as we have opportunity, especially unto the household of faith (Gal. vi. 10); but in a charitable consideration and treatment of one another's infirmities, or differing judgments and practices in respect to the right use of things indifferent in themselves. This, indeed, is the great stress of the apostle's elaborate exposition of this subject in the parts of his letters referred to. He treats of the observance or non-observance of certain days which in the eyes of some were sacred, so that to them their non-observance was a sin, while others knew them to have no sanctity above other days. In the same way, some abstained from meats as having been pol-



luted by being offered to idols ; others knew that there was no sin in eating these things, and accordingly indulged in them, disregarding the scruples of their weaker brethren. Thus, on the one hand, they wounded their weak brethren's conscience by doing that which in their eyes was sin. But while thus grieving, they also tempted these weaker ones to sin, by following the example of the more enlightened, in doing what in the eyes of the latter, and in itself, was not sinful, but became sinful when done by the less enlightened, because the latter believed it so. For tho in these matters indifferent, as the apostle declares, "all things are pure," yet "it is evil for that man that eateth with offence" (Rom. xiv. 20). That is to say, if a man, in whatever he is doing, believes he sins, and intends to sin, he does thereby sin. Whatever be the nature of the act, there is the sin of evil intent. In Paul's expressive words, "Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that which he alloweth ; and he that doubteth is damned [condemned] if he eat, because he eateth not of faith. And whatsoever is not of faith is sin." (*Id.* 22, 23.) Irrespective of all questions about any other faith, whatsoever a man does without any faith in its being what, according to his best light and judgment, is pleasing to God, is sin.

Now, instead of acting in the pride of a "knowledge that puffeth up," rather than the "charity which edifieth" (1. Cor. viii. 1), and thus speeding weak Christians on to destruction, we should sacrifice our own pleasure and emolument, when we can do so without moral compromise, to their spiritual welfare, in a charitable estimate of their scruples and judgments, however groundless, if yet they be conscientious. What can surpass the conclusiveness of the apostle's argument, or the urgency of his appeal? Speaking in reference to the treatment of those who felt that in eating meat which had been offered in sacrifice to idols, they were incurring the guilt of idolatry, he says: "But meat commendeth us not to God : for neither, if we eat, are we the better ; neither, if we eat not, are we the worse. But take heed lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling-block to them that are weak. For if any one see thee which hast knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not the conscience of him which is weak be emboldened to eat those things which are offered to idols ; and through thy knowledge

shall the weak brother perish, for whom Christ died? But when ye sin so against the weak brethren, ye sin against Christ." (1. Cor. viii. 8-12.)

4. The grand conclusion of the whole matter is then reached by the apostle, in which we would approach the practical outcome of this discussion: "Wherefore if meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend" (1. Cor. viii. 13). A conclusion somewhat amplified in the correspondent part of his letter to the Romans, when he declares: "It is good neither to eat flesh nor drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak" (Rom. xiv. 21). This is only a segment in the grander sweep of that all-inclusive practical and theoretical law of the Christian life already emphasized, in which his treatment of this subject culminates—"Whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God."

A man may be a Christian without being a Christian gentleman, and this, too, without being amenable to church discipline for being rough, coarse, boastful, self-asserting, and regardless of the just feelings and claims of others. But, it hardly need be said, this is a most unseemly and unedifying assertion of Christian liberty. How much finer and nobler is that exercise of it enjoined by the apostle—"Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things" (Phil. iv. 8). No wonder at the eulogium attributed to the infidel Bolingbroke, who is reputed to have declared his admiration of the apostle Paul "because he was so perfect a gentleman."

But the law of charity is not one-sided. If they who have knowledge that some things are sinless, which their weaker brother deems sinful, may not use their knowledge uncharitably in a haughty or uncaring contempt of his ignorant scruples, or in tempting him to commit that which, tho no sin to an enlightened Christian, is a sin to him, from his narrow standpoint; neither, on the other hand, may the weaker brother judge and condemn one who differs from him in his views and practice respecting these non-essential and indifferent matters. He is to presume that his brother acts in the case according to

his best light, and in all good conscience. Most flagrant breaches of charity tending to hurtful, and even fatal strifes and divisions, have often resulted from the fanatical and bigoted anathematizing of practices innocent in themselves, by ultraists, by one-idea reformers, by those "righteous over-much" in single lines of self-denial, who make abundant amends for this by swinging over to heedless and even foul self-indulgence elsewhere; who are monomaniacs in some one reform, and licentious in general living; whose prototypes were depicted once for all by our Saviour as those who "pay tithe of mint, anise, and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith" (Matt. xxiii. 23). From all such uncharitableness, good Lord, deliver us. Says Paul: "Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth: for God hath received him" (Rom. xiv. 3).

And further, it may sometimes happen that, when narrow, ignorant, and fanatical people undertake to enforce, as a matter of absolute, universal, and intrinsic obligation, what, after all, falls under the category of things indifferent, and is to be determined by each one's conscientious judgment as to its expediency and propriety in the circumstances, it may be a duty to say so, and act accordingly. A principle may be involved in yielding to demands that we treat that as a sin, in its own nature and in all circumstances, which is only so by accident and in some circumstances, of which circumstances and their moral bearings each one, in all candor, must judge for himself; herein being subject to no man, and not at liberty to allow himself to be subject to any other. It may sometimes be a duty to do what otherwise would be better refrained from, for the simple purpose of asserting and vindicating a liberty unwarrantably threatened or invaded. Even in cases in which Paul exhorts to abstinence from things offered to idols, for the sake of the weak believer who protests against it as partaking of idolatry, he says: "Eat not, for his sake that shewed it; and for conscience' sake: for the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof: Conscience, I say, NOT THINE OWN, BUT OF THE OTHER: FOR WHY IS MY LIBERTY JUDGED OF ANOTHER MAN'S CONSCIENCE?" (1. Cor. x. 27-9.)

So, while he declares, "All things are lawful for me; but

all things are not expedient," he adds, "I will not be brought under the power of any." He charges us to "stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage" (Gal. v. 1). Because, of itself, external circumcision is neither morally good nor evil, in peculiar circumstances Paul circumcised Timothy, so as to avoid exciting the prejudices of the Jews against Christianity, and thus hindering his access to them for good. But when this concession came to be perverted so that Jews and Judaizing converts insisted on the circumcision of the Gentiles as essential to their salvation and recognition as Christians, and when Peter was giving some countenance to the demand, he discarded and denounced it utterly, because, practised in compliance with such a demand, it amounted to a sacrifice of principle and a surrender of the Gospel. Therefore he declares that Titus, who was with him, being a Greek was not "compelled" to be circumcised; and this, because false brethren "came in privily to spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus, that they might bring us into bondage" (Gal. ii. 3, 4). And herein he declares he "withstood Peter to the face because he was to be blamed."

It is obviously a chief problem of the Christian life, and of common morality as well, rightly to adjust the true maintenance and use of liberty in things indifferent, so as not virtually to sacrifice it and fall into a bondage, galling, ensnaring, debilitating, on the one hand; yet so as to promote the honor of Christ in our own and others' edification, on the other. We are not to allow others to impose on us super-scriptural standards of morality and conditions of salvation, on the one hand; or, on the other, to use our liberty in things indifferent so as to turn it into licentiousness, or to sacrifice, or subordinate the spiritual welfare of others to our own self-indulgence. While "free, yet not using our liberty for a cloak of maliciousness" (1. Pet. ii. 16). Charity, love, in every aspect and outworking of it, is to be the grand overmastering impulse of the Christian life. With tireless assiduity, with a heavenly tact and wisdom, we are to aim to adapt ourselves to all; to come into sympathetic, winsome communication with all, that so we may be in the best position to do them good; to gain them to Christ, holiness, and

salvation. So the practical conclusion of the whole matter is, that each one for himself, and especially all who would be wise to win souls, should make the great apostle's line of conduct their own, in due adaptation to time, place, and circumstance. "For tho I be free from all men, yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law; to them that are without law as without law (being not without law to God, but under law to Christ), that I might gain them that are without law. To the weak became I as weak, that I might gain the weak: I am made all things to all men, if by any means I might save some." (1 Cor. ix. 19-22.)

But here we must mark the boundary between Christian and Jesuitical expediency, wisdom, and prudence in upholding and propagating the church and Gospel. Within the sphere of things lawful, *i.e.* not sinful, all the resources of Christian ingenuity, benignity, fidelity, should be exhausted to devise ways and find media of successful approach to the souls of men, "if by any means we may save some;" if we may allure them away from sin, vice, evil, to Christ and clean Christian living. In things non-essential and indifferent we must accommodate ourselves to their prejudices, and infirmities even; yea, with sweetest persuasion and gentlest insinuation go down into their hearts, and draw them as with the cords of a man and the bands of love; or if they be defiant and presumptuous in their wickedness and irreligion, it may be expedient to awe them with the divine threatenings; by the terrors of the Lord to persuade them, and to pierce their self-inflation by the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God. It is our opinion that the Protestant and evangelical ministry fail far more grievously here, than in regard to preaching the substance and marrow of Christian truth. They may often fail of due earnestness, which is very much like want of blood in the body. But they fail still more, we apprehend, in that ineffable tact which rightly divides the word of truth, so timing, proportioning, adapting it that it shall stand forth, not in dead heartless abstractions, often abstractions of abstractions; but in living concrete forms, so that



men shall behold themselves in it as in a glass, and, with their needs, shall behold "Him that liveth, and was dead; and is alive forever more, and hath the keys of death and hell." If the weakness of the pulpit lies largely here, much more, unless we mistake, does great weakness out of the pulpit lie in just this region: in the want of heart, zeal, tact, to bear the heavenly message from house to house, and from heart to heart, with the kindling warmth of love, and the aptness of a heaven-inspired wisdom. We are sure that many pastorates now fearfully barren would be more fruitful, if this vacuum of kind face-to-face dealing with souls were properly filled. This is not the duty of the pastor only. It is the province of all Christians, especially office-bearers in the church. And no service is more rich in blessings to its doers, its objects, and the whole church. But it can scarcely be expected that others will be very efficient in this work, however much exhorted to it, with no stimulus and guidance of pastoral example. There have been pastors utterly refraining from such service, almost as much as if it were a *malum prohibitum*, who contented themselves with publicly scourging their people for not doing it, or into doing it—a process very impotent and unsatisfying to all parties, so long as the minister does not himself thus "allure to brighter worlds and lead the way."

But while they are, within the limits prescribed, "to become all things to all men, if by any means they may save some," they are not to go the length of doing evil that good may come, or of the Jesuitical maxim that "the end sanctifies the means." They are indeed to be "wise as serpents," but "harmless as doves." We are to "seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness." "Other things shall be added" unto us in due order. But we are not to commit unrighteousness as a means of promoting righteousness, much less for the sake of decoying people into the church, which so far as built up in this way is a very fabric of iniquity, not the temple of God. A fatal error is the subordination of other, even moral, obligations to that of promoting and enlarging the church. Pre-eminent is that doctrine concerning veracity which requires or permits the confessor to deny his knowledge of what is told him at the confessional, because he does not know, with a communicable knowledge—

*scientia communicabile*. This is one form of the doctrine of mental reservation in our affirmations; *i.e.*, making them according to truth, save wherein the mind secretly reserves the privilege of having it otherwise—a principle which, carried out, undermines all confidence between man and man, and disorganizes society.

The other bad maxim, once, if not now, in vogue with Jesuits and others, is found in Probabilism, so named. That is, as duty is often doubtful, according to some almost always so, probability may be our guide. This probability may pertain to the nature of the act, or the opinions of casuists about it; and since these opinions often differ, thus leaving pure probability for our guide, this will be followed if we take the less, or least probable authority. For even then we shall be following probability, which is our lawful guide. It is obvious that such a principle of duty undermines all foundations. There is no standard of right. Right may be the most, or least, probably right. We can never know what or whom to trust. Probability in any form never applies, more than expediency, to actions in themselves moral. It is only applicable, where expediency is, to things morally indifferent; and then only in reference to their most probable bearings or tendencies. But even here the doctrine that the least probability may overbear a greater and predominating one is itself monstrous, and subverts all ethical standards. It installs mere caprice as the guide of the vast majority of human actions. It is only matched by that climacteric proverb of unscrupulous greed and ambition—"Nothing succeeds like success."

In close neighborhood to this, lies the application of the principle of expediency to the times, ways, degrees of fulness, of communicating truth by those who possess it, not only to other classes, but to those in a state of mind incapable of appreciating or not perverting it. This includes also the case of those who consider themselves to have reached views of truth and degrees of knowledge beyond their generation or church. In respect to this general subject certain principles are beyond dispute. (1) No one can innocently proclaim as true what he knows or believes to be untrue; or that as certain which to his own mind is doubtful. (2) No man may from

selfish or worldly motives hold back truths or portions of truth known to himself, which appear suited to the wants of those whom he addresses; or when the non-avowal of them amounts to a failure to make a good confession before many witnesses, a "shunning to declare the whole counsel of God" (Acts xx. 27). But within these limits there is a certain liberty, which often becomes a duty, of reserve in the communication of truth or portions of truth, because, for one reason or another, those addressed are incapable of not perverting or abusing it. This is determined very largely by the knowledge or ignorance, the maturity or immaturity, the candor or obduracy, of those with whom we have to deal. We are not to cast pearls before swine. Babes in Christ must be fed with milk, the rudiments of truth, not with meat, or with truth in forms more advanced, abstract, or methodical, because they are as yet unable to bear it. It is beyond their powers of digestion and assimilation. It would therefore minister not strength, but debility. The Great Teacher thus held back important teachings until his disciples should come under fit conditions of training and discipline to receive profit and not harm from them. He told them, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now" (John xvi. 12). Yet there are limits to all this. It is easy to stretch it so as to make it a pretext for unfaithfulness and time-serving, rather than a principle of wise and conscientious discretion in "becoming all things to all men for the sake of saving some." It would be absurd in itself, and a gross breach of trust, to always be withholding what the souls of the people need, because some are confounded by it, while others wrest it to their own destruction. It would be like keeping the sane in ignorance or error on account of the whims of the insane; like refusing to make the Scriptures profitable for "reproof and correction" to the great mass who need it, because it might still further distress some wretched victim of religious melancholy; like keeping the well on a starveling diet in order to avoid overloading spiritual dyspeptics. To withhold saving or edifying truth because it will be so misapplied by some as to become unprofitable and injurious to them, would amount to withholding it altogether. To some the preacher must be "a savor of life unto life;" to others, "of death unto death"

(2 Cor. ii. 16). Each new case presents its own peculiarities. None can be fully provided for by any minute, cast-iron rule. The heavenly wisdom, zeal, and love of the preacher are brought into constant requisition. He must do his best, without treason to truth and God, "if by any means he may save some."

The esoteric and exoteric, the progressive and conservative, and the obligation to publish or keep silent in regard to supposed discoveries in advance of standing beliefs, come under similar methods of adjudication, subject to one special qualification. While one who supposes himself illuminated beyond his brethren, or his time, is to judge before God whether the present voluntary promulgation of his views is, in the present condition and temper of those affected by them, likely to be for edification; and while he is never to deny or disguise them if called in providence to declare himself; he may justly feel bound to keep silence until he is sure they have passed beyond their crude and immature state to that ripeness which comes of long study, reflection, and experience. Nay, he ought to feel bound to this, rather than cause disturbance and convulsions by that very rawness which time will defecate from them. That brilliant genius, Horace Bushnell, late in life, characterized those works which thirty years ago convulsed the Congregational churches of Connecticut as "green."<sup>1</sup> Perhaps, had he waited till his views ripened before promulgating them, much sad agitation would have been spared himself and his communion. But it must never be assumed that any man, body of men, churches, are infallible, or that they have mastered the *omne scibile*, or that the whole meaning of the Scriptures has been evolved, or that no new light will come forth from them, and upon them, through diligent study, and the illumination of God's Providence and Spirit. All plausible claims to new light should be candidly considered and weighed. The most charitable construction should be put even upon apparent aberrations. But if they strike at fundamentals, upon what within the pale of the Christian church has, not in the speculations of theorists and dogmatists, but in the faith, life, prayers, and hymns of Christian people, been accepted *semper, ubique, ab omnibus*, then we may conclude that, if the church has not found the substance of the Bible's teach-

<sup>1</sup> Life and Letters of Horace Bushnell, p. 553.

ing so far, it is undiscoverable. The Bible has then failed as a revelation to man. Infidelity is the true creed. This will not do. Our course is plain here. Accept whatever real light comes to us. "Prove all things. Hold fast that which is good." (1 Thess. v. 21.) "If there come any unto you and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed" (2 John 10). The charity that beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, is a charity that rejoiceth in the truth. Indeed the whole matter of liberty, duty, and charity, in the manner of mutual dealing between those who suppose themselves more enlightened in doctrine and those whom they deem less so, is closely akin to the case of those who have more or less light in regard to the right or wrong of using things indifferent. To find the point of practical junction or reconciliation of the two principles—"If thy brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkest thou not uncharitably," and "Why is my liberty judged of another man's conscience?"—is one of the chief problems of Christian life.

The application of the principles thus conspicuous and unmistakable in Paul's treatment of this great subject, which touches life at nearly all points and all times, must be left very much to each one's individual judgment and conscience. It is eminently the sphere of personal liberty and responsibility combined. Here we call no man Lord. One is our Master, even Christ. Questions of practice incessantly controverted—games, amusements, indulgences that have been and are sharply debated—find here the principle by which they must be tried. Are they, in a given case, for edification? Do they promote the moral and religious welfare of men? Are they conducive to good, all things considered?

It seems to us a beneficent use of Christian liberty to abstain from intoxicating beverages, not because all use of them is *per se* a sin, but because, while no duty requires them to be taken except in special cases for medicinal or hygienic uses, such abstinence promotes their disuse and so lessens great perils to ourselves, to others, to society. The evils averted by their universal disuse in our view surpass all calculation. But this does not justify us in making such abstinence a test of virtue, uprightness, or religion, or the want of it an iniquity to be visited with social ostracism, civil penalties, or church excommunication.



Different views of expediency and obligation may and do obtain here, and the liberty of each is not to be judged by "other men's consciences." Much less may we do evil that good may come, or maintain unscriptural doctrine in order to raise the supposed stringency of the obligation of abstinence above the plane of expediency to that of intrinsic and immutable obligation, like the duty of abstaining from poisoning wells. Such we esteem the doctrine, maintained by some, that all the wines, any use of which is permitted in Scripture, were unfermented and non-alcoholic. If the cause of temperance, as dependent on abstinence, can be placed on no stronger basis than this, it cannot stand or prevail. Not only so. But the system of torturing the Scriptures out of their obvious meaning, in the supposed interest of so excellent a cause, is capable of wide application, and may easily be made effective for emasculating them of whatever clashes with the baldest rationalism, or "the desires of the flesh and the mind;" in a word, for undermining the authority of that on which every good cause must find its firmest foundation. What higher ground of appeal do we want than that of Christian expediency—the duty of so using our liberty that it may offer no stumbling-block or occasion to fall to others? "It is good neither to eat flesh, nor drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak" (Rom. xiv. 21). So says Paul. So say we. If this does not suffice, what will? When ceremonies indifferent in themselves were demanded of, and enforced upon, the reformers as a condition of unity, they deemed it the time not to yield even in things indifferent, if the demand was enforced by persecution. Says the Formula of Concord, *de cæremoniis ecclesiasticis*: "Credimus, docemus et confitemur, quod temporibus persecutionum, quando perspicua et constans confessio a nobis exigitur, hostibus evangelii in rebus adiaphoris non sit cedendum" (Art. x. 4.)

We say this not only in interest of truth as such, but because we believe the cause of total abstinence itself, in all its most benignant influence, will, on the true basis, have a far wider prevalence than on that which many, as we think, in this respect, injudicious friends of it, have so long been attempting to substitute for it.

LYMAN H. ATWATER.

## LEGAL PROHIBITION OF THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC.

EVERY great reform, in the course of its development, is said to pass through three stages. In the first, no notice is taken of it by the practical mind ; in the second, it is denounced as unworthy of notice ; while in the third stage its expediency is conceded and its practical character recognized by all. That the movement in favor of the legal prohibition of the liquor traffic has met with ridicule, derision, and contempt is neither surprising nor important. No great movement running counter to all the customs and habits of thought of a people ever had a different experience. If it be grounded on a *just principle*, its ultimate success is assured.

### THE JUSTICE OF THE PRINCIPLE.

Writers like John Stuart Mill in England, Laboulaye in France, and Von Humboldt in Germany, have sought to contract the limits of state legislation as much as possible without destroying the existence of the state. But we are willing to grant them that there is a circle around every individual which no government ought to overstep. No one denies that to-day. We are willing also to have the boundary line drawn where Mr. Mill has drawn it, and to say with him, this reserved territory includes all that part which concerns only the life, whether inward or outward, of the individual, and does not affect the interests of others, or affects them only through the moral influence of example. Or we may adopt the limitation of state action as laid down by Von Humboldt, and say that to protect its citizens the state must forbid or restrict those actions having an immediate relation to the actor alone whose consequences injure others in their rights ; that is, which “without their consent diminish their freedom or their goods, *or from which these*

*results may fairly be apprehended to proceed."* Does the prohibition of the traffic in intoxicating liquors fall within any such limitation of state action as is here marked out? It certainly does not. No one can doubt but that the results which may fairly be apprehended to proceed from the traffic in intoxicating liquors diminish both the freedom and the goods of others, by creating a criminal class to prey upon both, and a pauper class to be supported at the public expense. No rule of limitation can be laid down which permits the existence of the state and yet denies to it the power to protect itself against an evil and a wrong which would undermine the very foundations upon which the social fabric rests. If the natural and proximate result of the use of intoxicating liquors is intoxication, and the natural and proximate results of intoxication are disorder, violence, and crime, he must needs be bold indeed who would deny to the state the right to protect its endangered interests by prohibiting the endangering act.

But it is sometimes said that every one has a *natural* right to buy and sell and drink intoxicating liquors; that to deny him this right is to unjustly interfere with his natural freedom from restraint. This argument implies that this "natural freedom from restraint" is some valuable right which a man possessed in a state of nature, and which it is therefore the duty of the state to recognize and protect. Every one, however, ought to know, what has been shown over and over again, that "in no proper or valuable sense has any such liberty existed or been possible." A state of nature in which man is to be considered as an individual without regard to family or political relations, with a right to do as he pleases, is a state of perpetual warfare and contention. It is by no means certain that there ever was any such thing as a *natural* as distinguished from a *social* state. But if there was, man when he passed from his natural into his social state merged his natural in his civil rights. And civil rights are defined by that eminent jurist Mr. Justice Cooley as embracing "the right to do everything not harmful to the public or to other individuals." Whenever a private right becomes injurious, noxious, or offensive to the public good, the private right becomes subordinate to the public right which community has to demand protection therefrom. Acts

innocent in themselves acquire from circumstances the quality of injuring the public. To carry arms about one's person for purposes of self-protection is in itself an innocent act. But where citizens generally do the same thing the tendency is to create disorder and cause the unjustifiable taking of human life; the state, therefore, prohibits the carrying of dangerous weapons concealed upon one's person. So the building of a depot for the storage of gunpowder is in itself harmless and innocent, but the erection of a building for such a purpose in the centre of a crowded city becomes, from the surrounding circumstances, dangerous to the community, and is consequently not allowed. The same is true in reference to the exhibition of fireworks in large towns, which is sometimes forbidden for similar reasons. So it may be said of the traffic in intoxicating liquors, that notwithstanding it may be innocent in itself, it may nevertheless, by force of circumstances, be injurious to the public welfare and dangerous to the public peace. And if this be so, the private right of sale has become subordinate to the public right of protection. We conclude, therefore, that no man has a natural or a civil right to indulge in a traffic which renders life and property insecure, which promotes immorality, and creates public paupers to be supported at the state's expense. If it appears that the traffic in intoxicating liquors does all this, the justice of the principle that would prohibit and stamp out the whole miserable traffic cannot be denied.

States possess by the law of their existence certain rights or powers which are the inherent attributes of sovereignty. Among these is what is known as the Police Power. Fichte terms this power "the mediator between the state and its citizens." No one denies such a power to the state. Jeremy Bentham describes "police" as a system of precaution for the prevention of crimes or calamities, and distributes its business into eight distinct branches, three of which we desire to consider in connection with the duty of the state toward the traffic in intoxicating liquors. These are :

1. Police for the prevention of offences ;
2. Police of the public health ;
3. Police of charity.

## RELATION TO CRIME.

1. *Police for the prevention of offences.* If the state is possessed of the police power to enable it to take precautionary measures for the prevention of offences, it is important to ascertain, as nearly as may be, the exact relations of this traffic to crime. In 1670 that eminent chief-justice Sir Matthew Hale expressed himself in the following manner: "After an observation of more than twenty years in the courts, I have found that if the murders and manslaughters, the burglaries and robberies, the riots and tumults, the adulteries, fornications, rapes, and other enormities that have happened in that time were divided into five parts, four of them have been the issues and products of excessive drinking—of tavern or ale-house drinking." Passing over many similar utterances by distinguished judges of England and of this country, we come to the opinion recently pronounced by Noah Davis, the learned Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, wherein he says: "Whether judging from the declared judicial experience of others or from my own, or from carefully collected statistics running through many series of years, I believe it entirely safe to say that one half of all the crime of this country and of Great Britain is caused by the intemperate use of intoxicating liquors; and that of the crimes involving personal violence, certainly three fourths are chargeable to the same cause." No man, tho in his own conceit he be wiser than Sir Matthew Hale and the long line of distinguished men who have believed as he believed, can break the force of these opinions, fortified by statistics that cannot be questioned. An examination of some of these statistics will be both interesting and important. Lord Morpeth in his official capacity as Secretary for Ireland declared that of cases of murder, attempts at murder, offences against the person, aggravated assaults, and cutting and maiming, there were in 1837 *twelve thousand and ninety-six*; in 1838, *eleven thousand and fifty-eight*; but in 1839 only *one thousand and ninety-seven*; while in 1840 there were only *one hundred and seventy-three*. It will be at once admitted by all that this was a most remarkable diminution in the number of offences, for which there must



have been some adequate cause. That cause was the temperance movement instituted by Father Mathew, whose name is to be spoken only in reverence to the latest generations. And that movement, between the years 1838 and 1840, sweeping all Ireland like some great wave of the sea, had cleansed it of the great evil of intemperance which had hitherto been breeding all kinds of crime and disorder in the state. The consumption of spirits fell from 12,296,000 gallons to 5,290,000, and the excise on brandy decreased some £750,000. The number of prisoners confined in the Bridewell at Dublin fell in one year from 136 to 23, and one hundred cells stood empty. The Smithfield prison closed its doors. That was the supreme moment for Ireland. The time was ripe for a prohibitory law. Such a law supported by the public opinion then existing might have been enforced from that time on. But the tide was not taken at its flood. The traffic went on, and everything drifted back to the old condition of things. Father Mathew, learning by experience, finally saw his mistake, and admitted the necessity of a prohibitory law. A committee of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, reporting in 1875, stated that out of 28,289 commitments to the jails of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec during the three previous years, 21,236 were committed either for drunkenness or for crimes perpetrated under the influence of drink. The number of arrests made by the police department of the city of New York during the year 1874 are reported to have been 84,399, and of this number 61,470 were for intoxication and disorderly conduct. The convictions for crime in the State of Maine, with a prohibitory liquor law, were in the proportion of 1 to every 1689 of population. The convictions, on the other hand, in the State of New York (exclusive of New York City), without a prohibitory law, were in the proportion of 1 to every 620 of population. Crime diminished 75 per cent in the State of Connecticut under the prohibitory law of 1854, and in 1873 upon the restoration of the license system it increased 50 per cent in a single year. It cannot be necessary to pursue this subject further, for it must be apparent that the relation between intemperance and crime is that of cause and effect. To permit the sale of intoxicating liquors in grog-shops and saloons is to permit schools for the education of a criminal

class to be opened in every town and hamlet in the commonwealth. Sixty million dollars are annually expended in this country for the apprehension and punishment of those educated in these nurseries of crime and sent forth to prey upon the lives and the property of the citizens of the state. More than forty thousand criminals are supported at the public expense in the prison-houses of this country alone—a number said to be greater than were the allied forces of France and the United States at Yorktown on the memorable day when Cornwallis surrendered to Washington, and more than Lee had in his army at Appomattox Court House.

#### RELATION TO PUBLIC HEALTH.

2. *Police of the public health.* The preservation of the public health has been universally recognized as a subject falling within the legitimate domain of legislation. The ancient Egyptians, we are told by Diodorus of Sicily, employed physicians at the public expense whose duty it was to cure the sick without charge. In parts of Greece publicly paid physicians existed. And in the Roman empire it was the custom for the town authorities to appoint their town physicians, who received a salary from the public treasury and enjoyed immunity from public burdens. Almost every civilized state has had its sanitary laws and its sanitary police. Out of consideration for the public health laws are passed prohibiting the sale of poisonous drugs unless labelled; also laws prohibiting the practice of medicine by those who have not graduated from a medical college or passed a satisfactory examination before a state board of examiners. The interment of the dead within the limits of a dense population is forbidden. The intermarriage of persons within certain degrees of relationship is prohibited, because the children of such marriages are likely to be idiotic, dwarfs, or scrofulous. Laws are passed for the prevention of endemic diseases. Offensive trades are forbidden in populous districts. The property of citizens is taken possession of, purified, and even destroyed by the state when the public health demands it. In one case a regulation forbidding the growing of rice within a city was sustained on the ground of its injurious effect upon

health.<sup>1</sup> The life of the citizen is not regarded as belonging to himself, but to the state. Hence the law prohibits duelling, and no severity was formerly too great to be visited upon the *felo-de-se*. By the common law self-murder worked a forfeiture to the king of all the goods and chattels of the *felo-de-se*, and he was ignominiously buried in the highway with a stake driven through his body. If the life of the citizen belongs to the state, it is proper to inquire into the relations which exist between the traffic in intoxicating drinks and the public health. And in making examination into this subject we would direct attention not to what might sneeringly be called by some the "estimates" of philanthropists and reformers, but to the facts as they have been found to exist upon investigation made from a commercial standpoint. Life-insurance companies, as is well known, have been for years studying the influence of inebriety upon their risks. The safe investments of large amounts of capital have depended upon the accuracy of the conclusions reached. These investigations, as given by Mr. Neison, one of the most distinguished of English actuaries, have been summarized as follows: 1. When, in a given number of risks, ten temperate persons die between the ages of fifteen and twenty inclusive, eighteen intemperate persons die. 2. When, in a given number of risks, ten temperate persons die between the ages of twenty and thirty inclusive, fifty-one intemperate persons die, or the risk on an inebriate is more than 500 per cent greater than on a temperate person. 3. When, in a given number of risks, ten temperate persons die between the ages of thirty-one and forty inclusive, about forty intemperate persons die, or the risk is increased some 400 per cent.

The tables prepared by Mr. Neison exhibit at a glance the difference in the chances of duration of life between temperate and intemperate persons. A temperate person's chance of living is at 20, 44.2 years; at 30, 36.5 years; at 40, 28.8 years. An intemperate person's chance of living is at 20, 15.6 years; at 30, 13.8 years; at 40, 11.6 years.

The average life of drunkards is only thirty-five years and six months. The average life of non-users, on the other hand, is

<sup>1</sup> *Green v. Savannah*, 6 Geo. 1.

sixty-four years. The average loss of life, as appears from the statistics of insurance companies, is a loss of twenty-nine years on the life of every drunkard. This is not merely a loss to the individual or to his family, but to the state of that which properly belongs to it. The loss to the state for every one hundred drunkards is the loss of the aggregate wealth which would result from the production of 2900 years. And the aggregate number of years lost by annual premature deaths, on account of intemperance, amounts to 1,127,000 years, if any reliance can be placed upon what are claimed to be reliable statistics. The average wages of a laboring man for a year's services amount to \$500. There is, therefore, an annual loss through premature deaths of \$563,500,000. Large as these figures are, they by no means show the full measure of the loss of productive capacity to the state from this cause. For in addition to this absolute loss is the loss resulting from the inferior capacity for labor of the drunkard during the years that he continues to drag out his miserable existence.

Again, the state, in caring for the public health, expends large sums of public money annually in trying to cure the insane and in providing for the idiotic. Large asylums are erected at great expense, skilled physicians are employed, and the necessary nurses and attendants are required. The annual expenditures in this country for this purpose are estimated to reach \$50,000,000.

It is, therefore, important to inquire into the relation of the traffic in intoxicating liquors to the causation of insanity and of idiocy. Almost any treatise on the subject of insanity will show that the principal causes of this disease are *intemperance*, hereditary predisposition, and mental anxieties. Mr. Henry Maudsley, the distinguished professor of medical jurisprudence in University College, London, says: "While we must admit hereditary influence to be the most powerful factor in the causation of insanity, there can be no doubt that intemperance stands next to it in the list of efficient causes: it acts not only as a frequent exciting cause where there is hereditary predisposition, but as an originating cause of cerebral and mental degeneracy, as a producer of the disease *de novo*. If all hereditary causes of insanity were cut off, and if the disease were thus

stamped out for a time, it would assuredly soon be created anew by intemperance and other excesses.”<sup>1</sup> In support of the opinion expressed, the learned author refers to the experience of the Glamorgan County Asylum. The statistics of that institution show that during the second half of the year 1871 the admissions of male patients were only 24, whereas they were 47 and 73 in the preceding and succeeding half-years. And during the first quarter of the year 1873 the admissions were 10, whereas they were 21 and 18 in the preceding and succeeding quarters. Now, what is worthy of remark, there was no corresponding difference as regards the admission of the female insane during these periods. The interest and instruction of these facts, he adds, lie in this, “that the exceptional periods corresponded exactly with the last two ‘strikes’ in the coal and iron industries, in which Glamorganshire is extensively engaged. The decrease was undoubtedly due mainly to the fact that the laborers had no money to spend in drinking and in debauchery, that they were sober and temperate by compulsion, the direct result of which was that there was a marked decrease in the production of insanity and crime.” And Dr. Carpenter, an eminent physiologist equally well known in England and in America, in speaking of the hereditary transmission of perverted modes of functional activity, says: “The predisposition may have been congenital on the part of the parents, or it may have been acquired by themselves, and in no case is this more obvious than in the influence of alcoholic excesses on the part of one or both parents in producing idiocy, a predisposition to insanity, or weakness and instability of mind in the children, this being especially the case where both parents have thus transgressed. . . . And it is perfectly well known to those who are conversant with insanity, that of all the predisposing causes of that disorder, habits of intemperance on the part of either or both parents are among the most frequent.”<sup>2</sup> In illustration of the opinion expressed he calls attention to the cases of 359 idiots, only about a quarter of whom were found to be the children of parents who were known to be temperate,

<sup>1</sup> Maudsley's "Responsibility in Mental Disease."

<sup>2</sup> Carpenter's "Principles of Human Physiology."



while 99 of the number were the children of parents known to be absolute drunkards. A careful investigation of the subject has been made by Dr. Hitchcock, President of the Michigan State Board of Health, who declares that the number of idiots in this country made such by the use of alcohol is 319,000, and that the statistics show that over 9000 persons are annually made insane by the same cause.

#### RELATION TO PAUPERISM.

3. *Police of charity.* From ancient times to the present, from motives of public policy as well as from feelings of humanity, it has been deemed proper that the state should make provision for the infirm poor. The Athenians made provision for the poor out of the public treasury as early as the times of Pisistratus or Solon, altho at Rome there were no institutions of public charity. In England the giving of private alms to beggars was forbidden by legislative enactment in 1535, and collections were made for the benefit of paupers under authority of law in every parish. Large amounts of money are annually raised by taxation for their relief in every civilized state. In England alone there was raised for poor relief in 1833 the enormous sum of 8,600,000 pounds sterling. In England and Wales the pauper population in 1859 was equal to  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the whole population; in Holland in 1855 it was  $8\frac{1}{2}$  per cent; in Belgium in 1846 it amounted to 16 per cent; while in East and West Flanders in 1846 it is said to have reached 30 per cent. The rate in ordinary times in this country, where land is cheap and labor ordinarily in demand, is supposed to be only half of 1 per cent. But as we increase in population and in the number of our manufacturing towns, we are sure to find that this rate will be largely increased. Measures must be devised for the prevention, so far as possible, of pauperism. If we inquire into the relation of intemperance to pauperism, we shall find that the former is the "parent" of the latter. The returns made for a long series of years by the county of Suffolk (the city of Boston) to the Secretary of State of Massachusetts show an average of 80 per cent of the pauperism of that county to be due to intemperance. In the year 1863 the whole number of paupers

relieved by the authorities of that county was 12,242; of that number 9,885 had been made dependent either in consequence of their own or their parents' intemperance. The superintendent of the Deer Island Almshouse and Hospital (Boston), in his report to the Massachusetts Board of Health for 1875, declares that 90 per cent of the inmates of that institution are there by reason of intemperance. The report of the Massachusetts Board of State Charities for 1867 states that intemperance is the chief occasion of pauperism.

Such, then, is the relation of the traffic in intoxicating liquors to crime, to the public health, and to pauperism. In the causation of crime and pauperism it appears as a more important force than all other forces combined, and its injurious effects upon the public health are as great as they are lamentable. Certainly it is a seeming absurdity that a state should be possessed of a power to legislate for the prevention of offences, and at the same time be denied the right to put forth that power to eradicate the cause of almost all offences; that it should be under the necessity of burdening itself with enormous taxation for the support of the poor, the insane, and the idiotic, and at the same time denied the right to remove the cause which makes this enormous public expenditure necessary.

The primary end of government is the protection of human rights. In order to protect these rights great public burdens, in the shape of taxation, are imposed. Is that not the wisest legislation and the most in conformity to the ends and purposes of government which furnishes the maximum of protection for the minimum of taxation? This is the result which is to be achieved by the successful prohibition of the traffic in intoxicating liquors.

#### PROTECTION OF THE HOME.

It is not alone in its relations to crime, to the public health, and to pauperism that the traffic in intoxicating liquors is detrimental to the public welfare. It is the duty of the state to protect the corner-stone upon which the social fabric rests. Government, it is said, is so dependent on the life of the home that for a homeless community anarchy or despotism would be the alternative. "The family is older than civilization, and must always

precede and always accompany it, and without it there can be neither social state in which morality or decency will be recognized, nor civil state with regulated liberty and order." From the earliest times the state has been jealous to preserve and protect the family relations. The story will be told in heroic verse until the latest generations of how for ten weary years the old warriors of Greece fought on the plains of Troy to vindicate and preserve the sanctity of the family. When the state fails to protect the family relations it sows the seeds of its own decay. This was the cause of the ruin of the "Eternal City," whose proud boast it once was to be the mistress of the world, but who now sits "childless and crownless in her voiceless woe." In many ways the state takes the family under its protection and guards it from without. Finding polygamy at variance with the moral unity of the family, it punishes it as a crime. Knowing that a violation of the purity of the marriage relation tends to destroy the existence of the family, it pronounces judgment upon it as a most heinous offence. It prescribes and regulates the forms and conditions of marriage and divorce, and prohibits certain persons from contracting marriage. If the traffic in intoxicating liquors smites the family as with a pestilential blast, leaving it in sickness and death, is it not the duty of the state to interpose? And who denies but that it clothes wives in the habiliments of mourning and sends forth orphan children as paupers committed to the tender mercies of the state? The family is thus scattered and destroyed. No one can doubt that the traffic in intoxicating liquors is opposed to the welfare of the State. And if the end of the state is not merely to live but, as Aristotle says, to live *nobly*, then surely it should not tolerate that which is everywhere confessed to be the state's bane and curse. There is no defence to be made in its behalf, no apology to be offered for the wrongs it has done and the evil it has wrought. The earth is stained with the blood of thousands which it has slain, and the world is full of the agony it has wrought. "If intemperance were a new evil," says Judge Davis, "coming in upon us for the first time like a pestilence from some foreign shore, laden with its awful burden of disease, pauperism, and crime, with what horror would the nation contemplate its monstrous approach! What severity of laws, what stringencies

of quarantine, what activities of resistance would be suddenly aroused! But, alas! it is no new evil. It surrounds us like an atmosphere, as it has our fathers through countless generations. It perverts judgments, it poisons habits, it sways passions, it taints churches, and sears consciences. It seizes the enginery of our legislation, and by it creates a moral phenomenon of perpetual motion which nature denies to physics; for it licenses and empowers itself to beget in endless rounds the wrongs, vices, and crimes which society is organized to prevent; and, worst of all for our country, it encoils parties like the serpents of Laocoön, and crushes in its folds the spirit of patriotism and virtue." Most unfortunately, however, as Coleridge somewhere says, the most awful and interesting truths are often considered as so true that they lose all the power of truth, and lie bedridden in the dormitory of the soul, side by side with the most exploded errors.

#### PROHIBITORY LAWS CONSTITUTIONAL.

The question of the constitutionality of prohibitory liquor laws has been so often decided that it may be considered as beyond controversy. The power to establish ordinary regulations of police has been left with the States exclusively. And laws prohibiting altogether the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage are considered valid police regulations for the prevention of intemperance, pauperism, and crime, and for the abatement of nuisances.<sup>1</sup> "We cannot doubt," say the Supreme Court of Vermont,<sup>2</sup> "that the law in question falls within that large class of powers which are essential to the regulation, promotion, and preservation of the morals, health, and general well-being and prosperity of the people of this State; and that it may in an eminent degree be regarded as a police regulation, as much so as laws restraining the sale of diseased

<sup>1</sup> *Commonwealth v. Kendall*, 12 Cush. 414; *State v. Allmond*, 2 Houston (Del.), 641; *State v. Donehey*, 8 Iowa, 396; *People v. Hawley*, 3 Mich. 330; *State v. Paul*, 5 R. I. 185; *State v. Wheeler*, 25 Conn. 290; *Goddard v. Jacksonville*, 15 Ill. 588; *State v. Prescott*, 27 Vt. 194; *State v. Ludington*, 33 Wis. 107; *State v. Court of Common Pleas*, 7 Vroom (N. J.), 72; *State v. Bartemeyer*, 31 Iowa, 601; *Fisher v. McGirr*, 1 Gray, 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Lincoln v. Smith*, 25 Vt. 328, 337 *et seq.*

provisions or the quarantine laws, which restrain the natural liberty of the subject and authorize the destruction of his property, which may be supposed to be infected with contagious disease. . . . And it may well be inquired which is the more important and vital to the well-being of the body politic, to prevent the spread of a contagious disease, which affects the body, or the spread of a moral contagion, which results indirectly from the traffic and more directly from the unrestrained use of intoxicating liquors?"

The Supreme Court of the United States has decided that a State law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is a measure of police regulation looking to the preservation of the public morals, and that it is not repugnant to any clause of the Constitution of the United States, but a valid and constitutional exercise of the police power of the State.<sup>1</sup>

Undoubtedly a prohibitory liquor law might be so drawn as to be obnoxious to certain constitutional principles which would invalidate it. And in this connection many interesting questions suggest themselves, which neither the nature nor the limits of this article permit us to consider. We may in some subsequent article review the whole subject of the constitutionality not merely of the *prohibitory* but of the liquor laws in general. It is sufficient for our present purpose that it has been settled by the adjudications of our highest courts that laws prohibiting the domestic traffic in intoxicating liquors are valid as an exercise of the legitimate police powers of the State.

#### OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

I. It is said that these laws cannot be enforced; that they fail to prohibit the sale or to mitigate the evils that flow from the traffic, and that therefore we should be content with the license system and regulate that which we cannot prohibit. The fallacy of such reasoning lies in assuming that the license system actually regulates the traffic, whereas every one knows that it utterly fails to regulate. "As a remedy for the evils and dangers

<sup>1</sup> *Bartemeyer v. Iowa*, 18 Wall. 129; *Beer Co. v. Massachusetts*, 97 U. S. 25; and see License Cases, 5 Howard, 504.



of the liquor traffic," says Mr. Justice Pitman of Massachusetts, "license has proved a sad and miserable failure."<sup>1</sup> And the reason why it has failed lies in the fact that the system involves both a moral and a fiscal end, and the more the fiscal end is attained the less is the moral end.

In a country where the local indebtedness during the last decennial period ending in 1876 increased 200 per cent, while population increased only 33 per cent and valuation only 75 per cent, it is fair to presume that the fiscal end has come to be considered as of more importance than the moral end.

In an early case in New York in which it was held that bowling-alleys were a nuisance at common law, the court used the following language, which we adopt as our own and apply to grog-shops for the retail of intoxicating liquors: "A man who should erect a pig-sty under his neighbor's window could hardly excuse himself by showing that he intended to keep it clean and inoffensive. A house in a populous town, divided for poor people to inhabit during the prevalence of an infectious disease, is a nuisance. The law does not wait for the disease to spread. It exercises a wise forecast, and repels the evil at the threshold. It does the same thing in favor of public morals and public economy. A useless establishment, wasting the time of the owner, tending to fasten his own idle habits on his family, and to draw the men and boys of the neighborhood into a bad moral atmosphere—a place which, in spite of every care, will be attended by profligates, with evil communication, and at best with a waste of time and money, followed by the multiplication of paupers and rogues—has always been considered an obvious nuisance."<sup>2</sup> Are the men who create these nuisances, who erect these "pig-stys" upon every street corner, to be excused by the presentation of a license from the state, and is the state to be excused upon the plea that it intended to keep these "pig-stys" clean and inoffensive? This is worse than nonsense. It is trifling with great and sacred interests. Conceding that prohibition has failed in the past to prohibit, because of errors in the laws and an unenlightened public sentiment, it must also be

<sup>1</sup> PRINCETON REVIEW, Sept. 1878, p. 386.

<sup>2</sup> *Tanner v. Village of Albion*, 5 Hill, 121.

conceded that license has failed to regulate. If the principle of prohibition is right and that of license is wrong, is the state to be excused from adopting prohibition and justified for adopting the license system upon the plea that prohibition fails to entirely prohibit, when it is true that license utterly fails to regulate? Nay, more. It has appeared, from the statistics already quoted, that under a prohibitory liquor law crime is less frequently committed than under a license system. So that, conceding that principle and policy do sometimes diverge from one another,—a concession made for the argument's sake,—the fact will still remain that a prohibitory liquor law is justifiable as matter of principle *and of policy*.

Of the assertion so frequently made that a prohibitory law *cannot* be enforced, all that it is necessary to say is that desire is father to the thought. The statistics already mentioned give contradiction to the assertion. That the remedy is not completely successful is conceded. No law ever is. Laws against murder, adultery, arson, and theft exist in every civilized state, and notwithstanding their existence these offences are of frequent occurrence. Yet no one proposes to abolish them in consequence of their failure to completely do away with crime. How is it that an argument so puerile and nonsensical that it is never interposed except in the case of a prohibitory liquor law becomes so forcible and logical when urged against a law which seeks to stop the source from whence all offences come? In a letter written by Joshua L. Chamberlain in 1872, then Governor of Maine, now President of Bowdoin College, that gentleman, speaking of the prohibitory law, says: "*The law is as well executed generally in this State as other criminal laws are.*" This letter was written to Neal Dow, and was published at the time in all the leading papers of the country. We take it, therefore, to be true that prohibitory liquor laws may be so framed that the sworn officers of the law will not dare to connive at their violation.

2. Sumptuary laws are now regarded with disfavor and contempt. The opponents of prohibitory laws, therefore, appeal to this well-founded prejudice existing in the public mind against such laws, and would have it understood that prohibitory liquor laws and sumptuary laws are in effect the same. A sumptuary

law is one enacted to limit expenditure, not to prohibit it. Its purpose is to prevent extravagance. "Under the head of public economy," says Mr. Justice Blackstone, "may also be properly ranked all sumptuary laws against *luxury* and *extravagant expense* in dress, diet, and the like."<sup>1</sup> So, too, Mr. Chancellor Kent says: "The sumptuary laws of ancient Rome had their origin in the Twelve Tables, which controlled the *wastefulness* of prodigals and *unnecessary expenditure* at funerals. The appetite for luxury increased with dominion and riches, and sumptuary laws were from time to time enacted from the 566th year of the city down to the time of the emperors, restraining by severe checks *luxury* and *extravagance* in dress, furniture, and food. . . . During the middle ages the English, French, and other governments were, equally with the ancient Romans, accustomed to *limit* by positive laws the extent of private expenses, entertainments, and dress."<sup>2</sup> Webster defines sumptuary laws to be such "as *restrain* or *limit* the *expenses* of citizens in apparel, food, furniture, etc." Prohibitory liquor laws are not enacted to limit or restrain extravagant expenditure. That is not the evil which the law seeks to remedy. To be sure, such a law involves the prohibition of expenditure for liquor, but this does not constitute it a sumptuary law. As well might we call a law prohibiting the sale of obscene literature a sumptuary law because it involved incidentally a prohibition of expenditure for such literature. A prohibitory liquor law is a police regulation for the prevention of disorder, crime, and immorality. Mr. Amasa Walker, certainly a distinguished and accomplished scholar, has recognized the distinction existing between these two classes of laws. After showing that sumptuary laws always have and must continue to prove a failure, he says: "But all these furnish no conclusion against the regulation of public morals and manners in things that affect the happiness and safety of the community. It is no longer legislation to supplement the wisdom of the individual or instruct industry.' It becomes the defence of the general good. It is not a breach of personal rights, but the safeguard of public liberty. If there is any habit or practice which brings disease and suffering and dis-

<sup>1</sup> 4 Blackstone's Com. 170.

<sup>2</sup> Kent's Com. 330, n. b.

order, which abridges the power of labor and the span of life, which inflicts misery upon the innocent and unoffending, which entails expense upon the whole community for the charge of pauperism and the punishment of crime, there can be no doubt of the *right* and *duty* of the people to protect themselves, through the power of their government, by the most severe and effectual laws that can be devised. To deny this is to deny the validity of government itself."<sup>1</sup>

3. The third and last objection we care to consider is that made by a class represented by Mr. Bishop in the last Constitutional Convention in the State of Ohio, when he said that when he contemplated "the misery it [the traffic] entailed on the one hand, and the part it played in the national finances on the other," he was "not ready to sacrifice and destroy all the wealth and influence which are at this time invested in this branch of commerce." Such an objection as this may commend itself to a politician willing to measure the immaterial with the material. But it certainly will not commend itself either to the head or the heart of a statesman, or of an enlightened and Christian people. When a deputation of brewers waited on England's great premier to remind him of the loss the revenue would sustain by any further restrictions on the liquor traffic, Mr. Gladstone's reply was: "Gentlemen, you need not give yourselves any trouble about the revenue. The question of revenue must never stand in the way of needed reforms. Besides, with a sober population, not wasting their earnings, I shall know where to obtain the revenue."

The internal-revenue receipts of the United States for the fiscal year of 1879 were as follows:

Distilled spirits.....	\$52,520,248
Fermented liquors.....	10,729,320
Tobacco, cigars, and snuff.....	40,135,002
Bank and bankers.....	3,198,883
Adhesive stamps.....	6,237,537
Miscellaneous sources.....	577,802
	<hr/>
	\$113,398,792

The revenue derived from the sale of liquors is therefore a

<sup>1</sup> Walker's "Science of Wealth," 407.

very important part of the national finances, and yet the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, knowing that that revenue was an equally important factor in the British finances, very freely declared that he would "know where to obtain the revenue from" if he only had "a sober people, not wasting their earnings." Eliminating from the problem the misery, crime, and pauperism which the traffic involves, and looking at it from the purely material standpoint, it may be safely affirmed that the material interests of the country could not be better subserved than by transferring the capital employed in manufacturing intoxicating liquors from that channel to other branches of business. It is a well-known fact that over \$700,000,000 of capital are invested in this business, and that only two and a half per cent of the vast capital employed in the production of these liquors is returned as wages to the laborers engaged in their manufacture. On the other hand, in the other branches of industry it is said that the average return to the workingmen is thirty-two per cent of the capital involved. In one branch of industry, that of the manufacture of pins and needles, ninety per cent is given to the hand that works for their production. In the one case there is a diffusion of wealth, in the other a concentration of it. It will be readily conceded that a diffusion of wealth among the laboring classes has been the dream of the highest statesmanship.

#### CONCLUSION.

While the friends of the legal prohibition of the liquor traffic are justified in their belief that the principle which they cherish is just, that the law which they seek to enact is constitutional, and that the objections which are made to the realization of their plan in action are, for the most part, begotten of ignorance or of a captious disposition, it nevertheless becomes them to bear well in mind the great historic fact that no great social evil was ever thoroughly remedied by the mere enactment of a law. The majesty of the law is, in and of itself, insufficient. Offences are repressed, not by the severity of laws, but by the certainty of their execution. When Mr. Justice Blackstone wrote his commentaries there were no less than one hundred and sixty



offences punishable with death; yet it was a fact, which many have called attention to, that offences not only failed to diminish but actually increased in number. In 1624, when some chemists of Paris, cutting loose from the Aristotelian system, began to teach the "experimental" method, the Faculty of Theology beset the Parliament of Paris, and the Parliament prohibited the teaching of this new method under penalty of death. Such a law could be enforced at that day, but could not possibly be to-day. Law to be effective needs to be energized by an aroused and enlightened public opinion. It was a knowledge of this fact that kept Solon, altho clothed with the supreme authority, from giving his fellow-citizens those laws which were *ideally* the best, but only the nearest approach to such laws as they were able to bear. And this one fact would alone have entitled him to be numbered among the seven wise men of Greece. Buckle, writing his History of Civilization, has shown how the error of all ardent reformers has been their too great eagerness to effect their purpose. Those who have read history wisely have learned that it will not do to permit the political movement to outstrip the intellectual.

The future is full of promise, and we may look confidently forward to the full fruition of our hopes. The battle is being fought for good government, a higher civilization, and a happier country. The progress of truth, knowledge, and morality is irresistible, and therefore the outcome is not doubtful. "We know," says John Bright, "that science and education, and morality and religion, and all the great forces which move good and wise men are gathering to this conflict." It is a pity that in the conflict we in this country cannot have the assistance of the public press. It is the misfortune of the country that while we have, in the language of the Constitution, a "*free*" press, we do not have an *independent* one. In England, however, so we are told by an unwilling witness, the cause has become so strong that the English press is afraid to oppose it. Almost thirty years ago there was organized in Great Britain "The United Kingdom Temperance Alliance." Many of the leaders in church and state connected themselves with the society, and ever since have zealously labored to obtain the legal prohibition of the liquor traffic. To assist them in this work they first

raised £50,000, and at another time £100,000. "In a word," says the historian Molesworth, "they diffused information and prosecuted their agitation with a degree of vigor and success which has been only rivalled by the great anti-corn-law agitation." "Wherever its meetings were held," says Wilfrid Lawson, Bart., M.P., "and its advocates allowed a fair hearing, its principles were endorsed by enormous majorities, and I suppose even its bitterest opponents will admit that at the present time, amongst those who may be called the aristocracy of the working classes, it is decidedly among the most popular and enthusiastically supported political associations of the day." "The national instinct has been stimulated," recently exclaimed John Bright on the floor of the House of Commons, "and enlightened on this question, and the national conscience has been so awakened that it will never sleep again until a great and substantial change has been effected. . . . I think nobody can say that the consciences of the members of the House of Commons can fail to be touched by the consideration of this great and solemn question." The great Liberal leader was not mistaken, and in June, 1880, the Permissive Bill, for which the English prohibitionists have labored for thirty years, passed the House of Commons by a decisive majority. The history of the movement in Great Britain inspires the hope that the day is not far distant when we shall have in each of the States in our American Union a prohibitory liquor law, the warp and woof of which shall have so far become a part of the daily thoughts of the community that its successful enforcement will have removed "the greatest of the social evils."

HENRY WADE ROGERS.

## IS THOUGHT POSSIBLE WITHOUT LANGUAGE? CASE OF A DEAF-MUTE.

THE relation of thought to language has engaged the attention of philosophical thinkers from the earliest times. And now, in the discussion of the Darwinian theory of evolution, it has come into new prominence, in its bearing upon the question of the difference between the brute and the human intelligence. This theory admits a difference only in degree, and not in kind. It does not take the quite extreme nominalistic ground, which makes a name, or word, to be the essence of a general notion,—since it claims for the brutes some sort of capacity for general ideas;—but it fully adopts the *dictum* of Condillac, that the art of reasoning is reducible to “*l’art de bien parler*,” is nothing other than “*une langue bien faite*.” Language it views as an *organon*, which serves, however, not as an instrument employed by the reason, but which constitutes, in its working, the reason itself. In short, the intellectual superiority of man depends essentially on the possession of language, and language is the product of faculties which man shares with the brute, only more highly developed in him. (Darwin: *Descent of Man*, Part I., Chaps. II. and VI.; Huxley: *Hume*, Ch. V.)

Prof. Max Müller has contended most strenuously, and with a profuse expenditure of erudition, that the nature of language, as disclosed by the researches of comparative philology, furnishes a triumphant refutation of the Darwinian views. The earliest roots are grounded in general conceptions: the names of objects, such as horse, man, bird, tree, etc., spring from roots significant of some general attribute of the species or class to which they are applied. Not only is a general conception the essential constituent of the word, but it is, he maintains, impossible of existence except as realized in and by the word—it is the life of

which the articulate or other symbol is the body. And he draws the conclusion that the capability for general conceptions is a special faculty, differing in kind from anything manifested by the brutes, and therefore not to be accounted for as the product of evolution.

The argument, however, amounts to just this: that, because language begins with general ideas, therefore general ideas begin with language. It is plainly a *non sequitur*. As an argument, it is, indeed, worse than a failure: the very interesting and instructive facts adduced by the learned professor may fairly be taken so as even to lend their weight to the opposite side. What a thing begins with may be what it springs out of, and may have prior and independent existence.

In this and in other similar discussions, reference is made to the case of infant children and to that of uninstructed deaf-mutes. On the Darwinian view, children and deaf-mutes cannot be accorded the possession of any mental power or any form of mental action that distinguishes man from the brutes. (Huxley: *Hume*, Ch. V.) Prof. Max Müller is, so far, at one with the Darwinians, in that he ranks the mental processes of children and deaf-mutes in the same class with those of the brute animals. Thus he says (in writings already referred to), "The uninstructed deaf and dumb, I believe, have never given any signs of reason, in the true sense of the word." "Brutes" are "irrational beings simply in the sense of devoid of forming and handling general concepts." And, "according to those who have best studied the subject, it is perfectly true that deaf and dumb persons, if left entirely to themselves, have no concepts, except such as can be expressed by less perfect symbols—and it is only by being taught that they acquire some kind of conceptual thought and language."

Philosophers of the ultra-nominalist school would, of course, concur in relegating the mental processes of untaught deaf-mutes to the same category with those of the brute creation. Archbishop Whately expresses their views in words as follows:—

"A deaf-mute, before he has been taught a language,—either the finger-language or reading,—cannot carry on a train of reasoning, any more than a brute. He differs, indeed, from a brute in possessing the mental capability of employing language; but he can no more make use of that capa-

bility, till he is in possession of some system of arbitrary general signs, than a person born blind from cataract can make use of his capacity of seeing till the cataract is removed. You will find, accordingly, if you question a deaf-mute who has been taught language after having grown up, that no such thing as a train of reasoning had ever passed through his mind before he was taught." (Whately: *Lessons on Reasoning*, I., VIII.)

The importance of an accurate ascertainment of the facts concerning the mind of the uninstructed deaf-mute is sufficiently evident. The following narrative is offered as a contribution for this end. The writer, Mr. Melville Ballard, has been for years an instructor in the Columbia Institution for Deaf-Mutes, at Washington, D. C., and is a graduate of the National Deaf-Mute College, the higher department of the same institution. It will be seen that he himself had, in his early years,—with no power of clothing his thought in any form of language,—put clearly before his mind the question concerning the first beginning of things; and had even come to a vague notion of a power, of a nature undefined, as directing the motions of the heavenly bodies.

The case is an extraordinary one. The only instance on record that makes even the faintest approach to this is given in an article by the late Dr. H. P. Peet, in the *American Annals of the Deaf and Dumb*, Vol. VIII., (Hartford, 1856), entitled "Notions of the Deaf and Dumb before Instruction." The article reports the answers to a series of questions that had been proposed to the more advanced pupils of the New York Institution for the Deaf and Dumb; and to this among others: "Did you ever try to reflect about the origin of the world or its inhabitants?" One of the replies, by a girl fifteen years old before coming under instruction, was, "I tried to think, but could not do it. I thought the inhabitants came from the South." Another one wrote, "It is impossible for me to assert whether I had ever tried," &c. All the others stated that they had not, or to the best of their recollection had not, reflected at all upon the subject. The *Twenty-second Annual Report of the American Asylum* (Hartford, 1838) gives replies from pupils to a similar set of questions. To this one, "Had you reasoned or thought about the origin of the world, or the beings and things it contains?" all the answers were decided negatives.



One well-authenticated instance is as good as a hundred for the purpose of determining the general capacity of the human mind in the circumstances supposed. Mr. Ballard is known, to those who know him at all, as a person of more than common clearness of perception and accuracy and vividness of recollection, as well as of a most scrupulous regard for truth; and has been especially careful to include, in this statement, nothing of which he was at all doubtful. There was apparently, in his case, a somewhat precocious development of the reflective faculties; which, tho otherwise unaided, may have found a favoring circumstance in the isolation which shut him in to the company of his own thoughts. It is to be here remembered that the education of deaf-mutes commences ordinarily in immature age—commonly nowadays at as early an age as six or eight years,—and it is to be considered that such glimpses of thought in this direction as may not improbably have been experienced in some instances would not be likely to be retained in the recollection of after years.

We are not unfrequently told by educated deaf-mutes how, in their early years, the more striking and inaccessible objects and phenomena of nature awakened their wonder and curiosity, and were made the subject of various fanciful explanations, not unlike what may have been the germs of some of the myths that have obtained prevalence among men unenlightened by science. Their notions of this sort are interesting and worthy of attention; and are themselves evidence of a grade of intelligence quite above that of the brutes. Evidence of the like import is to be observed in the working of the language-making faculty, which, with the rare exceptions of the idiotic or imbecile, is always exercised by uneducated mutes, to a greater or less extent, through the medium of gestural signs. This is not a mere faculty of acquiring and using language; the signs are, for the most part, originated by themselves, are a creative product of their own minds, and they afford a more striking exhibition of innate endowment than does the mere acquisition of language on the part of those who hear and speak.

It is, however, with particular reference to the question whether thought is possible without language, that attention is

now invited to the case of Mr. Ballard, as related in his own words.

NARRATION BY MR. BALLARD.

"In consequence of the loss of my hearing in infancy,<sup>1</sup> I was debarred from enjoying the advantages which children in the full possession of their senses derive from the exercises of the common primary school, from the every-day talk of their school-fellows and playmates, and from the conversation of their parents and other grown-up persons.

"I could convey my thoughts and feelings to my parents and brothers by natural signs or pantomime, and I could understand what they said to me by the same medium; our intercourse being, however, confined to the daily routine of home affairs and hardly going beyond the circle of my own observation.

"My mother made the attempt to teach me to articulate by speaking loud close to my ear, and also by making me look at her lips and try to repeat what she had uttered. There was many a word of encouragement from the mother and many an expression of discouragement on the part of the child; and she persevered, hoping against hope, in this labor of love, until I was five years old, when she gave it up as a hopeless task. She, however, renewed the attempt occasionally at different periods afterwards.

"There was one thing to which she ever adhered, in our relations as mother and child. That was her endeavor for the molding of my character. She did not indulge me in anything on account of my privation. She did not suffer my misfortune to lead her to surrender her judgment to the fondness of her affection. She taught me to treat my brothers and sisters just

<sup>1</sup> He became deaf at the age of less than seventeen months, in consequence of a fall down a flight of stairs. Those who lose hearing at so early an age are not found by their instructors to have any appreciable advantage over those deaf from birth.

Readers interested in the questions of heredity may desire to be informed of the fact that Mr. Ballard comes from a family of the old Puritan stock of New England. His home was Fryeburg, Me. A great grandfather was Simon Frye, who was a lawyer and a judge of some court. Otherwise his ancestors, so far as he knows, have not been members of the learned professions.

as they were to treat me, and especially to respect their property in the playthings which belonged to them. An uncle of mine remonstrated with her in my behalf, saying that my brothers would be willing to gratify my humor. She answered him that she did not wish to have me grow up in the belief that I was a person different from others, having claims superior to theirs.

"My father adopted a course which he thought would, in some measure, compensate me for the loss of my hearing. It was that of taking me with him, when business required him to ride abroad; and he took me more frequently than he did my brothers; giving, as the reason for his apparent partiality, that they could acquire information through the ear, while I depended solely upon my eye for acquaintance with affairs of the outside world. He believed that observation would help to develop my faculties, and he also wished to see me deriving pleasure from some source.

"I have a vivid recollection of the delight I felt in watching the different scenes we passed through, observing the various phases of nature, both animate and inanimate; tho we did not, owing to my infirmity, engage in conversation. It was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question: *How came the world into being?* When this question occurred to my mind, I set myself to thinking it over a long time. My curiosity was awakened as to what was the origin of human life in its first appearance upon the earth, and of vegetable life as well, and also the cause of the existence of the earth, sun, moon, and stars.

"I remember at one time when my eye fell upon a very large old stump which we happened to pass in one of our rides, I asked myself, 'Is it possible that the first man that ever came into the world rose out of that stump? But that stump is only a remnant of a once noble magnificent tree, and how came that tree? Why, it came only by beginning to grow out of the ground just like those little trees now coming up.' And I dismissed from my mind, as an absurd idea, the connection between the origin of man and a decaying old stump.

"For my knowledge of the motives of my parents in their treatment of me during my childhood, I am indebted to a long

recital, given by my mother about five years ago, of incidents of my early life and the details connected therewith.

"I have no recollection of what it was that first suggested to me the question as to the origin of things. I had before this time gained ideas of the descent from parent to child, of the propagation of animals, and of the production of plants from seeds. The question that occurred to my mind was: whence came the first man, the first animal, and the first plant, at the remotest distance of time, before which there was no man, no animal, no plant; since I knew they all had a beginning and an end.

"It is impossible to state the exact order in which these different questions arose, *i. e.*, about men, animals, plants, the earth, sun, moon, &c. The lower animals did not receive so much thought as was bestowed upon man and the earth; perhaps because I put man and beast in the same class, since I believed that man would be annihilated and there was no resurrection beyond the grave,—tho I am now told by my mother that, in answer to my question, in the case of a deceased uncle who looked to me like a person in sleep, she had tried to make me understand that he would awake in the far future. It was my belief that man and beast derived their being from the same source, and were to be laid down in the dust in a state of annihilation. Considering the brute animal as of secondary importance, and allied to man on a lower level, man and the earth were the two things on which my mind dwelled most.

"I think I was five years old, when I began to understand the descent from parent to child and the propagation of animals. I was nearly eleven years old, when I entered the Institution where I was educated; and I remember distinctly that it was at least two years before this time that I began to ask myself the question as to the origin of the universe. My age was then about eight, not over nine years.

"Of the form of the earth, I had no idea in my childhood, except that, from a look at a map of the hemispheres, I inferred there were two immense discs of matter lying near each other. I also believed the sun and moon to be two round, flat plates of illuminating matter; and for those luminaries I entertained a sort of reverence on account of their power of lighting

and heating the earth. I thought from their coming up and going down, traveling across the sky in so regular a manner, that there must be a certain something having power to govern their course. I believed the sun went into a hole at the west and came out of another at the east, traveling through a great tube in the earth, describing the same curve as it seemed to describe in the sky. The stars seemed to me to be tiny lights studded in the sky.

"The source from which the universe came was the question about which my mind revolved in a vain struggle to grasp it, or rather to fight the way up to attain to a satisfactory answer. When I had occupied myself with this subject a considerable time, I perceived that it was a matter much greater than my mind could comprehend; and I remember well that I became so appalled at its mystery and so bewildered at my inability to grapple with it that I laid the subject aside and out of my mind, glad to escape being, as it were, drawn into a vortex of inextricable confusion. Tho I felt relieved at this escape, yet I could not resist the desire to know the truth; and I returned to the subject; but as before, I left it, after thinking it over for some time. In this state of perplexity, I hoped all the time to get at the truth, still believing that, the more I gave thought to the subject, the more my mind would penetrate the mystery. Thus, I was tossed like a shuttlecock, returning to the subject and recoiling from it, till I came to school.

"I remember that my mother once told me about a being up above, pointing her finger towards the sky and with a solemn look on her countenance. I do not recall the circumstance which led to this communication. When she mentioned the mysterious being up in the sky, I was eager to take hold of the subject, and plied her with questions concerning the form and appearance of this unknown being, asking if it was the sun, moon, or one of the stars. I knew she meant that there was a living one somewhere up in the sky; but when I realized that she could not answer my questions, I gave it up in despair, feeling sorrowful that I could not obtain a definite idea of the mysterious living one up in the sky.

"One day, while we were haying in a field, there was a series of heavy thunder-claps. I asked one of my brothers where they



came from. He pointed to the sky and made a zigzag motion with his finger, signifying lightning. I imagined there was a great man somewhere in the blue vault, who made a loud noise with his voice out of it; and each time I heard<sup>1</sup> a thunder-clap I was frightened, and looked up at the sky, fearing he was speaking a threatening word.

"In the year after my admission into the school for deaf-mutes, at Hartford, Conn., I learned a few sentences every Sunday, such as 'God is great,' 'God is wise,' 'God is strong,' 'God is kind,' etc., and tho I studied those simple words, I never acquired any idea of God as the Creator. I attended the chapel services, but they were almost unintelligible, owing to my imperfect knowledge of the sign-language as employed in the Institution. The second year I had a small catechism containing a series of questions and answers. The first question was, 'Who made this watch?' Answer: 'A man made it.' Second question: 'Who made that house?' Answer: 'Some men built it.' Third question: 'Who made the sun?' Answer: 'God created the sun, moon and stars.' Fourth question: 'Who made the earth?' Answer: 'God created the earth, sea, trees, grass and vegetables.'

"This method of proceeding from the lower stages of intelligent construction to the act of creation began to clear away, in my mind, the mystery of the origin of the universe. I was now able to understand well the sign-language used by my instructors in their explanations. While the creation of the heavens and the earth was being related to us, the Creator was described as a great invisible spirit, seeing and knowing all things, and at whose creative word the world sprang into existence. As this truth was dawning on my mind, I felt a sensation of awe at the magnitude of the work done by the one ruling mind. From the uncertain perplexing round of speculation in which I had been groping back and back through the dark depths of time, seeking to discover the origin of the universe, I found myself translated into a world of light, wherein my mind was set at rest on this great question; and I felt as tho I

<sup>1</sup> Not literally *heard*, of course. Deaf-mutes are quick to perceive shocks and jars that can be felt, even when so slight as to be unnoticed by those who can hear.

had become a new being. This revelation of the truth seemed to give a new dignity to everything, as deriving its existence from an almighty and wise Creator; and it seemed to elevate the world to a higher and more honorable place.

"It may be said, and perhaps to my reproach, that my inquiring disposition ought to have been satisfied. It was not so; for when I had learned of the creation of the universe by the one great ruling spirit, I began to ask myself whence came the Creator, and set myself to inquiring after his nature and origin. While I revolve this question, I ask myself, "Shall we ever know the nature of God and comprehend his infinity after we enter his kingdom?" And would it not be better for us to say with the patriarch of old, "Canst thou by searching find out God?"

"MELVILLE BALLARD."

That there may be no uncertainty as to how far Mr. Ballard may have been aided by signs in his early mental processes, I will add some facts obtained from him by personal inquiry. There were two brothers, of an age not far from his own, with whom he was accustomed to communicate freely by signs, as well as with his mother and sisters, and to some extent his father. A considerable vocabulary of signs, determinate and fixed in form, while retaining the natural significance of their origin, had by degrees grown up and become together with purely natural pantomime the established means of communication. Thus, there were signs, not only for the more common actions of men and animals, but for most of the surrounding objects, animate and inanimate; the signs for objects were derived, for the most part, from some characteristic peculiarity of action and movement, or from some feature pertaining to the shape and figure of the object. The signs for actions, as well as for objects, were specific rather than generic; thus, there was no general sign for *kill*, or for *make*. Qualities were indicated, so far as they could be, by significant action; color by pointing to some object,—to the shirt-bosom, ordinarily, for *white*. Number of days was so many sleeps; years were winters, described by the snow falling and accumulating and then wasting away. Years of age were marked as stages of growth or of increase of stature. There were, however, no specific signs by

which time future was distinguished from time past, the circumstances of the case being, ordinarily, the only means of indication. The occasion for noting periods and points of time would commonly have reference to the future. There were no signs for past or future time.

One or two incidents which Mr. Ballard relates will serve the present purpose better than any general statements. His brother once told him of an occurrence which he had just read the account of, from a newspaper, to others of the family: A man, while out hunting, discovered a squirrel and was preparing to fire at it, when the dog, in his excited caperings, struck the trigger of the gun, and the man was killed. Young Ballard understands the story perfectly, and soon after tries to make it known by signs to the boys of the neighboring school, but without success; he then runs home, and brings the paper and shows them the paragraph, having asked his mother to point out and mark it. Again: his mother conveyed to him the idea that he was to go from home to a distant place for instruction in school, also of his return (for the vacation), after the following fashion:—You go far yonder; ride day night; read-book; write; write fold [as a letter]; I unfold read glad; snow [falling flakes cold white] piled-up [hand gradually raised from near the ground] waste-away [hand gradually lowered,—that is to say, after one winter] you come-back glad.

That the train of thought pursued by Mr. Ballard in his boyhood, as he relates, was not dependent on the aid of signs of any kind, verbal or not verbal, is evident, not only from the scantiness of his vocabulary of signs, but from the fact that he did not make his thought the subject of communication with any one, and that the endeavors of his mother to give him some ideas of the Supreme Being and of a life beyond the grave were an entire failure.

It is clear that the mental processes he describes were of a high order of conceptual thought. They involved the possession and the handling of general notions,—notions, not only of men and animals, but of things as related by succession in a series, and of time as past, and of things as beginning and ceasing to exist. The attributes thus involved were distinctly and definitely apprehended.

The idea of a series of events or things running back indefinitely belongs clearly to thought of the higher order. It embraces in one view an indefinite number of particulars. The members of the series are not, and cannot be for the most part, represented individually and severally; but are apprehended merely as things similar to the small portion that are known and represented individually. They are apprehended also as having individual differences that are specifically unknown. There is in this way brought into exercise what we may call the *compendious mode of thought*: and this it is which distinguishes the higher from the lower operations of the intellect; and it obviously surpasses the capacity of the brutes.

In the matter of general notions, as this term is commonly applied, we are to distinguish two operations, of a widely different order. Merely to recognize a thing newly presented as similar to a thing or things previously known, and in this sense of the same class, is an operation of the lower order. But a thought such as finds expression in a general proposition—that is to say, in a proposition that predicates something of a whole class of objects, or of an indefinite portion of a class—is of a higher and quite different order. The former cannot be denied to the brutes, and it makes up a large part of the ordinary thinking of men. The distinctive characteristic of the latter is that it brings into exercise what I have described as the *compendious mode of thought*. Whenever we employ a general proposition of even the simplest character—such, for instance, as, All men are mortal; All sheep eat grass; Some men are unwise; Some sheep are black,—we embrace, in a comprehensive survey, an indefinite number of objects, which cannot by any possibility be all at one time individually represented—which we apprehend only collectively as an assemblage of things similar to what we have known individually and at the same time differenced by peculiarities that are not definitely known or represented.

In any use of general words, just so far as the object or objects signified are regarded as appertaining to a class indefinite in the number and the variety of the things it embraces, just so far, and so far only, is the operation of the higher order as above described. Such action belongs to what Leibnitz designated as symbolical knowledge, in his division of knowledge into sym-

bolical and intuitive. Even individual objects that are cognized as highly complex in their composition—as, for instance, a polygon of a thousand sides—can be apprehended all at once only compendiously or symbolically, and not intuitively. Indeed, every complex object of sense-perception may, for the human intellect, be made an object of this kind of cognition. Not till we come to a full understanding of the nature and import of symbolical cognition, and duly emphasize this element and assign to it its rightful place in the operations of the mind, can we justly distinguish between what is peculiar to man and what he has in common with lower forms of intelligence.

There are, indeed, different grades of general notions, according as the points of similarity on which they depend are more or less obvious—more or less easily apprehended, or by faculties of a lower or higher order. The notion of a horse or of a tree is more easily formed than the more generic notion of an animal or of a plant; and far more easily than the notions expressed by such terms as beautiful, wise, true, just, convenient, hurtful, civilized, and others that depend on still more tenuous similarities. But the difficulty lies wholly in the recognition or apprehension of the points of similarity. The difference, if not throughout a matter simply of degree, yet stands upon no single broad line of demarcation. Some resemblances are obtrusive, and obvious to sense-perception and the lowest forms of the understanding: others are more subtle and require a higher development of the intellect or sensibilities, or imply faculties and endowments, it may be, of a distinctly higher nature, in order to apprehend them. The process, in the formation of the general notion, is, however, always the same, except as regards the initial step, namely, the recognition of the resemblance. This once attained, the process of classification, and that of handling the notions thus formed, is in all cases, and may be in all respects, the same. Unless we can find a dividing line that marks off plainly classes of a lower from those of a higher order, we cannot make a distinction between representation and concept, as grounded in the nature or character of the classes to which the notions correspond. Objects the most concrete and the most obvious to sense are subject to the higher functions of thought as well as to the lower operations of intelligence.



On the subject of conceptual knowledge, there are sundry traditional prepossessions that have too long survived and still wait to be swept away. The nominalist contends that, as nothing exists, so nothing can be conceived, but individual objects. We cannot conceive of a triangle that is neither right-angled, acute-angled, nor obtuse-angled; neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene;—nor can we conceive of a horse that is of neither this nor that color, figure, &c. Now, while we cannot think of a triangle as being neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene, we can think of a group of three triangles that are severally equilateral, isosceles and scalene; and we can think of an individual triangle as one of this group, and yet indeterminate as to which one. We can, further, think of a group made up of an indefinite number of triangles, all alike as triangular figures, but all unlike and differenced as individual triangles,—the group embracing all possible triangles, and the number and the individual differences being of course not all distinctly apprehended. We can think of a single triangle as a some one indeterminate individual in such a group, that is to say, as either this or that definitely represented, or as some other quite indeterminately apprehended. It is not more difficult to think of a group of things than of a single thing, especially if the thing be at all complex—and every individual thing is so in a greater or less degree. And the notion of what we call an individual thing is a product of the mind's operation, as truly as that of a group of things. A *concept*, then, may be defined as the notion of a group of things that are recognized as related by certain common features of similarity, and are apprehended as indefinite in number and in respect to individual variations. When we think of a single thing as coming under a concept, as simply one of a certain class, but otherwise indefinite, there comes into exercise, over and above the symbolical or compendious operation, what, for want of any established designation, we may venture to call the *alternative*, or perhaps better, the *disjunctive, mode of thought*,—the thing being apprehended as either this, that, or the other, but undetermined as to which it may be, or as perhaps some one of many others that are not at all represented. So also is it when we think of some, as a not individualized, an indeterminate, portion of a class.

The element of indefiniteness in the concept, as just now defined involves the disjunctive mode of thought.

In symbolical cognition, we have a kind of knowledge that is separated by a wide chasm from all that is of a lower kind, and with no steps for a gradual passage from one to the other.

There is, however, something about such cognition that seems paradoxical, and which perhaps no analysis may be able fully to explain. An essential part of the object of such cognition is known merely as a something that might be distinctly represented and intuitively known. To know a thing in this way is to know it, in some sense, as a thing that we do not know. A part of the object of symbolical knowledge is consciously unknown. We have what is quite similar in the case of efforts of the memory. We do indeed know something about what we are trying to remember, but there is still something that we do not know, and of which we have a notion or knowledge as a thing unknown. It may perhaps be said that, in this part of the object, the notion we have of an unknown something is, itself, simply an extremely general notion. This, however, cannot be admitted: for it would be a self-evident absurdity to explain a general notion, as such, by representing it as composed in part of a general notion of a particular kind or of any kind,—the absurdity of a circle in definition. But, if the element which I have tried to describe, and have pointed out as involved in all rational thinking, should prove to be, after all, inexplicable and mysterious, it is yet real; and is not to be ignored, even if we cannot explain it to full satisfaction. The solution of the difficulty seems to me, however, to be this: that what, by an after act of reflection, may be brought under a general notion is, in and during the act of symbolical cognition, apprehended simply as an individual thing related to actual and possible knowledge as above explained;—and it is known as a thing that is unknown: that is to say, is known positively, as a thing related in the way mentioned, and negatively, as a thing not more specifically known or represented, and thus in this sense unknown.

In the ordinary handling of general conceptions, it is not necessary to have a perfectly distinct apprehension or knowledge of the points of similarity on which the conception is grounded,—

that is to say, of the content of the concept. It is only requisite that the apprehension be so clear as to suffice for the recognition of objects as belonging to one and the same class, and for distinguishing different classes of which one and the same object may be a member. And general words may be serviceably and intelligently enough employed, without even such clear apprehension, provided such apprehension be ready to suggest itself so far as occasion may require.

It is requisite for a general conception—is necessary in symbolical cognition—that there be something, either presented or represented to the mind, upon which to hang—by which to hold—that which is not represented, and all that which is compendiously and indeterminately apprehended. Words serve in this way and to this end; but along with the word and serving the same end, there ordinarily goes something more—some mental image, or representation. Such image, in the case of a given word, will not, ordinarily, be the same for different persons, nor for the same person at different times. It will commonly embrace, together with more or less of the marks or characters common to the class, others which are accidental and peculiar to certain individuals within the class. For objects having visible form, it may be a shadowy outline of the figure characteristic of the class, or it may be a distinct picture of some individual that is familiarly known. With the same person, it may, as I just now said, vary from time to time: thus, to one who had just before attended a horse-fair, or a horse-race, the word *horse* could hardly come into mind at all without suggesting the image of some of the individual horses he had so lately seen. The word *savage*, or *barbarian*, probably suggests to most minds an image that is quite special, or even individual, and that is consciously inadequate, and also consciously includes what is unessential, as measured by the real and proper meaning of the word; and in other instances the case is the same. Now, the image that thus goes with a name can serve as well without a name. That is to say, it can serve for thought; tho, of course, not for expression. For some orders of conceptions, a name, or some determinate symbol, is, as concerns thought, of more importance, and for others, of less. The name is not in any case essential to the formation of the general conception; the application of the

name comes of necessity after the formation of the conception.

If there were a convenient term by which to designate the determinate and represented part of a general conception (aside from the name), as distinguished from the indeterminate and unrepresented part, it would help to relieve one of the difficulties with which the treatment of this subject is beset.<sup>1</sup> The thing to be designated is a shifting and variable thing: not only different for different persons, but changing even from moment to moment as one thinks more carefully and intently and apprehends the conception more distinctly. It differs thus from the mental representation of a name, inasmuch as the latter is a more fixed thing than the former commonly is. It differs also by ordinarily including more or less of the distinctive attributes that mark the given conception:—in so doing, it is made to be something more than merely an internal symbol, something other than a bare sign, inasmuch as it includes more or less of what is signified.

To disprove the doctrine that a word, or name, is essential to the existence of a general notion, I have now to offer an argument which, I think, will be seen to be quite unanswerable; tho, strange to say, it has, unless I greatly mistake, never been brought forward in all the interminable discussion to which this subject has given occasion. What is a word? When we speak of the word *horse*, *man*, or any other,—when we say “this word,” or “that word,”—we mean, not a single, individual utterance, at a particular time, nor a single copy in writing or print. When a word is repeated in speech or writing, we call it the same word; evidently it is not the same individual thing. Not only so, a word admits of great variation in pronunciation and voice and tone and manner of utterance, when spoken, and in form and color, when written or printed, while it is still recognized as the same word. When we call it the same, we mean simply that it is fashioned after the same type—marked by the same general characteristics;—just as we may say, of two horses, “this is the same animal as that,” meaning, of course, an animal of the same species. The difference in the word *horse*, from the

<sup>1</sup> *Concept-image*, or *concept-phntasm*, is perhaps as good a term as can be devised.

mouth of two persons, may be fully as great as that between two actual horses. We know a given word—considered now with reference to the external form—simply as a thing of a certain type to which every single instance is conformed. It is thus a general object of thought, and the notion we have of it is a general notion, and it is only through such general notion that we recognize the word as the same in the repeated instances of its occurrence. We have really to acquire a general notion of the external form of a given word before we can attach meaning to it and have it as an auxiliary to a general notion of any sort. But, the notion of the word, being thus a general notion, would by the doctrine in question, require another word to constitute it such—which we know it does not,—and that, again, would require still another, and so on, in a *regressus ad infinitum*. That all this should ever have been overlooked is owing mainly to the ambiguous use of *this, that, the same, &c.*

Now, an actual horse is an object of sense-perception, and of representation in memory and imagination, just as is the word *horse*. And a general notion of the one has no more need of extraneous aid for its apprehension than that of the other. The doctrine here opposed is that at least the mental image of a word is an indispensable element in the concept. The truth, and the whole truth, is that words and the mental representation of the same bring with them, on many accounts which need not here be specified, immense practical advantages;—and the same is true, in a greater or less degree, of any other uniform set or system of symbols. But this does not in the least affect the validity of the argument just presented; the bare statement of which carries the evidence of its conclusiveness.

It would hardly be proper to pass without notice the explanation of general notions that has recently been put forth by Mr. Francis Galton. He is favorably known as an experimenter and an author who has contributed to physiology and to psychology some valuable concrete facts. For this we can thank him without accepting all his inferences and reasonings. He has invented a method of obtaining, by photography, what he calls “composite portraits.” By means of successive instantaneous exposures, very faint and singly imperceptible impressions of the features of a number of persons are super-



imposed, and thus a picture is obtained that gives a general average of all, only the common traits being distinctly brought out, and the individual diversities being indistinct or evanescent in proportion to the infrequency of their occurrence. When the individuals are of a common type of feature, as, for instance, by family resemblance, or as when character is written in the lines of the face in the case of certain criminal classes, it has been found possible, by a proper selection of specimens, to bring this common type distinctly to view in the composite portrait. All this is, so far, interesting and not without value. But, as is natural to one in the flush of a successful discovery, Mr. Galton has conceived an exaggerated estimate of the importance and the various applicability of what he has produced. In particular he thinks it of value as illustrating the mental process of generalization. The matter derives additional importance in consequence of the endorsement of the idea by Mr. Huxley, in his recent sketch of the life and philosophy of David Hume (Chap. IV.). Mr. Huxley, as does Hume, recognizes nothing as existing in mind other than impressions and ideas; the ideas being copies of impressions. He ranks "abstract or general ideas" under the category of "memories;" and defines them particularly as "the generic ideas which are formed from several similar, but not identical, complex experiences." They are a result of the repetition of impressions from individual objects; the common features being thus blended together and mutually reinforced by their greater frequency of repetition, while the individual diversities, by their less frequent occurrence, fall away and disappear from the view. This he illustrates by referring to "what takes place in the formation of compound photographs," meaning, of course, the process of Mr. Galton, as just described.

It must, however, be added, in justice to Mr. Huxley, that he gives expression to some misgiving as to the entire adequacy of this explanation, in the hesitating admission conveyed in his remarks on the nominalistic doctrine of Berkeley, as follows:—"But the subject is an abstruse one; and I must content myself with the remark, that tho Berkeley's view appears to be largely applicable to such general ideas as are formed after language has been acquired, and to all the more abstract sort of

conceptions, yet that general ideas of sensible objects may nevertheless be produced in the way indicated, and may exist independently of language."

Of this way of explaining general ideas, it is to be said, in the first place, that, even if the analogy should hold good to the extent that is claimed for it, the explanation nevertheless, fails to reach the heart of the matter. It applies only to the represented and determinate part of a general conception: the existence of the other and essentially distinctive part is wholly ignored. In a concept there is something other than a memory—something that is not to be explained as a congeries of impressions, or as the accumulated effect of repeated impressions.

But the analogy is, at best, quite defective, and goes only a very little way. Repeated sense-impressions do not make an idea more vivid; they simply tend to fix it in the memory: faint impressions, ever so many times repeated, never make a vivid idea. With these qualifications noted, there is, indeed, to be recognized a real analogy, so far as concerns certain operations of the memory. That is to say, there may be, in the memory, a blending and a mutual reinforcing of similar impressions. But there is a law of the memory that breaks in with fatal consequence upon the analogy, as concerns general conceptions. Recent impressions are more vivid, and stronger every way, than earlier impressions, and tend to supersede and obliterate them for the time being. According to the memory theory, therefore, individual diversities recently impressed would make a prominent figure in the general idea, or would even wholly supersede it. Moreover, in the compound photograph, the individual impression disappears, or rather in fact never appears; while, on the contrary, individual impressions on the mind may remain perfectly distinct alongside of the general idea to the formation of which they may have contributed.

It is not to be doubted that blended memories of similar things are possible and of frequent occurrence. And, again, it need not be questioned that the naturalist sometimes does, as Mr. Huxley says, make up for his own mind a distinct image which represents, in some sort, the average of a number of varying specimens; he does this purposely, and to subserve for himself a valuable end. But it is not the fact that the repre-

sented part of a concept is usually limited to the common characters, the points of similarity, that go to the making of the class. Most certainly, it is not made up by an average that gives the mean between individual variations.

The illustration, obviously, and indeed confessedly as explained by Mr. Galton, can apply strictly to only a very limited and select portion out of the whole wide field of general ideas; namely, to those of a highly concrete description, and those in which the similarities greatly preponderate over the diversities. What sort of an average, as a result of individual impressions, should we have for such a concept as that of an instrument, or of a thing, or an animal, or even of a person? To make the illustration hold good throughout, it would be necessary also to superadd a neutralizing influence: thus, for instance, in the general idea of a horse, we should have to dispose of the attribute of color in some way not provided for by the analogy of the compound photograph.

Enough, now, of this. It is all of a piece with the various other ways of explaining, or trying to explain, mental phenomena by means of analogies drawn from the material world, which have constantly misled and deluded philosophers and psychologists, as well as others. As for Mr. Huxley, it will not be claimed, on his behalf, that he has given to the facts of consciousness the thorough study that he has bestowed upon the natural sciences. He, certainly, has not, in this department, followed the method of positive science, the rule of induction, which requires, above everything else, a comprehensive survey inclusive of all the facts in the given field of inquiry. Tho his gropings in this field, with David Hume as pioneer, have been earnest and serious, we know that the special studies in the pursuit of which he has achieved success and won renown have lain in quite another region and been concerned with phenomena of a quite different order. The misfortune is that the prestige gained by this success lends weight to his opinions on these subjects, of which he has not obtained a mastery, and for which his special studies tend, in certain ways, to incapacitate him, and which are subjects of the greatest difficulty and of the highest importance.

Before concluding, it remains for us to give some consideration to the case of "our poor relations," the brute animals. As

may be inferred from what has been premised, I cannot absolutely deny them the possession of general ideas—cannot exclude them from all that we designate by that term. In a sense they have them; and in a sense they have them not. It is not for the want of a sufficient stock of general ideas, and these of a sufficiently high order, that they attain to no greater proficiency in the way of language than they do. The provision in the former respect goes far beyond their attainment in the latter. In this I agree to a certain extent with Mr. Darwin and Mr. Huxley. It is at another point that the view I take diverges from theirs. So far as it may be possible to reconcile the conflicting opinions, by determining and setting in the proper light whatever of truth there may be on either side, it is desirable, of course, to do so.

It cannot reasonably be questioned that animals of the more intelligent orders recognize multitudes of objects according to their kinds, when new to them as individual objects. A dog knows a bone as a bone and not a bit of wood, even tho he has never seen the same bone before. He knows his own kind from human beings, and *vice versa*; and knows various other animals as of the kinds of which they are. He knows a gentleman from a beggar; and sometimes an honest man from a thief. He knows what it is to go and come, to fetch and carry, to pursue and to stop, to keep watch; and so of various other actions. He knows things by single qualities: knows them, for instance, as hot or cold, and as having an odor which he likes; that is to say, he may recognize objects, when he sees them, as having these qualities. Domestic animals, too, understand the meaning of many words and other signs of ideas; and it is possible to train them to understand many more than they often do. The words and various other signs employed in the case of trained animals are, many of them, entirely arbitrary and artificial. By repetition and the law of association they are made to suggest the ideas, just as words suggest ideas to our minds. It is true the words or signs are addressed to them, for the most part, if not solely, in the way of command. But animals are able, themselves, to use signs for the purpose of making known their wants, or at least as a means of obtaining what they want; and the

more intelligent and docile can easily be taught to use arbitrary signs in this manner.

We probably can find no evidence that any of the animals can understand language of any kind used in the way of directly communicating information; much less that they can themselves so use it. This may require a more distinct knowledge than they possess, of their own minds and of other minds as knowing agents,—a knowledge that comes from self-consciousness, such as they have not. They can obtain information through signs; but that is a different thing from understanding a sign as made with the intent of giving information.

Their knowledge and use of language is, also, probably limited to single words or other single signs, and to phrases which they apprehend in singleness, without cognizance of the component words or parts of the phrase, and thus without the power of making or of understanding a new combination. Thus, suppose the most intelligent and proficient parrot to understand the two phrases, *black sheep* and *white dog*, we have no evidence that from this he would be able to make out, still less to make up, the new combinations, *white sheep* and *black dog*. In the article, by Dr. Samuel Wilkes, entitled "Notes on the History of my Parrot as related to the Nature of Language," in the *Journal of Mental Science* for July, 1879, we find, as the result of his observations, that phrases were apprehended in no other way than as single expressions. This is made quite evident by the occasional incongruous blending of different phrases that included some words in common.

The only faculties mentioned by the writer as concerned in the linguistic performances of this parrot were those of articulation, imitation, and the association of ideas. Any object or circumstance with which a word, or any kind of sound, had become associated, awakened by its recurrence a propensity to reproduce the sound. The utterances were made, however, many times, for purposes such as some of those for which human language is employed.

It is to be remarked, however, that to understand or to produce a new combination is nothing more than to bring one and the same object under two or more general ideas at the same



time ; or, it may be, under only a singular and a general idea ; and possibly this is not quite beyond the reach of the lower order of intelligence. If, for instance, we suppose a pack of dogs to know each other's names, let the master of the dogs call one by name and command some action, here would be a combination of a singular name with a general word ; and this, we may believe, might be understood by all the other dogs as well as by the one addressed, even tho, as a combination, it might be new to some of them. Some well-authenticated cases are related in which dogs have seemed to understand a combination as a combination ; and possibly some of the instances were really what they thus seemed to be.

With these mere hints on the subject of brute intelligence, I have simply to remark, in brief, that a very considerable development of language is supposable, with no higher grade of capacity than what may suffice for the recognition of objects according to kinds—for the handling of general ideas to this extent. Moreover, a large part of the ordinary language of mankind requires no higher capacity. But anything of the nature of what we have referred to as compendious thought, and thus of symbolical knowledge, is entirely beyond and cannot be conceived as developed out of the lower intelligence of the brutes. The brutes can infer and reason, after a fashion, from instance to instance, and are thus able to learn something by experience ; but they cannot apprehend a general law as such. The mind of man is capable of something higher than what Mr. Huxley calls “potential beliefs of memory,” and “potential beliefs of expectation ;” higher, even, than these as raised to the dignity of actual belief by being put into a form of words.

Allowing to the brutes the utmost that can be claimed for them, is it not still plain that man has faculties which we cannot conceive as developed out of or as simply exaltations in degree of anything that he possesses in common with the lower animals ? We know, if we know anything, that phenomena of consciousness are things wholly unlike matter and motion, whatever we may think of the relation between the one and the other. We know, also, that among phenomena of consciousness there are some wholly unlike others, so that they cannot be conceived

as developed out of them ; nor all as developed out of a common element. We know, for instance, that perceptions of color and colored extension, are, as phenomena of consciousness, quite distinct and different from those of either touch, taste, smell, or sound. Whatever may be the similarity in the way in which the impressions are produced, or in the structure of the organs, and whatever may be the dependence upon organic action,—that is to say, however they may be allied physiologically,—yet, as sensations or perceptions, those of the eye are different in themselves, and imply a special gift or power not implied in those of the ear, or the hand, or the tongue. Is it not thus with the acts of the reason as compared with the working of the lower faculties? That the two have some elements in common does not prove them to be throughout of the same order, or render it possible for one to be developed out of the other. And if the eye of the soul, the higher reason, by which we look through the universe of things, cannot look in upon itself and clearly discern its own nature and its own processes, we ought not, therefore, forgetting what it does, to deny its essential superiority, and to assimilate it to those lower and subsidiary faculties which we can bring under its scrutiny. That by which we understand all things—must it not be of a nature essentially superior to aught that is understood by it?

If man has special endowments which set him in a rank above all other creatures on this globe of the earth, it cannot be well for him to renounce, disown, or barter away his birthright. Would not a true science, that should comprehend all the phenomena and all the facts, be able to characterize man by some other marks than as the two-handed family of the Primates?

The design of this article was to present the facts of an individual case. The remarks into which I have been led, at greater length than I intended, have been added, not, certainly, with any idea that they amount to a thorough discussion of the subject, but as suggestions, offered with the view of contributing towards clearing away some errors of long standing, which have made this subject a so fruitful, and at the same time so fruitless, theme of disputation.

SAMUEL PORTER.

## PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND CIVIL-SERVICE REFORM.

WE have very little light, from history or tradition, upon the conception formed by our constitution-makers of the executive office which they created. It has been asserted, with great show of reason, that they did not know what they were making. The best suggestion we have in regard to their intention is in the assertion that they made the office to fit General Washington. Washington found that a great number of questions of detail arose in the office, in regard to which he was able to mould it according to his judgment of what was expedient. He established certain precedents. Jefferson rather ostentatiously overthrew many of the precedents which had been established, and others have followed his example, both in overthrowing precedents and introducing innovations. There has, therefore, been no steady tradition moulding the office, as there was no close definition to control it from the outset.

It seems, however, that the theory of the presidential office in the minds of the constitution-makers was substantially as follows: They took the view of the English constitution which was held by the Whigs during the first half of the last century. They assumed that the chief executive might have, and ought to have, certain prerogatives. If he were a king, he might be incompetent to exercise these prerogatives, or might abuse them. If he were an elected officer of a republic, he would, of course, be selected for his competency, and he would only hold power for a limited period, and by a defeasible tenure, so that abuse would be guarded against. Here there were two points of detail—the chief executive could only be named by an election, and he must hold office only for a limited period. In

regard to the election, it is obvious that the constitution-makers never intended to provide for a grand democratic mass vote, in the nature of a *plébiscite*. They feared intrigue if the election were committed to Congress, and they thought that a great mass vote (if they ever conceived of such a thing) would be unwieldy and unsuitable. The election was to be by States, by an assembly of notables in some respects analogous to Congress, yet guarded against intrigue by the provision that they were to meet only in their separate States. Viewed upon the surface, this might seem to be a very ingenious and satisfactory system. In fact, we know that the history of this device has only illustrated the futility of all such devices. The device has only served to offer the material on which the social, political, and economic forces at work in our society—what we might call the genius of the nation—has wrought itself to accomplish its own ends. We have no unwritten laws. We do not rely on tradition, precedent, and prescription; but some “unwritten laws” have been developed over and around this electoral machinery, for the purpose of wresting it into a thoroughly democratic shape, which are the most inexorable laws of our political order. The political and social sanctions of those laws are so strong and sure that no one will break them.

As to the period of the presidential office, the constitution-makers were hedged in between the difficulty of putting an end to a bad administration within its term, on the one side, and the disadvantage of frequent elections, on the other. In providing for a four years' term, with re-eligibility, they seemed to have hit upon a wise and moderate solution of the problem.

In experience it has been necessary once to amend and reconstruct the machinery of presidential elections, and there has scarcely been a time when some amendment has not been pending in Congress which proposed to do away with the electoral college, to blot out the States as organs in the election, to shorten or lengthen the term, or to do away with re-eligibility, to say nothing of propositions to entirely alter the character of the office. These propositions (except the last class) have been serious, and have received attention as something more than the vagaries of political speculators or the whims of discontented persons. We know that there has been enough in our

experience of the working of the plan to call for modification and improvement, if only public opinion could crystallize into the conviction that certain specific modifications are called for. I am not concerned in the present paper to express my opinion of the propositions which have been made; but it is worth while, in passing, to remember that, according to all experience, it is better for political institutions to be simple and direct, and that, however one might disapprove of the theory of selecting the chief executive by a great mass vote, if we are to have that arrangement in fact and effect, it is better to have it openly and plainly than covertly and by indirection.

In fact, then, the intention of the constitution-makers has gone for very little in the historical development of the presidency. The office has been moulded by the tastes and faiths of the people, and it interests us now to note what has been made of it. The most interesting and important question which can be raised in regard to the theory of this high office, as it has existed in history, is whether the President is the head of the nation or the head of the party. Many Presidents have shown a desire to construe the office in the former sense. Any man who reaches the presidential chair, no matter by what means, and no matter what may be the calibre of the man, is sure to feel a noble desire to make a record for statesmanlike success of a high order. His position is historical. He is sure of a place of some sort in the annals of the nation. He would be a strange man who did not care to make this place an honorable one. The position has about it also elements of grandeur, romance, and sentiment which cannot fail of effect on most men. If a man has any good stuff in him, such an office must appear to him a great chance and a great responsibility, and it must inspire a desire to be worthy. All this expands the conception of the office beyond that of a party leader, even of a prime minister. I think we all hold a conception of the office, according to which it is more, altho we cannot tell how much more, than the leadership of a party. The minority party are not out of the nation. They are not without rights and interests which are under the national protection, and in regard to which the President is the organ and representative of the nation. There are also often public functions which involve no party questions, in regard to



which unanimity is essential to propriety, and where the party leader cannot act with the proper effect because he brings party animities and hostilities with him in spite of himself. In England it is often necessary in such cases for the prime minister to confer with the leader of the opposition. We have no analogous arrangement. In social matters the same difficulty presents itself. Something of social leadership seems to belong to the presidential office. The ornamental or dignity element is reduced to its lowest terms, but something of it remains. This element, however, belongs to the civil head of the nation, not to a party leader. These points are of small importance compared with a wide and statesmanlike view of policy, which would seem to belong to the presidential office, if the President is anything more than a party leader. We can understand the position of a constitutional king who holds aloof from parties, or uses an independent position to moderate excesses, and we can understand the position of a prime minister who leads a party and enforces a policy; but an American President, if he tries to be more than the prime minister and less than the king—if he tries to moderate, soothe, and arbitrate instead of leading and fighting—assumes a most ambiguous and difficult duty. Many Presidents have tried it. No President has ever succeeded in it. Some have fallen between two stools; others have been condemned as traitors to their party, and have passed into history under unjust and contemptuous condemnation; others, after a short trial, have surrendered to party control. Washington had the best opportunity of trying the “head-of-the-nation” theory. He was, in a certain sense, bound to try it, and he did so; but he was a conspicuous example of falling between two lines of policy and failing of both. A President who has no party must try to carry on the government without a party, and that is plainly impossible.

At this writing, an administration is drawing to a close which no doubt enjoys, in the opinion of the great mass of the people, the judgment of being a clean, respectable, and satisfactory administration. If it had not been so, what points of attack it would have offered to an opposition outraged by its defective title! Yet this administration is hated and despised by the politicians. It is, therefore, weak. It has an air of Philistine

goodness and imbecility. It will enjoy no honor or credit in history. It resembles that of John Quincy Adams in many respects, and is inferior to it in some respects, but it will probably rest under much the same unjust misapprehension and contempt. In fact, Mr. Hayes' administration could not have carried us through any period of political struggle. It probably benefited by having to deal with an opposition Congress.

All the tendency has been to make the President the leader of a party, or perhaps, more strictly, the standard-bearer of a party who goes where the leaders direct him. \* If he does this, he has a peaceful, smooth, and prosperous path. He finds also a consistent position, which he and others can understand. He puts himself in a position which has a moral basis in the character and relation of political institutions.

So soon as we have reached this point, we see what a presidential election is, and how the whole of our political life centres around these periodical conflicts. Ambition, love of power, civil emolument, and greed of gain have been the great moving forces in politics under all forms of government. It is a childish hope to expect that "republics" are to be free of greed and vanity. They only have their own forms of greed and vanity to deal with. Political power and civil emolument, under our republican system, depend either on elections or on patronage, and if elected officers exercise the patronage the two are combined. The patronage becomes the force which moves the political machinery, of which elections are the central and most important part. Patronage is power to him who wields it, and emolument to him who receives it. The action and reaction are therefore equal, and the circuit is complete. The scattered forces concentrate in the election on an effort to elevate a certain candidate to power. On that candidate's power are centred all the hopes of all his supporters. From him, again, streams out to them the gratifications of greed and vanity which consolidate their ranks for the continually recurring struggle.

The presidency is the centre of party organization and the crown of party effort, because it is the greatest organ in the vast political organism of the country. State and city politics are interwoven with it. The federal officers manipulate the local politics in order to prepare strength for the presidential elec-

tion, success in which will perpetuate the same corps of federal officers. The patronage therefore reaches behind the Congressmen also, and they must either control it or be controlled by it. It becomes the power by which the President urges a policy on Congress, or a power by which the Senate coerces the President. It becomes the bond between the executive and the legislature, which the Constitution very mistakenly endeavored to sunder and to put into an affected attitude of indifference and independence towards each other.

What follows from this is that the presidential elections are conflicts renewed every four years to see which of two sets shall have possession of the organism described. The system of electing the chief executive of the nation every four years, and the abuse of the civil service to stimulate political work and to reward political work, are interdependent, and are inextricably interwoven with each other. As far as I can judge from conversation with experienced politicians, it is because they know that, in fact and practice, what is called the abuse of the civil-service is just as essential to the system of elections as steam is to the locomotive, that they cannot understand what the civil-service reformers are talking about. I am so far in accord with the politicians that I do not see how the civil service is to be reformed so long as the chief executive office is put up to be struggled for every four years. It is a very significant fact, as pointing to a true connection in nature and adaptedness between the system of party republican government and party abuse of the civil service, that the French are being led by the logic of their new institutions to methods of party proscription in their civil service.

I have said that the presidency is not bound about by any firm traditions. It is crude and unformed in many respects. The century which has elapsed has not sufficed to establish any firm grooves for it. Hence it is anomalous in many of its details, and it includes inconsistent principles and relations. The firm developments which have been forced upon it have lain in the direction of its partisan value and efficiency. In regard to that, a steady sequence through all administrations of all parties may be traced. In no respect has the steady partisan development been more remarkable than in the presidential elections. In

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we must have hung upon the slow returns from California for enough margin to establish the election. What controversy and chicane might we not have seen renewed? The blunder in Indiana by which the Republicans lost a vote also shows on what contingencies a close election might turn. It is to be noted that whenever a contested election occurs, it will not turn upon the vote of an old State, where methods are sure, communication rapid and open, evidence plentiful, etc.; but on some frontier State, where returns come in slowly, methods are loose, and technical questions, on which there are two good sides, are plentiful. The fourth presidential election ever held issued in a contested election. Fortunately the seat of government had just been removed to Washington. If it had still been in Philadelphia, the mob of that city would probably have settled the question. In 1876 we escaped by a *coup d'état* from another contest. It is living in a fool's paradise for a free self-governing people to go on from one election to another, congratulating themselves that they have escaped the peril again this time, but taking no steps to avert a political calamity of which we have had two warnings, and which is the greatest that can happen to us. Why is it anything but a question of time when we shall have another contested election?

Any one who will look back at the history of our presidential elections will see by what steady strides the art of electing Presidents has been perfected. Each new election has seen more comprehensive and more pertinacious generalship. Every part in the machinery of the campaign has a history. The conventions, the committees, the platforms, the campaign fund, the stump-speaking, the campaign literature, the campaign songs and singing, the torch-light processions, the semi-military clubs, the banners, and the mud-machines, have each a history of its own. Each organ or engine of campaign work has been developed by itself; and as each in higher perfection co-operates with all the rest in each succeeding campaign, and as each is employed on either side, the expenditure of energy is greater at every election, and the struggle is made more and more intense. Every one of these organs of the campaign bears upon the purpose of perfecting organization, stimulating interest, and concentrating force upon the party victory; that is, upon elevating to power him

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political institutions must be tested is, whether they attain the result with the least possible expense, annoyance, and loss. Is there not an unnecessary expense, annoyance, and loss, for the end accomplished, in holding a presidential election every four years? How shall we be better off in April, 1881, for getting Mr. Hayes out of the presidency and Mr. Garfield into it? We had Mr. Hayes, and were going on satisfactorily. There was no agitating question before us. Agitation was settling down. Every one was contented except the office-seekers. What was gained by the expense, annoyance, excitement, etc., of 1880?

There is now noticeable, I think, in the public mind, a growing terror of presidential elections. Before the late election it was said, on both sides, that a candidate was wanted who would take the office if he was elected to it. Here was a new conception of the presidential office on the part of those who made this remark, and here was also a menace to the peace of the country in the contingency (which was contemplated in the remark) of a disputed election. With the easy optimism which characterizes our politics, this remark and all its significance have been forgotten; but there are other instances. In one of the best speeches made during the campaign, it was argued, in conclusion, that voters in New York should vote for Garfield because, if New York gave its vote to him, he would be elected without possibility of dispute; whereas, if it voted for Hancock, there might be room for a disputed election. A great newspaper also said, a few days after the election, and no doubt with truth, that the people were greatly relieved to be free from the danger of a contested election. What view of the election was involved in this argument and this remark? Certainly the election was not regarded as the free and untrammelled selection of a chief magistrate, nor as a smooth and harmless means of carrying on the government. It was regarded as a peril. The controlling motives in regard to it were to reduce it or avoid it, and to get out of it as easily as possible.

That there is this feeling of peril, since 1876, is indisputable. As New York voted for Garfield, there was no dispute in 1880. If New York had voted for Hancock, he would have had just the requisite number of votes, leaving out California. His vote must, however, have included Nevada, a frontier, doubtful State, and

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primitive agricultural societies, such as existed here a century ago, it was not difficult to hold these elections. Each State was to vote by and for itself, on different days, in different ways, giving its voice for the executive head of the confederation in such way as it saw fit. There was not then facility of transportation or communication. Life was simple and dull. The mild excitement of a presidential election was pleasant and beneficial. The excitement was not to be compared with that of such an election held simultaneously by ten million voters, with such facilities of communication that the whole nation is wrought up to a common pulsation. The case is far different now, both as regards the excitement and as regards the community which has to endure it. We are now a great nation, with complex and varied interests. The presidential election throws an artificial and injurious excitement athwart all the industrial and other permanent interests of the country. This must be more and more the case as time goes on, and as our society is bound together by the finer fibres which only grow as a nation gets older and more settled. Everything about a presidential election tends to stimulate excitement, to cloud reason, to breed delusions, and to betray good sense. It is held on one day only, and the same day throughout the country. It is concentrated on the election of one of two men—not of a Congress. It is foreseen for a definite period, and prepared for by regular means. It is, therefore, a great disturbance to the country, and it comes about every four years whether there is any real political crisis or not. No doubt the “outs” are fully ready after four years to try again whether they cannot get in, but peaceful and industrious citizens need have little interest in this effort if there is no important question of administration to be put to the decision of the nation.

The mere fact of the campaign and election is a hindrance and injury to business. A business scare is sure to be the accompaniment of every presidential election hereafter. It has a basis of truth in the facts already stated, and it is such a valuable piece of capital to the “ins,” who can always trace it to fear of a change, that it is sure not to be neglected. We must, of course, get ourselves governed, and we must do it by the methods of self-government; but the question by which all

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from whom, if in power, bounty may be expected by the party in question. No institutions have been invented whose purpose is to make sure of getting a competent statesman into the presidency, or to secure a direct and simple verdict by the voters upon the administration, or to draw out public opinion on any measure. The institutions which had that purpose have perished, or have been distorted to suit the other purpose. In short, the life-principle in the presidential election is the desire for power and emolument, and this controlling force has crushed everything else or absorbed everything else. The most serious questions and the most important measures are treated only as means to the great end. Here we have the reason why elections fail of the educating influence which is alleged in their defence. It is open to every one's observation that documents, speeches, and arguments have little effect. Tradition is strong in their favor, but the political managers begrudge the cost of them. Drill and spectacular effect nowadays play a far more important part in the election. The education the election exerts is education in the art of elections, in the tactics of party management, in shrewd and cynical dealing with the weaknesses of human nature, and not in the principles of self-government or the knowledge of public questions. I allege in proof of this the fact that the principles of self-government and the tactics of party warfare are continually confused with each other in the press and on the stump. Party platforms represent the sacrifice of public questions to party interest. In theory, they are statements of party dogmas and convictions. In practice, they have become proverbs for empty phrases and Janus-faced propositions. A model platform is one in which two contradictory propositions are combined in the same sentence, or a non-proposition is so stated that each man may read there just what will suit his own notions.

The student of political institutions knows that they never go backward. He must look in the future for advance along the lines marked out by the past. The Chicago convention of 1880 was certainly a very refined and highly developed specimen of the national nominating convention. The history of that convention is most instructive, but it is now almost forgotten. As soon as the candidates were named, the convention dissolved,

and was as speedily forgotten as the broken shell from which the fowl has emerged. It is a mistake, however, to forget it too soon. The congratulations that "the machine was smashed," with which some of us welcomed the members of the convention home, were too hasty. The triumvirate of "bosses" failed there because, altho their scheme was carefully and skilfully prepared, they had not secured the national committee. The defeat which was inflicted on them was one of those costly victories which educate the enemy, point out his errors, and enable him to ensure victory the next time. The next triumvirate of bosses will have the national committee.

The developments in the use of money from campaign to campaign are a subject deserving treatment by itself, if any one who could command the necessary information would at the same time study the matter. There are three different matters embraced under this head :

1. The increasing need for money drives the party in power to political assessments. From the politician's stand-point, these assessments are logical and proper. The office-holders should contribute to support the party which put them in place and will keep them there. The election, in this point of view, is the occasion of a periodical tax, or toll, or fine, levied on the office-holder. We have here a specific abuse of the civil service, one which is indefensible, easily defined and reached, and therefore a good object upon which to exercise the initial measures of reform. The fire and movement of the campaign, however, are sure to overthrow this reform. The fears of the office-holder coincide with the interests and desires of the party managers to break over such feeble resistance as the reform has been able to accumulate.

2. The use of money for elaborate campaign artifices and machinery reaches sums which no one seems able to guess at. I have not been able to form any conjecture about it which is worth anything. It is certain only that it amounts to millions, and that it is almost a pure waste of capital. One phenomenon which has become very familiar in some of the States has not yet appeared on the federal arena: that is, the man of wealth and political ambition who is ready to spend a large sum to win the presidency. I think that if any one will estimate the cost

of paying all the expenses of all the delegates to a nominating convention, he will be astonished at the smallness of the sum.

3. The illegitimate use of money in the presidential election is something which is known to everybody, but which we agree to ignore and to pass over with certain conventional phrases. It is difficult, of course, to get at facts or to justify general assertions. A correspondent of the *Nation* of November 18th seems to have been quite close to the facts, and to have been very much shocked by them. In view of what we all know, and what any two of us in private conversation will agree upon, it is rather amusing to read the newspaper comments on bribery in other countries. There have recently been some great scandals of this sort in England, which have furnished the text for thanksgivings that we are not as other men are. It is forgotten that these scandals are brought to light by a public investigation whose object is to reach and correct the abuse. Such an investigation amongst us would be considered very "unpractical."

Presidential elections are chargeable with many of the worst errors and mishaps in our history. I have already alluded to the contested election of 1800, which put the newly formed Union to a very severe strain. If there had been no presidential election in 1812, there would have been no second war with England. The tariffs of 1816, 1824, 1828, and 1832 resulted from the bidding of the two parties, in the election years, for the support of the protectionists. The protectionists tricked both parties, and voted for either as they chose, because both voted for protection. In this way the protective policy was fastened on the country in spite of the interest of the nation, and the early set of the people to freedom in trade as well as to every other kind of freedom. The election of 1836 caused the distribution of the surplus revenue in that year. Neither party dared resist a mischievous measure which seemed to contain elements of popularity. Presidential intrigues cost us the war with Mexico, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the civil war in Kansas. Presidential intrigues wrought up the sectional misunderstanding until "Yankees" and "Southerners" formed legendary and fabulous notions of each other. It was on account of the importance of the Southern vote to all presidential aspirants that the Southern

“arrogance” and the Northern “truckling” were developed. The politicians found their account in stimulating sectional pride and animosity until a presidential election became the occasion of the civil war. Presidential intrigues in Johnson’s administration frustrated the most peaceful and promising efforts at reconstruction, and brought about the carpet-bag era with tyranny on one side and Kuklux outrages on the other. In 1876 we had a very narrow escape from another civil war. The fact that we put up the office of highest power and dignity every four years to be contended for in an election contest has been the controlling fact in our political history. The question how and by whom to get that office filled has been constantly present, and it has superseded all other questions. Time and labor have been exhausted in the constantly renewed necessity for getting the office filled, and we have not been able to profit by its functions for any length of time before the toil and annoyance of choosing a new man to fill it have recommenced. The time of Congress has always been largely taken up with President-making, especially in the last session before the election. Between the bickerings over the last election and preparations for the next one, sometimes almost the whole four years have slipped away. Matters of urgent importance must be postponed until after the election. Measures of doubtful expediency must be pushed through to make capital for the election. Measures which were right and expedient might not be brought forward lest they should be troublesome in the election. These delays, makeshifts, and concessions, however, have all passed into the life of the nation and become part of its history. Every such political incident—the thing done or the thing undone—combines with others, produces consequences, affects public opinion, forms a precedent, strengthens or weakens a tradition, and influences the habits of thought of the people. No political incident stands alone. No incident can be brought about temporarily and then set aside. It remains in its consequences and effects, whatever may be done to revoke it. Witness the educational effect of the early tariff laws; the present feeling and prejudice of the people about a national bank; the long struggle which was necessary before “distribution” schemes were finally brought to rest; the secondary effects of violating the compromise tariff;



the real effect of the Dred Scott decision, regarded as a political manœuvre; and the effects of the legal-tender law, passed to meet a temporary necessity. The principle of continuity and propagation has applied fully to all the presidential intrigues which have played so large a part in our history. It is difficult to conceive how different our history would have been if we had had some way of filling the chief executive place without periodical elections.

Presidential elections must also be charged with corrupting the public men of the country. Presidential ambition has been the bane of our public men. Very few of the first-rate ones have escaped the infection of this ambition, and, within the last forty years, it has rioted amongst the third, fifth, and tenth rate ones. As one of the last said some time ago, when he was rallied upon his "chances": "I do not see why the lightning may not strike me as well as any other man." Presidential ambition has forced those who were afflicted by it to do what they would not do, and leave undone what they would do, if they took counsel only of reason and conscience. One after another of them has belittled himself before the nation by his inability to conceal disappointment and chagrin. The eagerness for this honor, on the part of public men, can easily be understood; but it has been a moral disease amongst our statesmen. To offset this evil, we have the proud boast that any American may be President. Do we not pay too dearly for this bit of claptrap? How many of us want to be President? How many of us would surrender our reversion in the office if we could only be sure that no American could become President unless he were fit and competent?

Presidential elections corrupt local politics. State and city politics enjoy favorable chances in the "off-years," as they have come to be designated. The federal office-holder then sometimes relaxes his interference. On the approach of a presidential election, however, everything else has to bend to the organization and labor of the campaign. It is not simply because all persons who are in any degree "in politics" find their interest all absorbed, so that they cannot attend, with free minds, to anything else, but the selection of local officers suffers directly. Local offices are used as makeweights or bonuses with which to win

strength in the great contest, and the momentum of the presidential election carries into many subordinate and local offices party candidates who would at another time have failed because they could not have drawn out the party vote.

Presidential elections act upon timid reforms and newly planted improvements as a storm acts on sprouting plants. The election of 1880 has destroyed all that had been accomplished of civil-service reform during Mr. Hayes' administration. It is said that Mr. Hayes has done very little. In fact, when we consider the nature and difficulty of the task, he has done a great deal. He has not been supported as he deserved in what he has done. Those who believed in the reform and desired it were bound to understand the difficulty of it, to welcome little beginnings towards it, to take what they could get and nurse it carefully in hopes of more, to appreciate the President's efforts, and to support and encourage him. They have, on the contrary, taken the position of spectators and critics. The beginnings of reform seemed to me hopeful. They were such as might grow if they had time, peace, and toleration. The recurrence of the election has crushed them out. The employés have been assessed, the office-holders have managed the campaign, the rules have been broken over, and we are back again at the beginning, only worse off than before, because the reform has become ridiculous. Now, in politics, when a thing becomes ridiculous before it is widely or fairly understood, it suffers great harm.

The case here stated in regard to civil-service reform illustrates a general tendency. When the election period comes around again, there is a tendency to fall back into the old ruts. Serious issues are excluded so far as possible, since, of course, the parties can be held together more easily, and the election can be managed with less trouble, if old issues are maintained and old methods retained. The considerations which would have great weight in time of peace, and in the undisturbed flow of affairs, seem to be of inferior importance, and one is ready to sacrifice them when an exciting campaign has wrought one up to the point of believing that the main thing "now" is to elect our man. The way free trade was treated by its republican friends during the last campaign was a conspicuous illustration of this. The election acts, therefore, as a blight upon strug-

gling reforms, and as a hindrance to important political measures.

So far, now, I have noticed the difficulties, dangers, and evils incident to the election of the chief executive by a popular vote in periods of only four years. The abuses of the civil service and the obstacles to reform in it seem to be in close and organic connection with this system of providing for the filling of the chief executive office. If the civil service should be reformed as the "reformers" want to see it reformed, presidential elections, and indeed local elections also, would cease to be what they are now. Note what proportion of the voters will take the trouble to vote on a constitutional amendment which may be of the very first importance. If the personal element were reduced, as it would be reduced by the contemplated reform, elections would lose their heat, agitation, noise, and expense, and would be far more sober, rational, and fruitful. On the other hand, if the elections should be made less frequent, the civil service would be reformed to a great extent, simply as a consequence. The workers and office-seekers would either lose or forget their trade, and they could not hold out through a long period of delay and hope. Which of the two branches of the evil, the too frequent elections or the abuse of the civil service, may be the best point of attack is yet to be considered. It is evident that for new States out of Europe the republican form of government is to prevail in the future. A monarchy is for us, for a hundred reasons, out of the question. The republican form of government is, however, yet new, crude, and unformed. This is especially true of our own government. For instance, the present session of Congress opens with a hot party fight on a question about the respective functions of Congress and the Vice-President in counting the electoral votes. Centuries perhaps must elapse before precedent, habit, and experience shall have made our system smooth and easy, and shall have so defined its separate organs, and their spheres of activity, that they may act upon each other without friction. We are fettered, as yet, by the traditions of monarchy and by youthful deference to foreign models. We lack the independent energy to deal with our own problems according to the genius of our institutions.

Republican, or presidential, government is weak in two respects. It lacks stability and it lacks elasticity. The continuity of national life is more or less broken at every change of administration, and it is distinctly broken by every change of party. The unity and continuity of the nation need to be not only represented, but sustained and defended against the conception that the majority or the major party are the nation. The more democratic the institutions are, the greater is the need of just this guarantee against an abuse of democracy. Political changes should be brought about by political institutions just when the occasion for them arises, and at no other time. This is what is meant by elasticity or flexibility. When officers are elected for a set period, elections must recur whether there is any political crisis or not, whether there is any real occasion to appeal to the country or not. The perfection of republican institutions will call for improvements or new devices to introduce greater stability with greater flexibility. As we have seen above, any gain in this direction will be a gain also in civil-service reform.

Most students of statecraft turn from our institutions to English institutions for guidance in the way of modification. English institutions have the smooth, steady, frictionless action which is in strongest contrast with our harsh and grinding system. The executive has two organs—the ornamental of dignity organ, which supports the unity and continuity of the nation, and the working organ, which carries on self-government under party organization. The latter organ is designated by the play of institutions upon each other which amounts to a kind of natural selection. The man is elected by nobody, but he is set in evidence by the action of parliamentary and official life during a long period. Every one knows who it ought to be, perhaps even to the sole possible individual, or, at most, within a possibility of two or three. One of these it must be. It can be no one else. This is very beautiful and very captivating, as it is managed in England by men whose social and political training combine to make them moderate and careful to observe “the limits.” It does not work well, however, in the English colonies. They are far too frequently in the throes of a cabinet crisis. They have governors appointed from England to carry

the dignity part of the executive, an officer for whom we could find no parallel. I have never been able to see how we could graft any part of the English system on ours without entirely giving up ours and adopting theirs.

The French experience with a republican form of government is full of instruction. They have had three Presidents, who have each adopted a different theory of the presidential office in regard to the point I have discussed above: viz., whether the President is to be like a Constitutional King or like a Prime Minister. M. Thiers construed his office as if he had been a minister. He attended the legislature and defended his own policy. MacMahon was elected for a definite term of seven years. He did not attend the legislature. He had a parliamentary ministry. Nevertheless he had opinions of his own, and he tried to bring them to bear on the administration of affairs. The consequence was that he was obliged to resign, in spite of his set term of office, before it had expired. M. Grévy seems to have assumed the neutral rôle of a constitutional sovereign who reigns but does not govern. He enjoys peace, but is scarcely mentioned in the administration. This series of experiments only confirms political theory and also our American experience. A prime minister is a functionary whose moral basis is consistent, harmonious, and well rounded. A constitutional king is another functionary who has a true moral basis in facts and nature. The former is a party leader. He conducts self-government by party. The latter's first duty is to be out of and above party. A *tertium quid*, something between these two and partaking of both, is an impossibility. It has no true moral relations, and it will gravitate either towards a constitutional monarch, as the French presidency has done, or towards a party leader and working ruler, as the American presidency has done.

The legislatures of modern times are the real depositaries of the power and will of the State. The centre of gravity of our system tends all the time to settle more firmly in the House of Representatives. Such a tendency is revolutionary as regards the existing constitution; that is, it tends to entirely reconstruct it. It is an interesting subject for speculation whether our House of Representatives would not gain dignity and be cured



of many of its worst faults if it had the power it is always reaching after, and had also the responsibility which must go with the power. That it will win more and more power by virtue of the very fact that it has the most and strongest independent elements of strength in its popular constituency and its power over money, seems most probable. When it really has power, will it submit to the opposition of the executive to a thing on which it has resolutely determined? I think not. All precedent and analogy shows that it will not. How long it may take for the development which has been indicated to work itself out I do not pretend to foresee. It seemed to me that the collision of the Democratic House with the Republican Senate, and then with the Republican President, and the use of "riders" on the appropriation bill, were premonitions of a struggle in which, in the end, the House, if it had a strong majority and a good support in public opinion on the point in question, was sure to win. If, then, this change should be brought about, the presidency would become more of an ornamental office; its power would be lessened; the chiefs of departments would become a true cabinet; the President might, without any reason to the contrary, be elected for a much longer term; it would no longer make any difference if he had no qualities not possessed by respectable mediocrity, and the functions of the political worker would lose importance. This proposition might equally well be stated in another form: We can lengthen the term of the presidential office if we strip it of the most important powers which it now possesses to control legislation, and we can then solve the problem of civil-service reform.

To sum up: We have found that the corruption of the civil service is an historical product of the forces at work in American political life, under the conditions set by American political institutions. It is not an artificial product. No one brought it about. It was in no program. It is a growth. Its origin and its law are to be sought in facts of human nature, and of the political order, together with historical conditions. It follows that no artificial remedies will correct the abuses of the civil service unless they are such as reach to the remolding of political institutions. The elective system as employed by us, especially the system by which the President is elected, is the institution most in

question. It follows also that the prejudice of those who do not want any change either of spirit or form in political institutions, and who regard civil-service reform as something foreign and hostile to their favorite political dogmas and methods, is well founded. It follows, finally, that the dogmas referred to are false and the methods are mischievous, and that the corrections here and the reform of the civil service must go hand in hand.

WILLIAM G. SUMNER.



